



Reactance versus Rationalization: Divergent Responses to Policies that Constrain Freedom

Journal:	<i>Psychological Science</i>
Manuscript ID:	PSCI-11-1182.R2
Manuscript Type:	Research article
Date Submitted by the Author:	20-Aug-2011
Complete List of Authors:	Laurin, Kristin Kay, Aaron; Duke University Fitzsimons, Gavan
Keywords:	Judgment, Motivation

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Review Only

Reactance versus Rationalization: Divergent Responses to Policies that Constrain Freedom

Kristin Laurin

Aaron Kay & Gavan Fitzsimons

University of Waterloo

Duke University

Running head: REACTANCE VERSUS RATIONALIZATION

Key words: Reactance, rationalization, restricted freedom

Abstract

1
2
3
4
5
6 How do people respond to government policies and work environments that place
7
8 restrictions on their personal freedoms? The psychological literature offers two contradictory
9
10 answers to this question; here we attempt to resolve this apparent discrepancy. Specifically, we
11
12 identify the absoluteness of a restriction as one factor that determines how people respond to it.
13
14 Across two studies, participants responded to absolute restrictions (restrictions that were sure to
15
16 come into effect) with *rationalization*: they viewed the restrictions more favorably, and valued
17
18 the restricted freedoms less, compared to control participants. Participants responded in the
19
20 opposite way to identical restrictions that were described as non-absolute (as having a small
21
22 chance of not coming into effect): these participants displayed reactance, viewing the restrictions
23
24 less favorably, and valuing the restricted freedoms more, compared to control participants. We
25
26 end by discussing future directions, as well as practical applications..
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 *God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the*
4 *wisdom to know the difference*
5 *-Serenity prayer*
6
7
8
9

10 Imagine the government announced a ban on smoking, Google declared employees could
11 not make personal calls at work, or the National Hockey League banned fighting. How would
12 smokers, Google employees, and NHL athletes, respectively, react to these sudden restrictions on
13 their freedoms?
14
15
16
17

18
19 Two established literatures offer opposite answers. One suggests that when freedoms are
20 restricted, people engage in cognitive processes that serve to cast the restriction in its most
21 positive light – a tendency we refer to as *rationalization* (Aronson, 1973/1989; Elster, 1983;
22 Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002). The other suggests people will instead react against new
23 restrictions, enhancing the value of the restricted freedom – a tendency we refer to as *reactance*
24 (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm 1981).
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 Here, we attempt to reconcile these apparently contradictory literatures and identify one
34 factor, *absoluteness*, that may determine which of the two processes is most likely to occur in
35 any specific instance. When restrictions are absolute, people should be more likely to engage in
36 rationalization than reactance. However, when restrictions are instead non-absolute, the opposite
37 should occur: people should be more likely to engage in reactance than rationalization.
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 *Rationalization and reactance*

46
47 The term rationalization refers to a range of psychological processes, all designed to
48 make a specific target appear more palatable to the rationalizer. For example, cognitive
49 dissonance research suggests that people will go to great lengths to maintain a view of their
50 behavior as consistent with their preferences, often by enhancing the perceived desirability of an
51 already committed decision or action (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957). Likewise, System
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Justification Theory proposes that people are motivated to enhance the legitimacy of the system
4 within which they operate (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004); viewing their given status quo as the
5 way things *should* be (Kay et al, 2009). This stream of research suggests that restricted freedoms
6 – or any new circumstances, for that matter – will most likely be met with rationalization.
7
8 Although NHL hockey players may greatly value fighting, this stream of research suggests they
9 would actually rationalize a ban on fighting.
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18 A separate body of research, however, proposes a completely opposite response to
19 restricted freedom. Reactance theory suggests that people are motivated to restore restricted
20 freedoms, and respond negatively to others' attempts to constrain them (Brehm, 1966; 1989;
21 Wicklund, 1974). In a seminal study, participants rated a record as much more desirable if they
22 learned that they could not choose to receive it as a gift (Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban,
23 1966; see also Chartrand, Dalton, & Fitzsimons, 2007; Snibbe & Markus, 2005). This stream of
24 research suggests that restricted freedoms are met with backlash; according to it, hockey players
25 would lash out against a ban on fighting, exaggerating the value they attach to this practice.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36 *Absoluteness*

37
38
39 These two contradictory sets of findings have coexisted in the social psychological
40 literature for decades. Here we propose and test a possible resolution that revolves around the
41 construct of absoluteness. An *absolute* restriction is complete, certain and permanent; for
42 example, a new law that definitively bans all seniors from driving. A *non-absolute* restriction is
43 incomplete, uncertain or temporally limited; for example, the ban on seniors driving would be
44 non-absolute if it allowed some seniors to continue driving, was slated to come into effect
45 pending approval, was difficult to enforce, or was in danger of being repealed by its opponents.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 We test the hypothesis that people respond to absolute restrictions with rationalization and to
4 non-absolute restrictions with reactance.
5
6

7
8 The rationalization and reactance literatures are consistent with this proposed moderator.
9
10 Most rationalization research involves events that have already happened, or will definitely
11 happen – that is, most rationalization research concerns absolute restrictions. In cognitive
12 dissonance research, participants typically rationalize an action that they have already committed
13 and cannot change. System justification theory proposes that people rationalize persistent
14 features of the social economic and political status quos (e.g., racial and gender inequalities),
15 which most people likely perceive as relatively permanent and unchangeable (see also Laurin,
16 Shepherd, & Kay, 2010).
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 In contrast, a survey of the reactance literature reveals that little of it, if any, concerns
28 absolute restrictions. Participants who have their freedom restricted when choosing a record can
29 go out and purchase the record elsewhere. People exposed to coercive health messages, which
30 typically produce reactance (Silvia, 2005), can effectively resist these attempts to constrain their
31 beliefs and actions. Thus, we hypothesize that that participants will react against non-absolute
32 restrictions, but that absolute restrictions will lead to rationalization, the exact opposite reaction.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 Study 1

42
43 In Study 1, we measured attitudes toward a restriction on participants' driving rights. We
44 manipulated this restriction's absoluteness, and predicted that participants in the absolute
45 condition would rationalize, reporting more positive attitudes toward restrictions on driving
46 rights, compared to a control condition. In contrast, we predicted that participants in the non-
47 absolute condition would display reactance, reporting more negative attitudes toward restrictions
48 on driving rights, compared to a control condition.
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Our view of reactance and rationalization suggests that both are motivational processes
4 (see Kay et al., 2009; Wortman & Brehm, 1975), and as such should occur particularly for
5 restrictions viewed as relevant. People should feel no motivation to protect rights that they do not
6 exercise, nor to adapt to new restrictions that do not affect them. We therefore included a
7 measure of driving frequency, predicting that effects would emerge most strongly among
8 frequent drivers.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17 *Method*

18
19
20 *Participants.* Seventy-six undergraduates (61% female, $M_{age} = 19.3$ years) participated
21 online.
22
23

24
25 *Procedure.* Participants first read that experts had concluded that lower speed limits in
26 cities would improve safety. Participants in the control condition read no further information.
27 Participants in both experimental conditions then read that their government had decided to
28 reduce municipal speed limits. Participants in the absolute condition read that the legislation
29 would definitely come into effect. Participants in the non-absolute condition read that the
30 legislation would come into effect, assuming that a majority of government officials voted to
31 enact it, which they likely would (supporting information available online presents the text for
32 each condition in both studies).
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44 Participants used a seven-point scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *extremely*) to rate their support
45 for and annoyance with ($r = -.49$, $p < .001$) lowered municipal speed limits. We reverse scored
46 their annoyance ratings and created an averaged index of positive attitudes toward reduced speed
47 limits. Participants also reported how often they drove in the city, using a six-point scale (1 =
48 *never*, 6 = *several times per week*). This measure was unaffected by condition, $F(2, 74) < 1$, *ns*.
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 *Results*

56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 In the first step of a hierarchical linear regression, we found that more frequent drivers
4 reported marginally more negative attitudes toward reduced speed limits, $\beta = -.21$, $t(74) = 1.89$, p
5 = .06. Adding two dummy codes representing the three absoluteness conditions explained a
6 significant additional portion of the variance, $F_{change}(2, 72) = 6.23$, $p = .003$. Participants who
7 read about an absolute restriction rationalized it, reporting more positive attitudes toward
8 reduced speed limits compared to control participants, $\beta = .26$, $t(72) = 2.09$, $p = .04$. In contrast,
9 participants who read about a non-absolute restriction reacted against it, reporting more negative
10 attitudes compared to control participants, $\beta = -.18$, $t(72) = 1.95$, $p = .06$.

11
12 Finally, adding the terms representing the interaction between absoluteness and driving
13 frequency explained significantly more variance, $F_{change}(2, 70) = 4.57$, $p = .01$ (see Figure 1).
14 The effect of the absoluteness manipulations were driven by participants who drove frequently,
15 $\beta_{absolute\ vs.\ control} = .41$, $t(70) = 2.50$, $p = .02$; $\beta_{non-absolute\ vs.\ control} = -.40$, $t(70) = 2.36$, $p = .02$. Among
16 participants who drove infrequently, we observed neither reactance nor rationalization, both β s <
17 .12, both $ts < 1$, ns .

18
19 As predicted, participants rationalized a restriction on their freedom when it was absolute
20 but reacted against the very same restriction when it was non-absolute – that is, when it was not
21 yet set in stone. Importantly, this effect was also moderated by an indicator of motivational
22 involvement.

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

56
57 In Study 2, we sought to replicate our findings from Study 1 using a different restriction
58 and a conceptually different dependent measure. We also included two non-absolute conditions
59 that varied in their distance from absoluteness, in addition to the absolute and control conditions,
60 predicting that both non-absolute conditions would elicit reactance. Finally, we sought to address

1
2
3 an alternative interpretation of Study 1, where participants could have inferred different
4
5 normative information from the manipulations. Participants in the absolute condition could have
6
7 assumed that the legislation was objectively desirable, simply because it seemed to have
8
9 encountered no opposition. Similarly, participants in the non-absolute condition could have
10
11 assumed that the legislation was objectively less desirable, simply because we raised the
12
13 possibility that it could encounter opposition. Thus, the pattern of results we found could have
14
15 resulted from this purely inferential process.
16
17

18
19
20 Although this alternative explanation does not account for the interaction with self-
21
22 reported driving frequency, we sought to rule it out more convincingly in Study 2. We
23
24 manipulated whether the information our American participants read applied to America or to
25
26 India – i.e., whether the information was self-relevant or not – resulting in a 2 (self-relevant vs.
27
28 non-self-relevant) X 4 (absolute vs. non-absolute-very likely vs. non-absolute-somewhat likely
29
30 vs. control) between-subjects design. This design yielded four pairs of conditions where the non-
31
32 self-relevant condition acted as a control condition for its self-relevant counterpart, with
33
34 normative information held constant across the pair. Comparing self-relevant and non-self-
35
36 relevant conditions that do not differ in terms of normative information, therefore, provides an
37
38 even stronger test of our motivational hypothesis.
39
40
41
42

43 *Method*

44
45
46 *Participants.* 258 American residents (63% female, $M_{age} = 33.8$ years) participated
47
48 online.
49

50
51 *Procedure.* Participants read materials similar to those used in Study 1, except that
52
53 instead of municipal speed limits they referred to the dangers of using a cell phone while driving,
54
55 and a government plan to ban this practice (absolute and non-absolute conditions only). For half
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 the participants, the information was relevant to India; for the other half it was relevant to
4
5 America. Two non-absolute conditions differed in the stated likelihood of government officials
6
7 voting against the legislation: quite small (non-absolute-very likely condition) vs. reasonable
8
9 (non-absolute-somewhat likely condition).
10
11

12
13 Participants used a seven-point scale (1 = *not at all* to 7 = *extremely*) to rate how
14
15 important it was to them to use a cell phone while driving and how bothered they would be if
16
17 they were unable to do so ($r = .88, p < .001$); we averaged these items into an index of positive
18
19 attitudes toward cell phone use while driving.
20
21

22 *Results*

23
24 A 2 (self-relevant vs. non-self-relevant) X 4 (absolute vs. non-absolute/very likely vs.
25
26 non-absolute/somewhat likely vs. control) between-subjects ANOVA yielded a significant
27
28 interaction, $F(3, 250) = 8.24, p < .001$ (see Figure 2). Participants who read about an absolute
29
30 restriction rationalized it, reporting more *negative* attitudes toward cell phone use while driving
31
32 if they thought the restriction was self-relevant than if they thought it was non-self-relevant, $F(3,$
33
34 $250) = 10.92, p < .001$. In contrast, participants who read about a non-absolute restriction reacted
35
36 against it, reporting more *positive* attitudes toward cell phone use while driving if they thought it
37
38 was self-relevant than if they thought it was non-self-relevant, whether this non-absolute
39
40 restriction was very likely, $F(3, 250) = 4.45, p = .005$, or somewhat likely, $F(3, 250) = 4.62, p =$
41
42 $.004$. Participants who read no information about the restriction's likelihood reported similar
43
44 attitudes whether they thought the restriction was self-relevant or not, $F(3, 250) < 1, ns$.
45
46
47
48
49

50
51 Analyzed differently, the absoluteness manipulations affected attitudes in the self-
52
53 relevant conditions, $F(3, 250) = 7.26, p < .001$, but not the non-self-relevant conditions, $F(3,$
54
55 $250) = 1.70, p = .17$. In the self-relevant conditions, participants who read about an absolute ban
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 on cell phone use while driving reported more negative attitudes toward cell phone use while
4 driving, relative to control participants, $F(3, 250) = 3.55, p = .02$. Participants who read about
5 non-absolute bans reported more positive attitudes than control participants, whether the ban
6 they read about was very likely, $F(3, 250) = 2.77, p = .04$, or somewhat likely, $F(3, 250) = 5.46,$
7 $p = .001$. Participants in the two non-absolute conditions reported similar attitudes, $F(3, 250) < 1,$
8 ns .

9
10 Thus, Study 2 replicated and extended findings from Study 1, while ruling out an
11 alternative explanation by keeping normative information constant across experimental and
12 control conditions. Participants who read about a restriction that would absolutely apply to them
13 rationalized it: they *downplayed* the importance of the restricted freedom. Participants who read
14 about a restriction that would likely, but not absolutely, apply to them reacted against it: they
15 *enhanced* the importance of the restricted freedom. Importantly, neither of these effects occurred
16 when the restriction was situated in a context (India) that would not impact the participants.

34 General Discussion

35
36 We have illustrated people's divergent reactions to different types of restrictions. When a
37 restriction is definitive, they respond positively to it and minimize the importance they attach to
38 the restricted freedom. In contrast, when there is a chance – even a slim one – that the restriction
39 will not come into effect, people respond negatively to it and exaggerate the importance they
40 attach to the restricted freedom. Both effects occurred specifically for self-relevant restrictions,
41 suggesting that both are driven by motivational, rather than inferential, processes. These studies,
42 therefore, help reconcile two seemingly opposing literatures – theories of rationalization and
43 reactance – by identifying one factor that determines which process is most likely to occur.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 The complete story, however, is probably more nuanced than what we have demonstrated
4
5 in these two studies. Some restrictions, even when absolute, might be too sudden or abhorrent to
6
7 elicit rationalization. Imagine if the American government announced today that all marriages
8
9 would henceforth be arranged by the state. Also, *perceptions* of absoluteness may matter much
10
11 more than objective features of restrictions. Some individuals might perceive the most
12
13 objectively absolute of restrictions as non-absolute or vice-versa
14
15

16
17 These findings also have diverse practical applications, potentially shedding some light
18
19 on the uprisings currently spreading throughout the Middle-East. To the extent that a political
20
21 regime feels absolute and permanent to its citizens, people will rationalize its actions and
22
23 decisions. But once they learn that similar regimes have been toppled, and are therefore not as
24
25 absolute as they once thought, people may become reactant, and find themselves closer to
26
27 experiencing the fury and dissatisfaction required to motivate a revolution. Consistent with this
28
29 perspective, prominent theories of collective action have emphasized the role of perceived
30
31 cognitive alternatives to current social arrangements in motivating social change (e.g., Tajfel &
32
33 Taylor, 1986).
34
35
36
37

38
39 The two studies presented here help clarify the seemingly opposing predictions derived
40
41 from theories of reactance versus rationalization. Rather than arguing for or against one of these
42
43 two theories, we have demonstrated conditions under which each will be most likely to emerge.
44
45 In so doing, this research advances our understanding of the psychological processes involved,
46
47 and should also prove useful in the wide range of domains that rely on accurately predicting how
48
49 people will respond to attempts to restrict their behavior.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

References

- 1
2
3
4
5
6 Aronson, E. (1989). The rationalizing animal. In H. J. Leavitt, L. R. Pondy, & D. M. Boje (Eds.),
7
8 *Readings in managerial psychology* (4th ed., pp. 134-144). Chicago: University of
9
10 Chicago Press. (Original work published in 1973).
11
12
13 Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (2001). *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*.
14
15 Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
16
17
18 Bartley, W. W. (1990). *The retreat to commitment*. NY: Knopf.
19
20 Brehm, J. W. (1956). Post-decision changes in desirability of alternatives. *Journal of Abnormal*
21
22 *and Social Psychology*, 52, 384-389.
23
24
25 Brehm, J. W. (1966). *A theory of psychological reactance*. NY: Academic Press.
26
27
28 Brehm, J. W. (1989). Psychological reactance: Theory and applications. *Advances in Consumer*
29
30 *Research*, 16, 72-75.
31
32 Brehm, J. W., & Brehm, S. S. (1981). *Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and control*.
33
34 NY: Academic Press.
35
36
37 Brehm, J. W., Stires, L. K., Sensnig, J., & Shaban, J. (1966). The attractiveness of an eliminated
38
39 choice alternative. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2, 301-313.
40
41
42 Chartrand, T. L., Dalton, A. N., & Fitzsimons, G. J. (2007). Nonconscious relationship reactance:
43
44 When significant others prime opposing goals. *Journal of Experimental Social*
45
46 *Psychology*, 43, 719-726.
47
48
49 Cooper, J. (2007). *Cognitive dissonance: 50 years of a classic theory*. London: Sage publications
50
51
52 Elster, J. (1983). *Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge
53
54 University Press.
55
56
57 Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
58
59
60

- 1
2
3 Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. (1998). Immune
4 neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. *Journal of Personality and*
5
6 *Social Psychology, 75*, 617-638.
7
8
9
10 Jonas, E., Graupmann, V., Kayser, D. N., Zanna, M. P., Traut-Mattausch, E., & Frey, D. (2009).
11 Culture, self, and the emergence of reactance: Is there a “universal” freedom? *Journal of*
12
13 *Experimental Social Psychology, 45*, 1068-1080.
14
15
16
17 Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory:
18 Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo.
19
20
21 *Political Psychology, 25*, 881-919.
22
23
24 Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Peach, J. M., Friesen, J., Laurin, K., Zanna, M. P., & Spencer, S. J.
25
26 (2009). Inequality, discrimination, and the power of the status quo: Direct evidence for a
27
28 motivation to view what is as what should be. *Journal of Personality and Social*
29
30 *Psychology, 97*, 421-434.
31
32
33
34 Kay, A., Jimenez, M.C., & Jost, J.T. (2002). Sour grapes, sweet lemons, and the anticipatory
35
36 rationalization of the status quo. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28*, 1300-
37
38 1312.
39
40
41 Laurin, K., Shepherd, S., & Kay, A. C. (2010). Restricted emigration, system inescapability, and
42
43 defense of the status quo: System-justifying consequences of restricted exit opportunities.
44
45
46 *Psychological Science, 21*, 1075-1082.
47
48
49 Niebuhr, R. (1986). *The essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected essays and addresses* (R. M.
50
51 Brown, Ed.). NY: Vail-Ballou Press.
52
53 Silvia, P. J. (2005). Deflecting reactance: The role of similarity in increasing compliance and
54
55 reducing resistance. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27*, 277-284.
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Snibbe, A. C., & Markus, H. R. (2005). You can't always get what you want: Educational
4 attainment, agency, and choice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 703-
5
6 720.
7
8
9

10 Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In S.
11 Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (2nd ed., pp. 7-24).
12
13 Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
14
15
16

17 van der Toorn, J., Tyler, T. R., & Jost, J. T. (2011). More than fair: Outcome dependence, system
18 justification, and the perceived legitimacy of authority figures. *Journal of Experimental*
19
20 *Social Psychology*, 47, 127=138.
21
22
23


24 Wortman, C. B., & Brehm, J. W. (1975). Responses to uncontrollable outcomes: An integration
25 of reactance theory and the learned helplessness model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) *Advances*
26
27 *in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 8, pp. 236-277). CA: Academic Press.
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Figure Captions

1
2
3
4
5
6 *Figure 1:* Attitudes toward a reduction in municipal speed limits among participants who expect
7
8 this restriction to occur absolutely, participants who expect this restriction to occur non-
9
10 absolutely, and participants with no expectations, as function of driving frequency (Study
11
12 1).

13
14
15 *Figure 2:* Attitudes toward using cell phones among participants whose expectations that this
16
17 freedom will be restricted are absolute, non-absolute, or non-existent (self-relevant and
18
19 non-self-relevant conditions; Study 2).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60


Figure 1.



Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Figure 2.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

View Only