

Who Belongs in Managed Care? Using Premium Policy to Achieve an Efficient Assignment in Medicare

Jacob Glazer
Tel Aviv University
Boston University

Thomas G. McGuire
Harvard Medical School

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Abstract

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1 Introduction

Beneficiaries in Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly and disabled, choose between two major options: traditional Medicare and a set of private health insurance plans, including managed care plans, offered under Medicare Part C. Part C has suffered severe criticism since its inception more than twenty five years ago, and remains very controversial. Nonetheless, Part C, currently known as Medicare Advantage, is the main hope for modernizing Medicare through introduction of the cost and quality management techniques common in private health insurance. Most research on the economics of Medicare Advantage (*MA*) focuses on the supply prices Medicare pays to *MA* plans. Many papers study the rules by which Medicare pays plans, including the risk adjustment of plan payments, and their effect on plan behavior. Demand prices paid by Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in *MA* plans receive much less attention.

At present, the *MA* plan chooses the premium beneficiaries pay to join an *MA* plan (subject to Medicare regulation), and this premium is the same for low and high-demand beneficiaries. *MA* plans can thus employ the classic and powerful selection device identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976): low premiums attract those with a low demand for health care. We consider whether instead of allowing plans to set premiums, Medicare should set the *MA* plan premium. If Medicare sets beneficiary premiums for both *TM* and *MA*, it can do so conditioned on some beneficiary characteristics. Turning to supply prices, Medicare now conditions its plan payments on certain demand factors, but not others. By risk adjustment Medicare pays plans more for beneficiaries who use more health care because of factors related to measured health status.¹ Demand for health care is also related to nonhealth factors, such as income or wealth, which are not part of risk adjustment.² These

¹Medicare risk adjusts payments to *MA* plans using Diagnostic Cost Groups which measure health status based on diagnoses on hospital claims from the previous year. See Pope et al. (2004).

²Cross-sectional studies generally report a positive income elasticity of demand that is less than one. The

demand-related factors can, however, be part of premium policy. This paper shows that pairing health status based plan payments by Medicare with beneficiary premiums adjusted for other demand factors can radically improve the performance of Medicare Part C.

1.1 An Illustration of the Problem

Presently, beneficiaries pay a Part B premium set nationally by Medicare to join *TM*, and *MA* plans set a premium charged to beneficiaries to join the plan. The underlying economic idea of the *MA* plan premium is that if the *MA* plan can provide coverage for a lower cost, it can pass this on to beneficiaries through a low premium and attract those willing to switch; or, if the *MA* plan provides extra services beneficiaries value, it can charge for this in a higher premium. These perspectives are insufficient when the issue is efficient sorting of beneficiaries between insurance options. A theme in the analysis in this paper is that when *TM* sets a single premium for all beneficiaries and the *MA* plan sets a single premium for all beneficiaries, sorting by beneficiary choice will not in general be efficient.

Table 1 illustrates this with a very simple example of two beneficiaries. The table shows the cost and value to Smith and Miller of two health plans we label *MA* and *TM*. *MA* is less expensive/lower value. For efficiency, we want Smith to be in *MA* and Miller to be in *TM*. Consider now how sorting works when each plan has a premium. Normalize the premium charged for *MA* at zero. Consider now various premiums for *TM*. Assume Smith and Miller choose the plan that maximizes value less premium they pay. For both people, the net private value for *MA* is 5. For Smith the value of *TM* less premium is $12 - P_{TM}$, and for Miller it is $9 - P_{TM}$, where P_{TM} is the premium charged for *TM*. The problem is that there is no P_{TM} that leads Smith to choose *MA* and Miller to choose *TM*.³

Rand Health Insurance Experiment, for example, found income elasticities of between .1 and .2. (Newhouse et al., 1993). Studies using longitudinal variation in income find much larger elasticities, generally classifying health care as a “luxury good” with income elasticities exceeding 1.0. See Fogel (2008).

³To get Smith in *MA* $P_{TM} > 7$; to get Miller in *TM*, $P_{TM} < 4$.

Table 1

No Premiums Sort Smith and Miller Efficiently

	Plans			
	<i>MA</i>		<i>TM</i>	
	Cost	Value	Cost	Value
Smith	0	5	10	12
Miller	0	5	2	9

The problem stems from the fact that cost, not just value, differs between the two people. This is a general feature of health insurance markets that needs to be taken account of by Medicare as it decides payment policy for Medicare Part C.

1.2 Plan of Paper

After presenting institutional background on Medicare and the *MA* program in Section 2, Section 3 sets out our model of Medicare. Beneficiaries vary in their demand for health care according to health status and a nonhealth status factor, “income.” *TM* and *MA* allocate health care spending in different ways. *TM* accommodates demand (from lower health status or higher income) but creates the familiar moral hazard inefficiency. *MA* rations care by health status but does not recognize income-related preferences. Section 4 characterizes the efficient assignment of beneficiaries to *MA* and *TM* in light of the way care is rationed in the two forms of health insurance. The welfare framework we apply is the conventional one in economics, maximizing consumer benefits less social costs. An “assignment” refers to a division of beneficiaries between *MA* and *TM*. The efficient assignment looks quite different than we see at present. Under current policies, healthy, low-income beneficiaries tend towards *MA* while the sick and higher income groups stay in *TM*.⁴ We argue that an efficient assignment avoids the *TM*-associated moral hazard costs for the high-demand groups, not the

⁴Low-income beneficiaries also eligible for Medicaid (dual-eligibles) pay no premium for *TM* and face little *TM* cost sharing. These low-income beneficiaries are almost all in *TM*.

low-demand ones. The efficient assignment we describe has the high-income groups in *MA* and the low-income groups in *TM*.

Section 5 contains a series of results about the role of the premiums beneficiaries pay in implementing an efficient assignment in Medicare. First, we show that given all beneficiaries pay the same for *TM*, no policy in which all beneficiaries pay the same for joining *MA* can achieve an efficient allocation. Interestingly, risk adjustment of plan payments cannot fix this problem. Also, this result is robust to whether Medicare or the plan sets the premium. Second, an efficient allocation can be attained if Medicare fixes a single premium for *MA*, and sets an income-related premium for joining *TM*.⁵ Third, even if Medicare sets an income-related premium for *TM*, if Medicare allows the *MA* plans to set the premium, plans do not supply the efficient level of care.

Health status risk-adjusted Medicare payments to *MA* plans are required to achieve efficiency, though risk adjustment in direct proportion to health-status based demand (conventional risk adjustment) is not part of the optimal mechanism. We show that a division of labor between Medicare plan payments conditioned on health status and beneficiary premiums conditioned on income can sort beneficiaries efficiently into *MA* and *TM* and achieve the (second-best) efficient allocation of health care, subject to the rationing rules characterizing *MA* and *TM*.

Section 6 considers several extensions of our analysis including how our conclusions would change with alternative welfare frameworks. We consider replacing demand with “need” as an objective, and replacing social costs with Medicare program spending. We also consider introduction of more demand heterogeneity and competition among *MA* plans. Section 7 briefly summarizes the paper and points to issues for further research. The main message of

⁵By 2009, Medicare phased in a small income-related premium for Part B, effectively equivalent to an income-related premium for *TM*. Higher premiums are expected to affect only 5 percent of beneficiaries. Part D also has income-related premiums. See CMS (2008). Beneficiaries also eligible for Medicaid pay no premium, introducing a second connection between income and premiums under current policy.

our paper is that Medicare should set premiums for both *MA* and *TM*, and that premium policy and plan payment policy should be considered jointly. An income-related premium policy by Medicare could lead to a fundamental realignment of the role of *MA* plans in the Medicare program, a realignment we argue in the next section is much needed.

2 Medicare and Medicare Advantage

2.1 Program Descriptions

At age 65, most Americans become eligible for Medicare.⁶ If beneficiaries do not elect an *MA* plan, they are automatically enrolled in Part A of Medicare at no cost to them. Part A is financed largely by a payroll tax shared by employees and employers (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). Part A covers inpatient hospital services, some post-hospital stays in nursing facilities and home health care, and hospice care, but requires considerable beneficiary cost sharing. Beneficiaries may also enroll in Part B, which covers doctors visits, other ambulatory services and some drugs at federally defined benefits. The Part B premium, \$96.40 per month for 2009, pays only about 25 percent of Medicare's cost of Part B, the balance being paid for by general revenues (KFF, 2008). The vast majority of beneficiaries in *TM* enroll in Part B. The Part B premium is deducted from the beneficiary's monthly Social Security check. Beneficiaries are also subject to cost sharing in Part B, including an annual deductible of \$135 in 2009, and 20 percent cost sharing on Medicare allowed charges. Since 2006, beneficiaries may join a Part D plan covering prescription drug costs. Part D plans receive about 75 percent of their federal revenue from general revenues, are offered by private insurers and vary in coverage. Part D premiums are set by a bidding procedure, and low-income beneficiaries receive a premium subsidy. Beneficiaries with Part A, and the optional Parts B and D, are in "traditional Medicare."

⁶Medicare also provides health insurance for qualified disabled beneficiaries below age 65. These beneficiaries may also choose to join the same *MA* plans on the same terms as the elderly beneficiaries.

Virtually all hospitals and practicing physicians participate in traditional Medicare, giving beneficiaries wide choice of providers. Medicare and its regional intermediaries make broad coverage decisions but do not interfere in physician and patient choice of treatment. Health care in *TM* has been criticized as being uncoordinated and costly (Newhouse, 2002). *TM* contends with cost issues by provider payment policy: Medicare payments to physicians and hospitals are lower than private plans on average (refs and specifics).⁷

Most beneficiaries in *TM* avoid cost sharing in Parts A and B via supplemental coverage.(refs) Medicaid pays cost sharing for eligible low-income beneficiaries. Some employers buy wrap-around coverage for retirees. Finally, most beneficiaries not in either of these groups buy “medigap” policies to cover some or all of the cost sharing.

The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) created *MA* to replace the short-lived Medicare + Choice (M+C) version of Part C. *MA* plans are private, must cover all Part A and B benefits, and may supplement these benefits by reduced cost sharing or coverage for additional services not part of *TM*, such as vision or dental care (Gold, 2008).⁸ *MA* plans may or may not include drug coverage. Those that do are referred to as MA-PD (i.e., “Prescription Drug”) plans.

The MMA created new plan types within *MA* and the higher payments mandated in the legislation awakened dormant plan types established earlier. We distinguish between what we consider to be bona fide managed care plans and others. We count Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), the oldest and largest plan type, and the mostly tightly managed, along with Preferred Provider (PPOs) and the small number of Provider-Sponsored

⁷In traditional Medicare, physicians are paid for each procedure according to a fee schedule. Hospitals are paid according to the diagnosis-related group (DRG) in which a patient is classified at discharge. The hospital payment system is partly “prospective,” embodies some incentives to the hospital to economize on resources during the hospital stay. For an overview of Medicare payment policies applying to physicians, hospitals and health plans, See Newhouse (2002).

⁸Gold and her colleagues at Mathematica Policy Research have tracked policy, enrollment, plan types and other data on Part C for a number of years in a useful series of publications.

Organizations (PSOs) as managed care. The other plan types, notably the Regional PPOs and Private Fee-for-Service (PFFS) plans, are not in this category.⁹ Our model of *MA* plan behavior laid out below applies to managed care plans only. 13.3 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were in bona fide managed care plans as of December 2007,¹⁰ with 3.8 percent in PFFS plans and the balance of beneficiaries in traditional Medicare.

The performance of Part C has been disappointing from the first, and remains so. The original intention of Part C was to allow Medicare to share in the cost savings achieved by managed care by paying plans at 95 percent of the expected cost in *TM*. Favorable selection into plans thwarted Medicare savings goals from the first.¹¹ Attempting to address the unfavorable impact of selection, M+C introduced more sophisticated risk adjustment of plan payments and limited increases in some plan payments. These changes drove plans from Part C. The number of contracting plans fell 50 percent under M+C, and as Gold et al. (2004) concluded, M+C was “widely viewed as a failure.” In response, the MMA raised payment rates. By buying its way out of trouble, Medicare has revitalized Part C but sacrificed any cost savings potential. Analyses by the Congressional Budget Office (Orszag, 2007) and MedPAC (Miller, 2007) report that Medicare pays about 15 percent more for beneficiaries in *MA* plans than for beneficiaries in *TM*. No wonder that *MA* falls in Washington’s cross hairs. Part C not only moves few beneficiaries into real managed care plans, it costs rather than saves Medicare money.

The recent increases in Medicare payments have expanded the supply of *MA* plans to beneficiaries, including those that live in rural areas. In 2008, every beneficiary could choose among multiple *MA* plans, though residents of many rural counties still had no offering of a bona fide managed care plan, largely because of the difficulty of assembling a network of

⁹Part C also includes Special Needs Plans (SNPs) intended for beneficiaries in long-term care.

¹⁰Gold (2008) p.20

¹¹Brown (1993) estimated that favorable selection cost Medicare 5.7% over *TM* costs, thus more than offsetting the efficiency discount Medicare was seeking.

providers in sparsely served areas.¹² The HMO form of *MA* plan serves the majority of *MA* enrollees, currently 70 percent, down from 84 percent in 1999. In absolute terms, the number of beneficiaries in HMOs is no higher than 1999, indicating that all the growth in *MA* enrollment since then has been in other plan types.

Some of the mechanics of *MA* are helpful to review before proceeding with our analysis. All beneficiaries in *MA* enroll in Part B. HMOs, generally set premiums below the Medicare Part B premium of \$96.40 beneficiaries pay in *TM*. The average HMO premium was \$24 per month in 2008, with 65% of HMOs setting a zero premium, the minimum possible under Medicare regulations.¹³ These plans also typically have reduced cost sharing and other additional coverage so that the average beneficiary electing these plans can expect lower health care payments and can avoid buying Medicare supplemental (Medigap) coverage.

MA costs rather than saves Medicare because of the way Medicare pays *MA* plans. Medicare payments to plans are based on a Medicare “benchmark” rate set for each county and the plan’s “bid.”¹⁴ The benchmark is based on the maximum of the CMS estimate of Medicare costs for a typical beneficiary in Parts A and B (CMS should have stopped here) and the past payment rate for the county trended forward at national average Medicare cost growth rates. These grandfathered rates pre-date the MMA and are in some cases much higher than estimates of current average cost. They are the first reason why payments to *MA* plans exceed expected *TM* costs. The second reason has to do with a “budget neutrality” adjustment. Until 2010, no plan can have its payment reduced by risk adjustment; risk adjustment only affects the magnitude of any increase. Medicare had to raise the average benchmark enough so that even the plan attracting the healthiest beneficiaries would not see a negative impact.

¹²For recent data on *MA* plans, see Gold (2009).

¹³The Part B premium is paid to Medicare whether a beneficiary joins an *MA* plan or elects Part B in *TM*. When an HMO or other *MA* plan reduces the premium to the beneficiary the plan in effect pays the premium to Medicare.

¹⁴Merlis (2007) is an excellent primer.

This is hard to believe, but, “Because of the budget neutrality adjustment, all of the county’s benchmarks for 2007 are above Medicare’s projected FFS costs.” (Merlis, 2007, page 7).

Medicare payments are also affected by the plan’s bid. A plan’s bid is intended to be an estimate of what regular benefits from Part A and B would cost the plan. It would be that, and, incidentally, a way to rescue Medicare from its benchmark rules, if economic incentives did not trump accounting principles. Incentives push plans to “bid” at least the benchmark. If the bid is above the benchmark, the plan is paid the benchmark. If the bid falls below the benchmark, Medicare pays the bid plus 75% of the benchmark-bid difference. The idea is that Medicare gets 25% of any “savings” (difference between benchmark and bid) and the plan must use the balance to reduce beneficiary premiums or provide additional coverage and benefits. The problem is that plans can increase their payment by increasing their bid up to the benchmark. In 2006, the average Plan bid was 99% of the benchmark, only slightly lower (97%) for HMOs, and above the benchmark for other types of plans. In essence, plans are paid very close to the benchmark.¹⁵ Any excess payments Medicare makes to *MA* plans is exacerbated by selection of low-cost beneficiaries into *MA*. As far as we know, patterns of selection in *MA* are yet to be studied.

2.2 Previous Research

Our paper is related to a literature in public finance concerned with the public provision of private goods. Health care is a private good financed collectively for reasons, among others, related to equity. In Besley and Coate (1991), rich and poor consumers demand a good that could be provided by government with an equal consumption requirement, or left to the market. Some redistribution to the poor can be achieved by providing a base level to everyone

¹⁵A bid close to the benchmark, indicating that the benchmark payment is needed to cover basic Medicare services, seems inconsistent with *MA* plan’s ability to buy down the premium and often additional services.

financed collectively by progressive taxes, and letting the rich opt out to the private system.¹⁶ Within a health care context, researchers study resource allocation in public systems, and how a private sector fringe affects public costs and efficiency (Barros and Olivella, 2005). Grassi and Ma (2008) analyze the interaction between a budget-constrained public health care system that allocates by rationing and a private sector that accommodates demand but may set prices. Consumers differ according to wealth and cost. Our paper shares with this literature consumers' option to leave the public sector-like rationing plan (our *MA* plan). In our analysis of Medicare, however, the alternative system, *TM*, is also publicly financed and subject to regulation.

A focus on the premiums paid by beneficiaries recalls Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) who recognized the premium as a powerful selection device. In a Medicare context, the emphasis in the literature has instead been on skimping on services as a tool for selection.¹⁷ A recent literature identifies which services among the many provided by a health plan are subject to the strongest incentive for a plan to use as a selection device. The premium charged by a plan can fit within the same framework as service-level selection. In Ellis and McGuire's (2007) terms, services that are predictable and predictive of total health care costs would be rationed tightly. The premium is perfectly predictable (and therefore a powerful selection device) but completely uncorrelated with total health care costs (because it is a constant). The service-level selection literature implies that the "service" of a dollar payment to join (negative premium) would be overprovided by profit-oriented plans seeking to attract low-cost enrollees.

There are two approaches in the literature to rationing in managed care, quantity setting (Pauly and Ramsey, 1999; Baumgartner, 1991) and shadow-prices (Keeler, Carter, Newhouse,

¹⁶Normative models of local public goods trade off production efficiencies and service of heterogeneity in tastes. Oates (1972) compares inefficiencies associated with higher or lower level of government provision of public goods.

¹⁷The early literature made overall cost comparisons between managed care and traditional Medicare. The more recent literature on service-level selection studies categories of expenditures. See Ellis and McGuire (2007) for review of some papers.

1998; Frank, Glazer and McGuire, 2000). The quantity-setting approach sees the plan as setting the level (or maximum level) of service available to members irrespective of their demand. The shadow-price approach emanates from a distinction between the bottom-line oriented plan financial leadership and the health-minded clinicians. The plan sets a budget for health care or components of health care, and clinicians ration their resources according to the health needs of the enrollees. In papers applying the shadow price approach to date, no distinction has been made between demand (benefits perceived by the enrollee) and value of services to the clinician doing the rationing. In our paper, where we introduce non health status factors affecting demand, this distinction becomes an important one.

Plan choice of benefits and premiums can serve beneficiary heterogeneity, as well as being a device for selection.¹⁸ The idea, as expressed by Pizer, Frakt and Feldman (2003) is “Beneficiaries who highly value certain benefits can search for a plan that offers those benefits and pay the marginal premium that corresponds to their choice”¹⁹ One can imagine Medicare risk-adjusted plan payments serving as a kind of voucher with premiums sorting beneficiaries by tastes for additional services. As our example in Table 1 shows, except in special circumstances, a premium does not sort beneficiaries efficiently. Town and Liu (2003), following methods proposed by Berry (1994), use market share and premium (price) data to estimate consumer surplus and profits associated with Part C plans during the 1990s, when

¹⁸Another use of the premium in the context of private health insurance is for an employer to recover some of the inframarginal surplus health insurance benefits confer on high-demand employees (Miller, 2005).

¹⁹In their empirical work, Pizer, Frakt and Feldman (2003) study the effect of off-cycle payment increases to Part C plans (called Medicare+Choice in 2000) to counter unanticipated declines in plan supply and beneficiary participation in Part C. Some plans were already “zero-premium” plans and could only pass on increased Medicare payments on to beneficiaries in the form of extra benefits. Plans with positive premiums could reduce premiums or add benefits. Data confirmed this. If, however, the benefit-premium tradeoff were being made efficiently in the first place, Medicare contribution increases should be passed fully on to the premium, with the minor qualification of income effects, which should be ignorable. Plans did, however, change benefits, not just premiums as payments increased. Gurol and Ellis (2004) note that in the presence of selection, the effect of a Medicare payment increase is more complicated, and the prediction on premiums and benefits is not so straightforward. They find that cross-sectional differences in Medicare payment rates are related to a mix of benefit changes and premium differences. See also Lustig (2008).

Part C rode the success of managed care throughout the US health insurance market, and plan and beneficiary participation was growing rapidly. They found that demand for HMO plans was inelastic to the premium, implying ample surplus to be divided between consumers and HMO plans. Beneficiaries had diverse tastes, but costs were assumed to be uniform, ruling out any selection issues by assumption.²⁰

Empirical research, including work on income elasticity of demand referred to earlier, confirms a role for non health status factors in demand. After adjusting for health status, there is an independent effect of income and other indicators of socioeconomic status on the likelihood that beneficiaries join an *MA* plan. Balsa, Cao and McGuire (2007) studied enrollment choices of 65+ Medicare beneficiaries not on Medicaid using five years of data from two sources, the National Health Interview Survey and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. Lower income groups, lower education groups and members of racial/ethnic minorities were more likely to join *MA*, after adjustment for self-assessed health status, the presence of a series of other health conditions, age, gender, and other factors. The Kaiser Family Foundation, with more recent data, report that *MA* enrollees are more likely to be poor (and report poor health) than beneficiaries in *TM* (KFF, 2008).

3 Beneficiaries and Their Health Plan Choices

3.1 Beneficiaries and Efficient Health Care

There are four types of beneficiaries, differentiated by health status and income. Beneficiaries can be healthy (*h*) or sick (*s*), poor (*p*) or rich (*r*). Type is unchanging and there is an equal

²⁰Town and Liu (2003) use the estimated elasticity and the premium price combined with profit maximization to back into an estimate of the marginal cost of a Medicare beneficiary in an HMO. This estimated marginal cost is substantially below the Medicare payment and the source of producer surplus in their estimates. The authors analyze the effect favorable selection into HMOs might have on their findings in some back-of-the-envelope calculations. While the results are highly sensitive to selection, particularly the impact on Medicare program costs, they argue that the research evidence does not lead to a conclusion that favorable selection could be strong enough to overturn their conclusions about net welfare gains in Part C during the 1990s.

number of each type.

We define $v_{ij}(x)$ to be the benefit of health spending x to a beneficiary with health status i , $i = h, s$, and income j , $j = p, r$. We assume $v'_{ij} > 0$, $v''_{ij} < 0$. The marginal benefit v'_{ij} can be interpreted as a demand function. We rank the demands of the healthy and sick, and poor and rich. Among those with the same income, we assume that for any price of health care, the demand by the sick exceeds the demand by the healthy; and, among those with the same health status, demand by the rich exceeds demand by the poor. Furthermore, we assume that at any price, the elasticity of demand for all groups is the same.²¹ (We do not assume elasticity is constant for all prices.)

These assumptions can be represented as:

$$v'_{hp}(x) = v'_{sp}(\gamma x) = v'_{hr}(\beta x) = v'_{sr}(\beta \gamma x), \quad (1)$$

for some $\gamma > 1$ and $\beta > 1$. If λ is a price or a shadow price used to ration care, then $x_{ij}(\lambda)$ is given by $v'_{ij}(x_{ij}(\lambda)) = \lambda$, for $i = h, s$ $j = p, r$. Following from (1), for all λ :

$$\begin{aligned} x_{ir}(\lambda) &= \beta x_{ip}(\lambda) \quad i = h, s \\ x_{sj}(\lambda) &= \gamma x_{hj}(\lambda) \quad j = p, r \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Demand by the rich is magnified by a factor β over the demand by the poor. Demand by the sick is magnified by a factor γ over demand by the healthy.

Medicare health insurance may require cost sharing and/or a premium to join. We refer to any beneficiary payment as t . Utility for each beneficiary type is then simply

$$u_{ij}(x_{ij}, t_{ij}) = v_{ij}(x_{ij}) - t_{ij} \quad (3)$$

²¹This assumption is stronger than we need. Our main conclusions require that the demand response to price for the rich exceeds that for the poor in absolute (not relative) terms. Equal elasticity ensures this, though it could still be true if the elasticity of demand by the poor exceeded that of the rich. For the poor to have an absolutely larger demand response, their demand elasticity would have to exceed that for the rich by a proportion approximated by how much more the rich consume than the poor at equal prices. Studies of demand response among income groups do not find differences in demand elasticity, and are thus consistent with the assumption we make. (Refs)

Total social welfare depends on the level of services to each type of beneficiary (not on any payments beneficiaries make). Benefits to all beneficiaries less cost is:²²

$$w(x) = \sum_i \sum_j v_{ij}(x_{ij}) - x_{ij} \quad i = s, h \quad j = p, r \quad (4)$$

where $x = \{x_{ij}\}$, a vector.

Maximizing $w(x)$ with respect to each of the x_{ij} yields the efficient (first-best) level of spending for each type, x_{ij}^* :

$$v'_{ij}(x_{ij}^*) = 1. \quad (5)$$

3.2 Rationing and Efficiency in Traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage

Beneficiaries have two alternatives for health insurance, Traditional Medicare (*TM*) and Medicare Advantage (*MA*). Each type of plan has a rationing rule which generates inefficiencies and which we regard to be fixed throughout this paper.

In *TM* we assume beneficiaries pay a fixed premium which we normalize to zero. Beneficiaries do pay a fixed cost sharing c , $0 < c < 1$, for each unit of x . Thus, in *TM*, $t_{ij} = cx_{ij}$. In *TM*, beneficiaries may choose x to maximize utility. For each type ij , the utility maximizing x_{ij}^{TM} solves the following demand equation:

$$v'_{ij}(x_{ij}^{TM}) = c \quad i = h, s \quad j = p, r \quad (6)$$

We assume that c is fixed throughout the analysis and, hence, a beneficiary's utility in *TM* is fixed and is equal to:

$$U_{ij}^{TM} = u_{ij}(x_{ij}^{TM}, cx_{ij}^{TM}) \quad i = h, s \quad j = p, r \quad (7)$$

Note that since $c < 1$, $x_{ij}^{TM} > x_{ij}^*$; all types use too much care in *TM*. An expression for the welfare loss for each type is:

$$L_{ij}^{TM} = \int_{x_{ij}^*}^{x_{ij}^{TM}} (1 - v'_{ij}(x)) dx = \int_c^1 (x_{ij}^{TM} - x_{ij}(\lambda)) d\lambda \quad i = h, s \quad j = p, r \quad (8)$$

²²The welfare framework (4) is based on utility. In health care an alternative approach is to consider resource allocation based on health care "need." We consider such an approach in Section 6.

From (2) and (8) we know:

$$L_{sr}^{TM} = \beta L_{sp}^{TM} = \gamma L_{hr}^{TM} = \gamma \beta L_{hp}^{TM} \quad (9)$$

In other words, we know the largest welfare loss is associated with the sick rich, and the lowest welfare loss with the healthy poor. Figure 1 depicts the inefficiency in TM for each group.

In MA beneficiaries pay a premium which we designate to be y_{ij}^{MA} . We assume there are no copayments in MA so $t_{ij}^{MA} = y_{ij}^{MA}$. In principle, y_{ij}^{MA} could differ among beneficiary types, and in principle, y_{ij}^{MA} could also be positive or negative. A negative y_{ij}^{MA} could be interpreted as a subsidy to join MA . In practice plans set a single premium, making y_{ij}^{MA} the same for all types.

In MA , beneficiaries do not choose their level of spending; the MA plan rations care. Our assumption is that clinicians in the MA plan ration a budget B according to health status (but not income). Let $I: \{h, s\} \times \{p, r\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an indicator function indicating whether type ij is in MA ($I(i, j) = 1$) or in TM ($I(i, j) = 0$). We will refer to the $I(i, j)$ as the assignment of beneficiaries to plans. Specifically, our assumption about MA plan rationing is that the care for each type, x_{ij}^{MA} , satisfies:

$$\sum_i \sum_j I(i, j) x_{ij}^{MA} = B \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x_{sj}^{MA} = \gamma x_{hj}^{MA}, \quad j = p, r \quad (10)$$

The budget B should be thought of as the total amount the plan allocates to treat patients. We allow for the plan to maximize profit which means that the plan's total revenue might exceed B . Equation (10) tells us that the doctors exhaust the budget, and sicker beneficiaries are allocated more spending than the rich by factor γ . Note that the poor and the rich of the same health type get the same spending in the MA plan. If there is only one health type in the plan, say the sick poor, (10) implies that the MA plan spends equally on all enrollees. If there is both healthy and sick in the plan, the sick get a γ proportion more spending than the healthy.

From (10), we can define what the sick and healthy get in the plan, independent of income:²³

$x_s = x_{sp}^{MA} = x_{sr}^{MA}$, and $x_h = x_{hp}^{MA} = x_{hr}^{MA}$. Utility for each type in MA is then

$$u_{ij}(x_i, y_{ij}^{MA}) \quad i = s, h, \quad j = p, r$$

We can make a number of observations about the efficiency of rationing in MA . First, if there is only a single type of beneficiary (e.g., the sick rich) in MA , the budget can be set so as to attain any x_{sr}^{MA} , including x_{sr}^* . Furthermore, from (1) and (10), MA rationing equates the marginal benefits of spending within income groups (i.e., across health status groups). An MA plan can thus be used to attain x_{sr}^* and x_{hr}^* for the sick rich and healthy rich, respectively, if only the rich were in the plan. By the same argument, an MA plan could be used to set x_{sp}^* and x_{hp}^* if only the poor were in the plan.

If two types with the same health status but different incomes are in the MA plan, the MA plan would give each income group the same spending. Since the rich value spending more than the poor, it is not, therefore, possible to efficiently serve both income groups. An expression for the welfare loss for any type and spending level in MA is:

$$L_{ij}^{MA}(x_i) = \int_{\min(x_{ij}^*, x_i)}^{\max(x_{ij}^*, x_i)} (|1 - v'_{ij}(x)|) dx \quad i = h, s \quad j = p, r \quad (11)$$

Figure 2 depicts the inefficiencies in MA in the case in which all four types are in the MA plan. The rationing rule (10) ensures that x_s is a certain proportion γ above x_h . Because all demands have equal elasticity, this is equivalent to assuming that rationing occurs as by a shadow price, λ , the level of which depends on the budget (and types enrolled). In Figure 2 we show the welfare loss in MA for the case where the poor get too much care in relation to their efficient level, and the rich get too little: $x_{sp}^* < x_s < x_{sr}^*$ and $x_{hp}^* < x_h < x_{hr}^*$.

²³Notice that, in principle, x_{ij}^{MA} is a function of B . We suppress the B to simplify the presentation.

4 Efficiency

As we have seen, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, both TM and MA have pluses and minuses. TM accommodates demand differences due to income as well as health status but provides too much care to everyone. MA can control moral hazard by rationing, but ignores income-driven differences in demand. In this section we consider how to assign beneficiaries to either TM or MA to minimize the efficiency losses depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Spending for each type in TM is determined by (6) and in MA by (10). The MA plan will also need to be given a budget to allocate among its members. The budget is implicitly determined in the problem we set out below. We will refer to an allocation as an assignment (a specification of which type of beneficiary is in each type of plan) and a spending amount for each beneficiary. An efficient allocation is one that minimizes the sum of the welfare losses.

An efficient allocation (x_h^0, x_s^0, I^0) is given by the solution to the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Min}_{(x_h, x_s, I)} \sum_{i=s, h} \sum_{j=p, r} (I(i, j) L_{ij}^{MA}(x_i) + (1 - I(i, j)) L_{ij}^{TM}) \\ \text{s.t. } x_s = \gamma x_h \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

Notice, that in the problem above x_i refers to the level of spending an individual with health status i will receive if he joins MA , and I refers to the assignment function.

There are only two possible solutions to the efficient allocation problem, characterized in Proposition 1.

Proposition 1: In an efficient allocation, either the rich are in MA and the poor are in TM , or, everyone is in MA .

Proof: Let (x_h^0, x_s^0, I^0) be an efficient allocation. The proposition follows from the following observations:

$$(a) \quad I^0(i, j) = 1 \text{ iff } L_{ij}^{MA}(x_i^0) \leq L_{ij}^{TM},$$

$$(b) I^0(h, j) = 1 \text{ iff } I^0(s, j) = 1,$$

$$(c) I^0(h, p) = 1 \text{ implies } I^0(h, r) = 1 \text{ and } I^0(s, r) = 1.$$

Part (a) follows trivially from the fact that the planner can always move types in and out of the MA plan, without affecting the levels of care x_h^0 and x_s^0 by adjusting the budget. If a type ij is added to (withdrawn from) the MA plan the budget is increased (decreased) by x_i^0 .²⁴

Part (b) follows from (a) above and the fact that

$$L_{sj}^{MA}(x_s) - L_{sj}^{TM} = \beta(L_{hj}^{MA}(x_h) - L_{hj}^{TM})$$

From (b), we know that if type hp is in MA it must also be that type sp is in MA . From (b) we also know that it cannot be the case hp and sp are in MA but only hr or only pr is in TM . Thus, to establish Part (c) it remains to be shown that it cannot be the case that only the poor (hp and sp) are in the MA plan (and the rich are in TM).

Notice that if only hp and sp are in MA , it must be that $x_i^0 = x_{ip}^*$ for $i = h, s$. In such a case the total welfare loss will be $L_{hr}^{TM} + L_{sr}^{TM}$. In such a case, however, welfare could be improved by assigning only types hr and sr to MA (and assigning hp and sp to TM) and allocating them the level of services $x_i^0 = x_{ir}^*$. In such a case the welfare loss will only be $L_{hp}^{TM} + L_{sp}^{TM}$, which must be smaller. ■

Corollary 1: There exists a $\beta^0 > 1$ such that if $\beta > \beta^0$, then in an efficient assignment the rich are in MA and the poor are in TM . If $\beta < \beta^0$, in an efficient assignment, everyone is in MA .

Proof: If the rich are in MA and the poor are in TM , the rich will get the efficient level of care and welfare loss will be:

²⁴For convenience, we assume that if $L_{ij}^{MA}(x_i^0) = L_{ij}^{TM}$ the individual is assigned to MA .

$$L^1 = L_{hp}^{TM} + L_{sp}^{TM} > 0$$

If everyone is in *MA* welfare loss will be

$$L^2 = \sum_{i=s,h} \sum_{j=p,r} L_{ij}^{MA}(x_i)$$

where x_i $i = s, h$ is the level of care that minimizes the welfare loss given that everyone is in *MA*.

Notice that L^1 is independent of β whereas $L^2 = 0$ when $\beta = 0$ and it increases with β . Thus for β small enough $L^2 < L^1$ and it is socially efficient to have everyone in *MA* whereas for β large enough $L^2 > L^1$ and it is socially efficient to have only the rich in *MA*. ■

Proposition 1 implies that an efficient assignment takes one of two forms: all types are in *MA*, or, only the rich are in *MA* with the poor in *TM*. Corollary 1 indicates that the form of efficient assignment depends on β , the parameter capturing how much different demand by the rich is from demand by the poor. If the demands of the rich and the poor are not very different (β is near one), there is little welfare loss from combining the rich and the poor in *MA*, and the efficient assignment will be everyone in *MA*. If the demands are very different (β is much greater than one), the rich and the poor demand very different health care spending for a given health status. An *MA* plan providing the same health care to both will create large welfare losses. In this case, the poor should not be in *MA*.

The interesting form of efficient assignment is when the one-size-fits-all resource allocation in *MA* does create a significant welfare loss, and only the rich should be in *MA*. Why the rich? The rich demand more health care than the poor and their welfare loss in *TM* is greater. Using *MA* to ration health care avoids more efficiency losses if the rationing is oriented to the rich. The healthy and sick (rich) can both be efficiently served in *MA* because the *MA* plan

respects health status differences in demand (though not income differences). Thus, the efficient allocation with only the rich in *MA* will have the rich sick and healthy getting their efficient health care spending, and the poor being served inefficiently in *TM*.

As we noted in our review of the performance of *MA*, it is in fact the poor that choose *MA*, not the rich. This is because Medicare's current policy sorts the low, not the high-demand groups, into *MA*.

5 Implementation

In this section we consider allocations that can be implemented with Medicare policy. For an allocation to be implementable it must be consistent with beneficiary and *MA* plan behavior. Beneficiaries choose between *MA* and *TM* to maximize utility. The *MA* plan must accept all beneficiaries who seek to join, but may choose the level of services to offer. We adopt the conventional assumption that the *MA* plan seeks to maximize profits. However, some results hold under other plan objectives, such as maximizing the number of enrollees subject to breaking even.

Our specific objective in this section is to identify the allocations that are implementable with various Medicare policies. We define Medicare policy to consist of a pair (r_{ij}, y_{ij}) $i = s, h$, $j = p, r$, indicating what Medicare pays to the *MA* plan and what premiums beneficiaries pay to join *MA*. Note that we are supposing that Medicare chooses *MA* plan premiums. In principle, Medicare payment and beneficiary premium could depend on both health status and income. We regard the premium beneficiaries pay as going directly to Medicare. If the premium is negative (a subsidy), this would be paid by Medicare to beneficiaries. We say that an allocation (x_h, x_s, I) is implementable by (r_{ij}, y_{ij}) if, given (r_{ij}, y_{ij}) , the plan chooses (x_h, x_s) and beneficiaries choose plans according to I .

The first policy we consider is current policy: Medicare pays plans according to health status, and all beneficiaries pay the same premium to join the *MA* plan. This policy cannot in general achieve an efficient allocation. Next, we consider an alteration of current policy in which Medicare continues to pay plans on the basis of health status, but charges beneficiaries a premium that can differ by income. This second policy enables Medicare to implement any efficient allocation.

There are obviously other forms of policy that could be considered. Conceivably, for example, Medicare could make a flat payment to plans for every beneficiary and then set a premium for each type that depends on both health status and income. Such a voucher-complete risk adjustment-subsidy scheme could achieve efficiency. We do not believe, however, that Medicare premium policy requiring beneficiaries to pay their own risk adjustment is interesting. We focus on policies with a division of labor between Medicare plan payments, that can be risk adjusted on health status but not income, and Medicare premium policy that can be adjusted on income but not health status.

5.1 The Fundamental Problem with a Single Premium

Current Medicare policy involves two elements. First, Medicare makes a health status (but not income) related risk adjusted payment to the plan for each enrollee, r_h for each healthy enrollee and r_s for each sick enrollee. Second, *MA* plans set the premium to be the same for all beneficiaries. In other words, $y_{ij} = \bar{y}$, $i = h, s$, $j = p, r$. This premium could be positive or negative.

In what follows we make the following assumption, which we will refer to as an assumption that “coverage in *TM* is sufficiently good:”

$$U_{hp}^{TM} - v_{hp}(x_{hp}^*) = \int_c^1 (x_{hp}(\lambda) - x_{hp}^*) d\lambda - cx_{hp}^* > 0$$

Under this assumption, if the premium the individual has to pay to join the MA plan is set at zero and the level of care at MA is set at the efficient level for type hp , the individual of this type will prefer TM over MA . One can easily see that the condition above holds for $c = 0$ and that it is violated at $c = 1$. Thus, we assume that the level of copayment is sufficiently low.

We can now make the following proposition which follows directly from utility maximization:

Proposition 2: Suppose coverage in TM is sufficiently good, $x_i^{MA} = x_{ir}^*$ and $y_{ij} = \bar{y}$ for $i = h, s$ and $j = p, r$. If type sr chooses MA , everyone chooses MA .

Proof: If type sr chooses MA it must be that

$$U_{sr}^{TM} - v_{sr}(x_{sr}^*) + \bar{y} < 0.$$

Notice that:

$$U_{sr}^{TM} - v_{sr}(x_{sr}^*) = \gamma\beta(U_{hp}^{TM} - v_{hp}(x_{hp}^*)) > U_{hp}^{TM} - v_{hp}(x_{hp}^*) > U_{hp}^{TM} - v_{hp}(x_{hr}^*).$$

Hence, if $U_{sr}^{TM} - v_{sr}(x_{sr}^*) + \bar{y} < 0$ it must be that $U_{hp}^{TM} - v_{hp}(x_{hr}^*) + \bar{y} < 0$, and type hp also chooses MA . In the same way it can be shown that the other types also choose MA . ■

Corollary 2 follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2:

Corollary 2: Suppose that coverage in TM is sufficiently good, then the only efficient allocation that can be achieved with a single premium policy is if everyone is in MA .

Our assumption about c ensures that TM is attractive enough to be a viable option to MA . Obviously, if c were very close to 1, TM would be a bad option for beneficiaries, even if it were free, and the question of dividing beneficiaries between TM and MA would not be interesting. In practice, c is low, near zero at the margin for Part A, and 20% for Part B. With a single premium for MA (which could be positive or negative), all types pay the same price to join MA . Proposition 2 states that if the highest demand type, the sick rich, prefers MA at this price, then every other type will prefer MA as well. This is because

higher-demand types give up relatively more leaving TM ; if the single price makes it worthwhile for the high-demand type to give up TM , it must also be worthwhile for a lower demand type.

Taken together, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 expose a fundamental problem of current policy. A single MA premium can implement an efficient assignment only in the uninteresting case in which all beneficiaries should be in MA . (Recall there is never an efficient assignment in which no beneficiary is in MA .) This would be easy to do: If we want everyone in MA , set a very large negative premium (subsidy) to join MA , large enough so that all types would rather be in MA . In the interesting case in which beneficiaries should be divided between MA and TM , a single premium can never achieve this assignment. Note that we have not specified in Proposition 2 how plans behave. This flaw in current policy therefore holds for any plan objective or any means of paying plans. It holds whether Medicare or plans decide on the single premium. Said another way, the flaw cannot be overcome by the way Medicare pays plans.

Proposition 2 may not hold if coverage in TM is not sufficiently good. For example, suppose c is very close to 1 and TM confers virtually no benefits to beneficiaries. Then one can readily see that if the poor and rich have quite different demands, a high-premium high benefit MA plan might attract the rich only, and thus might achieve an efficient allocation.

5.2 An Income-Based Premium Can Implement Any Efficient Allocation

We now consider Medicare payment policies that can implement an efficient allocation. Since implementation involves beneficiary and plan behavior, we must specify both the premiums beneficiaries pay, and the payments Medicare makes to the plans.

Proposition 3: Medicare policy of risk-adjusted payment to *MA* plans on the basis of health status paired with an income-adjusted premium to beneficiaries can implement any efficient allocation.

Implementing the efficient allocation when everyone is in *MA* is straightforward. We are concerned here with the case in which only the rich are in *MA*.

Proof: Let y_p denote the premium that types *hp* and *sp* pay and set

$$y_p \geq \text{Max}\{v_{hp}(x_{hr}^*) - U_{hp}^{TM}, v_{sp}(x_{sr}^*) - U_{sp}^{TM}\} \quad (13)$$

Let y_r denote the premium that both types *hr* and *sr* pay and set

$$y_r = v_{sr}(x_{sr}^*) - U_{sr}^{TM} < v_{hr}(x_{hr}^*) - U_{hr}^{TM} < 0 \quad (14)$$

The two inequalities above follow from the assumption that coverage in *TM* is sufficiently good.

Let r_h denote the risk adjusted payment the plan receives for each individual of either type *hr* or *hp* that joins the plan and set $r_h \leq \underline{x}$ where \underline{x} solves:

$$v_{hr}(\underline{x}) - y_r = U_{hr}^{TM}. \quad (15)$$

Notice that if $x_h^{MA} < \underline{x}$ type *hr* will choose *TM* when the premium he has to pay is y_r .

Let r_s denote the risk adjusted payment the plan receives for each individual of either type *sr* or *sp* that joins the plane and set

$$r_s = x_{hr}^* + x_{sr}^* - r_h. \quad (16)$$

(A special case of the risk adjustment payment scheme above is $r_h = 0$ and $r_s = x_{hr}^* + x_{sr}^*$).

Notice that under the premiums above if the plan provides the levels of services $x_h = x_{hr}^*$ and $x_s = x_{sr}^*$ both poor types *hp* and *sp* will prefer *TM* over the *MA* plan, whereas the rich types *hr* and *sr* will prefer to be in *MA*.

Furthermore, the profit maximizing plan will choose $x_h = x_{hr}^*$ and $x_s = x_{sr}^*$. If the plan chooses $x_h > x_{hr}^*$ (and, hence, $x_s > x_{sr}^*$), it will attract the rich types (and possibly also the poor) and lose money. If, on the other hand, the plan chooses $x_h < x_{hr}^*$ (and, hence, $x_s < x_{sr}^*$) it will attract (at most) the healthy types for which the risk adjusted payment is insufficient to cover the cost unless $x < r_h$. However, if $x \leq r_h \leq \underline{x}$ the individual will choose *TM*. ■

Premiums to beneficiaries must be set so that at the efficient allocation with only the rich in *MA*, the poor do not want to join *MA* but the rich do. Given the assumption that coverage in *TM* is sufficiently good, we know that $y_r < 0$. Furthermore using (14) [we can show that using transitivity of preferences for *MA* and *TM* across groups] $y_r < y_p$. In other words, the rich must be subsidized to join *MA*; the subsidy available to the poor must be less. The poor may possibly be charged a positive premium to keep them out of *MA*.

Proposition 3 also describes the risk adjusted payments that would implement the efficient allocation with just the rich in *MA*. Equation (17) ensures that the plan will break even if both the health and sick rich join. Payment for the healthy must be sufficiently low that the plan cannot cover cost for a level of services that will attract the rich health only. Equation (16) characterizes the level of spending on the rich healthy at which they are just indifferent between *TM* and *MA* at the premium they are charged for *MA*. The risk-adjusted payment for the rich can be no greater than this amount.

Some risk-adjustment is necessary to implement the efficient allocation. Paying the same for healthy and sick rich would allow the plan to reduce spending below the optimal, attract only the healthy and make profits. Notably, however, conventional risk adjustment,²⁵ with payment to the sick directly in proportion to their greater use, would not implement the

²⁵The term “conventional” risk adjustment refers to risk adjustment in proportion to expected spending, usually based on an empirical predictive model of health care costs. See Glazer and McGuire (2002) for discussion and contrast with “optimal” risk adjustment which is derived as a solution to a resource allocation problem. The analyses in the current paper are in the spirit of the optimal risk adjustment literature.

efficient allocation. More specifically, consider a Medicare risk adjustment policy where x_{hr}^* is paid for the healthy and x_{sr}^* is paid for the sick. This would obviously allow the plan to break even at the efficient level of service for the two types we want in the plan. The clinical spending rules at the plan would mean that if the plan spent its entire budget, the healthy and sick would get the efficient care. But would the plan choose to spend the whole budget? From (15), the rich sick are just indifferent to joining MA , but the rich healthy get a surplus at the premium for the rich. The MA plan being paid conventional risk adjustment could therefore spend a little less on health care for both types, attract only the rich healthy, and make a profit. This is why the risk adjustment formula must be set to make the healthy rich unprofitable if they alone join the plan. This Rothschild-Stiglitz type result parallels the literature on optimal risk adjustment which calls for “overpaying for the sick” (in order to encourage spending on services used by the sick).

5.3 Reinterpretation: An Income-Related Premium to Join TM

While the idea of charging the poor more than the rich to join MA seems odd, the income-related premium called for in Proposition 3 can be thought of in a different and more appealing way. Since the premium from (15) is likely to be negative, it can be thought of as a positive premium to join TM . In other words, suppose the MA plan were free (normalize the MA plan premium to zero, and charge beneficiaries to join TM). Set the premium for TM to the rich to be

$$y_{ir}^{TM} = U_{sr}^{TM} - v_{sr}(x_{sr}^*) \quad i = s, h. \quad (17)$$

Set the premium for TM for the poor

$$y_p^{TM} < \text{Min}\{U_{hp}^{TM} - v_{hp}(x_{hr}^*), U_{sp}^{TM} - v_{sp}(x_{sr}^*)\}. \quad (18)$$

At these premiums, the poor will be in TM and the rich will not pay the premium at TM and go to MA .

5.4 MA Plan Choosing A Premium Interferes with Efficiency

So far we have regarded premiums as being set and collected by Medicare. In what follows, we allow the *MA* plan to choose a premium. We show that in such a case, the plan will not choose the efficient level of care.

Let $y^{TM} = \{y_p^{TM}, y_r^{TM}\}$ denote the premium that Medicare charges for *TM* to beneficiaries with income $i = p, r$, and let $y^{MA} = \{y_p^{MA}, y_r^{MA}\}$ denote the premium that the *MA* plan charges a beneficiary with income i . Let $r = \{r_h, r_s\}$ denote the payment Medicare pays the plan for each individual with health status $j = h, s$ that joins the plan. The order of moves is as follows: First, Medicare announces y^{TM} and r . Next, the *MA* plan chooses $x = \{x_h, x_s\}$ (where, $x_s = \gamma x_h$) and announces y^{MA} . Finally, individuals observe y^{TM} , y^{MA} and x and decide whether to join *MA* or *TM*.

Proposition 4: If the *MA* plan chooses y^{MA} , it will not choose the socially efficient level of care.

Proof: Suppose that the socially efficient allocation is such that only the rich are in *MA*. In such a case, in order for the socially efficient allocation to be implemented, it must be that the *MA* plan attracts only the rich types and provides each type with the socially efficient level of care. If only the rich types are in *MA*, the plan's profit is $r_h + r_s + 2y_r^{MA} - x(1 + \gamma)$. The plan's choice of y_r^{MA} and x must satisfy:

$$\text{Max}_{\{y_r^{MA}, x\}} r_h + r_s + 2y_r^{MA} - x(1 + \gamma)$$

s.t.

$$v_{hr}(x) - y_r^{MA} \geq U_{hr}^{TM} - y_r^{TM}$$

$$v_{sr}(\gamma x) - y_r^{MA} \geq U_{sr}^{TM} - y_r^{TM}$$

By (15) we know that (at $\{x_{hr}^*, x_{sr}^*\}$) only the second constraint is binding and, hence, the first-order conditions imply:

$$2 + \lambda = 0$$

$$-(1 + \gamma) - \lambda \gamma v'_{sr}(\gamma x) = 0$$

where λ is the multiplier for the second constraint. Hence,

$$v'_{sr}(\gamma x) = \frac{1 + \gamma}{2\gamma} < 1 = v'_{sr}(x_{sr}^*)$$

which also implies

$$v'_{hr}(x) = \frac{1 + \gamma}{2\gamma} < 1 = v'_{hr}(x_{hr}^*)$$

Hence, the plan chooses a level of care higher than the socially efficient one both for the healthy and for the sick rich types. ■

The intuition for the result above is as follows: Suppose that the plan attracts only the rich and provides the socially efficient levels of care, x_{hr}^* and x_{sr}^* , and charges a premium y_r^{MA} . Notice, first, that setting y_r^{MA} to maximize profits implies that if the plan attracts both rich types, it must be that sr (weakly) prefers MA over TM and type hr strictly prefers MA over TM . Next observe that if the plan increases y_r^{MA} and x_s by ϵ and x_h by $\frac{\epsilon}{\gamma}$, and both the healthy and the sick rich types stay with the plan, the plan's profit will be increased by $\epsilon(2 - (1 + \frac{1}{\gamma}))$. Next observe that if at x_{sr}^* and y_r^{MA} , the individual of type sr prefers MA over TM , then, since $v'(x_{sr}^*) = 1$, if the plan increases both x_s and y_r^{MA} by ϵ , the individual of type sr will still prefer MA over TM . Furthermore, since at x_{hr}^* , type hr strictly prefers MA over TM , there is an ϵ small enough such that even if the premium is increased by ϵ and x_h is increased by $\frac{\epsilon}{\gamma}$ the individual of type hr will still prefer MA over TM . Thus, the plan can increase its profit by increasing the level of services beyond their socially efficient level and increasing the premium accordingly.

It should be mentioned here that even in the case where it is socially efficient for all types to be in MA , letting the plan charge a premium will result in the plan providing a level of

services beyond the socially desired one. The proof of this result is similar to the one provided above for the case where it is socially efficient for only the rich to be in *MA*.

6 Extensions

This section considers several extensions of the basic model of *MA* and *TM* presented so far. We address alternative welfare frameworks, heterogeneity in demand, and multiple *MA* plans and competition.

6.1 Alternative Welfare Frameworks

We have so far studied the effect of premium and payment policy on social welfare defined as benefits less social costs, where benefits are willingness to pay as governed by both health need and income, and costs are resource costs. This section considers alternative objectives: first, replacing willingness to pay with “need,” and second, replacing cost with Medicare spending.

A long tradition in health economics regards health care need as distinct from ability or willingness to pay (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). Many of the health care finance and delivery systems in Europe and elsewhere are designed around the “solidarity” principal implying that care should be financed according to ability to pay, but delivered according to need (Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000).

Our model separates the contributions of health status and “income” to demand.

Disregarding income-based preferences for health care for purposes of welfare implies setting $\beta = 1$ when expressing social costs and benefits, not distinguishing the benefits health care confers on the rich and poor while recognizing differences due to health status. The analysis of efficiency and implementation is very simple in this case. Everyone should be in *MA*. Rationing in *MA* responds to health status but not income, just what is called for in a need-based welfare analysis. Charging everyone a very high premium for *TM*, or simply

eliminating the option altogether, moves everyone in MA . Such analysis supports policy of broad-based national health service as in the United Kingdom, socialized universal insurance as in Canada, or a social health insurance system as in Germany. In all these systems, the norm is rationing according to need.²⁶

Another alternative welfare framework attends to Medicare program spending rather than social costs. In the extreme, one could seek to “minimize Medicare spending.” Within the model we set up, Medicare could reduce its net spending by simply adding a constant to the premiums for all beneficiary types for both MA and TM . Medicare spending could be lowered indefinitely by this “head tax” approach. (The head tax might also be income-dependent.) The problem of minimizing Medicare program spending becomes meaningful with a constraint on beneficiary welfare, rendering Medicare’s problem to be how best to finance a certain level of beneficiary net benefit from the Medicare program.²⁷

Medicare pays $(1 - c)x_{ij}^{TM}$ for each type in TM . For each type in an MA plan, Medicare makes a risk-adjusted payment to the plan. Medicare risk adjustment is r_s for the sick and r_h for the healthy. Let y_j^{MA} , y_j^{TM} $j = p, r$, be the income-adjusted premiums for MA and TM , respectively, paid to Medicare. Medicare net spending is then:

$$R = \sum_{i=s,h} \sum_{j=p,r} I(i, j)((r_i - y_j^{MA}) + (1 - I(i, j))((1 - c)x_{ij}^{TM} - y_j^{TM})) \quad (19)$$

Suppose we constrain beneficiary welfare for each type to be no less than utility of efficient care with no premium. In other words, each beneficiary must get utility at least equal to $v_{ij}(x_{ij}^*)$, $i = s, h$, $j = p, r$. What is the allocation with income-related premiums that minimizes Medicare costs subject to these constraints? Is this allocation implementable with a risk-adjusted payment to plans and the income-adjusted premium?

²⁶Higher income groups in Germany can opt out into a private health insurance system that pays physicians higher prices and improves access to care. High-income patients can of course pay privately Canada and in the UK, though the option of private insurance is not formalized by social policy as it is in Germany.

²⁷A related approach would be to maximize welfare subject to a fixed level of Medicare spending.

It can be shown (in results that parallel Proposition 1 in the paper and are available from the authors/web) that if Medicare can assign beneficiaries to plans and charge an income-related premium, the allocation that minimizes Medicare net spending subject to the utility constraints is one that puts the rich in MA , gives them the efficient care for no premium, and puts the poor in TM , and charges them a positive premium to be in TM . Medicare can spend no less on the rich in MA in any allocation. Although the premium Medicare can collect from the poor is greater than what Medicare could collect if the rich were in TM , the moral hazard savings of putting the high-demand group in MA more than offsets this difference.

Implementing the efficient allocation (minimizing Medicare spending subject to the utility constraints) requires premium policy that keeps the poor out of MA and the rich out of TM . The poor must be charged a high premium for MA (that they would not pay) to discourage them from electing the MA plan. The rich, in MA at no premium, must be charged a premium just enough to keep them from wanting to change to TM . It must be “just enough” because at a higher premium the MA plan would not be forced to offer the efficient health care. Risk adjustment of Medicare plan payments could be done as before, paying cost if both the health and sick rich join, and paying less than cost for the healthy rich. In sum, to implement the efficient allocation minimizing Medicare spending requires plan-specific premia for the rich and the poor.

6.2 Heterogeneity in Demand

There are a number of interesting extensions to consider related to introducing more or different kinds of heterogeneity in demand. First of all, it is worth remarking that our result of the rich being in MA and the poor in TM is sensitive to the relative frequency of beneficiaries in each type. If there were many more poor than rich, it would pay to put the poor rather than the rich in MA . MA is good at minimizing loss from moral hazard, and the objective is to put as much “demand” in MA as possible, whether this comes from higher demand due to

income in our analysis, or due to the simple number of beneficiaries in a certain group.

Other factors, aside from measured health status and income, affect utilization/demand for health services. Geography is one such factor attracting policy interest. In a series of influential publications, researchers at Dartmouth have called attention to large variations in spending per beneficiary in traditional Medicare that in many cases are not associated with differences in the observed quality of care or health status of beneficiaries.²⁸ Within our framework, we can consider whether geographic variation in spending could be considered a health-status type of variation or a preference-type of variation, or possibly something else, such as productive efficiency. If Medicare can use supply-side instruments (pay *MA* plans differently based on geography as it does now) or demand-side instruments (premiums based on geography not now used), what is the best way to contend with geographic variation?

6.3 Multiple Plans and Competition

More than one *MA* plan raises a number of issues. Sticking with existing model of beneficiaries:

- Efficiency is straightforward: need two types of plan, one for poor, one for rich.
- Implementation can be accomplished with general set of premiums and risk adjustment.
- Interesting questions revolve around constrained Medicare policy and sorting. What are reasonable restrictions on what Medicare could do with an *MA* Basic and *MA* Gold?

7 Conclusion

Ignore. Notes only.

²⁸See, for example, Fisher et al. (2003) or Wennberg et al. (2002).

The social benefits of switching a beneficiary from *TM* to an managed care plan are roughly proportional to magnitude of health care spending brought under “management.” It is thus the beneficiaries with *high demand*, because of health status or other factors such as income or education, that yield more social benefits (and save Medicare more money) by moving to *MA*. By contrast, *MA* plans actually attract the *low-demand* beneficiaries by lowering premiums below what beneficiaries pay for *TM*. While this empirical pattern is known, the usual conclusion is that inadequate risk adjustment is responsible for favorable selection into private plans. We argue that the design flaw in Medicare has to do with beneficiary premiums, not payments to plans.

Health plans incorporating some features of managed care are the only options for employees getting insurance through work, in individual health insurance markets, and in the state-run Medicaid programs for the poor.

The federal Medicare program will spend approximately \$xxx billion in 2009 for health care for the elderly and disabled beneficiaries. (ref) Projected Medicare spending accounts for almost all of growth in budget deficits in the next several decades. (ref)

Some income-related premiums already in Medicare. Limited in Part B. Part D has an income-related premium.

Relation to 1998 National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare.

Comment from one reader: Government rate setting as been “atrocious” and in the interests of the plans. What is to stop Congress from continuing to misbehave?

Chris A: now dual eligibles are not moved into MMC plans. Paper relates to that issue.

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Figure 1: Spending and Inefficiencies in Traditional Medicare




Figure 2: Spending and Inefficiencies in Medicare Advantage

