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Fuqua School of Business

Duke University, Durham

NC 27708, USA

Education

- *Ph.D. in Economic Analysis and Policy*, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University (1994)
- *Laurea in Economia Politica*, Università Bocconi (1988)

Work Experience

- 7/2000 - *Associate Professor*, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University;
(Assistant Professor from 7/2000 to 6/2004)
- 9/1994 - 6/2000 *Assistant Professor*, Stern School of Business, New York University;
- 7/1999 - 8/1999 *Visiting Professor*, University of California San Diego, Econ Dept.
- 9/1997 - 6/1998 *Visiting Professor*, University of Michigan, Econ Dept.
- 3/1988 - 7/1989 *Teaching Assistant*, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

Fields of Activity

- *Research*: Mechanism Design, Auction Theory, Collusion, Industrial Organization.
- *Teaching*: Microeconomics (Managerial Economics) and Game Theory (Competitive Analysis), for undergraduates, MBAs and PhDs.

Published and Accepted Papers:

“Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Finite Dimensional Approximations and Efficient Computation” (with Alex Belloni and Shouting Wang), *Operations Research*, forthcoming.

“Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Finite Dimensional Approximations and Efficient Computation,” (with Alex Belloni and Shouqiang Wang), *Operations Research*, (2010) 58(4): Part-2, 1079-1089, ([pdf](#)).

“Noncooperative Entry Deterrence in License Auctions: Dynamic versus Sealed-Bid” (with G. Das Varma) *Journal of Industrial Economics*, forthcoming.

“Bidder Collusion at First-Price Auctions” (with Leslie Marx and Peng Sun), *Review of Economic Design*, (2011) 15(2), 177-211.

“Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S.” (with Leslie Marx, David McAdams, and Brian Murray), *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, (2011) 5(1), 25-43.

“Knightian Uncertainty and Moral Hazard” (with Luca Rigotti and [Chris Shannon](#)), *Journal Economic Theory*, (May 2011) Vol. 146 1148–1172.

“The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions” (with Sandro Brusco and Leslie Marx), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, (2011) 3(2), 165-193.

“Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies: Theory and Data” (with Jim Anton and Sandro Brusco) *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2010) 69(1): 24-41.

“The ‘Google Effect’ in the FCC’s 700 MHz Auction” (with Sandro Brusco and Leslie Marx) *Information Economics and Policy*, (2009) 21, 101-114.

“Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints” (with S. Brusco), *Economic Theory*, (2009) 38(1): 105-125.

“Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing,” (with N. Economides and G. Woroch) in Gary Madden (ed.) *The Economics of Digital Markets*, Edward Elgar (2008).

“Budget Constraints and Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid” (with S. Brusco) *Journal of Industrial Economics*, (2008) 56(1): 113-142.

“Efficient Mechanisms for Mergers and Acquisitions” (with S. Brusco, D. T. Robinson and S. Viswanathan) *International Economic Review*, (2007) 48(3): 995-1035.

“Delegating Management to Experts” (with C. Dai and T. Lewis), *Rand Journal of Economics*, (2006) 37(3): 503-520.

“Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auction” (with R. Marshall and L. Marx) *Contributions in Theoretical Economics* (2005) 5(1), Article 4.

“Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities” (with Sandro Brusco), *Review of Economic Studies* (2002) 69(2): 407-436.

“Web Based Capacity Allocation Strategies for Customers with Heterogeneous Preferences” (with V. Agrawal and S. Seshadri) *Electronic Commerce Research*, (2002) 2(4): 359-384.

“Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division” (with Efe A. Ok), *The RAND Journal of Economics*, (2001) 32(2) 263-283.

“Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, (2001) 36(2): 219-240.

“The English Auction is Optimal among Simple Sequential Auctions,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, (1998) 82: 144-166.

“Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance” (with Nicholas Economides and Glenn Woroch), *Industrial and Corporate Change*, (1996) 5:(4): 1013-1028.

Working Papers:

“Uncertainty in Mechanism Design” (with Luca Rigotti and Chris Shannon)

Presentations at Conferences

July 1998, International Conference on Game Theory, SUNY, Stony Brook;

October 1998, Midwestern Conference on Theory and Trade, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;

April 1999, Decentralization conference, New York University;

June 1999, Decentralization conference, Universite' Libre de Bruxelles;

July 1999, International Conference on Game Theory, SUNY, Stony Brook;

October 1999, ICTEC, Nashville;

November 1999, Southeast Theory and International Economics Meetings, Georgetown University;

July 2000, First World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Bilbao, Spain;

October 2001, Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, Penn State University;

November 2001, INFORMS, Miami;

April 2002, Decentralization conference, Georgetown University;
April 2003, International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston;
June 2003, 4th International Conference on Public Economic Theory, Duke University;
August 2003, EEA-ESEM 2003, Stockholm;
October 2003, INFORMS, Atlanta;
January 2004, North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, San Diego;
July 2004, Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints, Stony Brook;
April 2005, Decentralization conference, UIUC;
May 2006, Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Toronto;
June 2006, North American Econometric Society Meetings, Minneapolis;
June 2007, SEAT meetings, Kos, Greece.

Seminars: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Pompeu Fabra, Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Tilburg University, University of Toronto, Rice University, Texas A&M, and Penn State (1994); Princeton University (1995); Brown University (1997); University of Michigan (1998), University of California San Diego, University of Padova (1999); Northwestern University, Caltech, INSEAD, and University of Pittsburgh (2000); University of Wisconsin (2003); Stony Brook, University of Venice, University of Magdeburg and WZB Berlin (2004), University of Notre Dame, Olin School of Business (2005), NYU, Northwestern University (2006), Vanderbilt University, Columbia University (2008).

Referee for:

American Economic Review; Econometrica; Economic Theory; Economics of Governance; Economic Journal; Economics Research; European Economic Review; Games and Economic Behavior; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; Journal of Economic Theory; Journal of Industrial Economics; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; Journal of Public Economics; Management Science; Operations Research; Public Choice; Ricerche Economiche; The Berkeley Electronic Press Journal; The Rand Journal of Economics; The Review of Economic Design; The Review of Economic Studies; The National Science Foundation.