Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints (with Sandro Brusco),

Economic Theory, Published online: 13 February 2007.

Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints (with Sandro Brusco)

The Journal of Industrial Economics, (2008) 56(1): 113-142.

Efficient Mechanisms for Mergers and Acquisitions (with Sandro Brusco, David T. Robinson and S. Viswanathan)

International Economic Review, (2007) 48(3): 995-1035.

Delegating Management to Experts (with Chifeng Dai and Tracy Lewis),

The Rand Journal of Economics, (2006) 27(3): 403-420 .

Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions (with Robert C. Marshall and Leslie Marx)

Contributions in Theoretical Economics 5 (1), Article 4 (2005).

Collusion via Signaling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions, with and without Complementarities (with Sandro Brusco)

The Review of Economic Studies, (2002), 69(2): 407-436.

Web Based Capacity Allocation Strategies for Customers with Heterogeneous Preferences (with V. Agrawal and S. Seshadri)

Electronic Commerce Research, (2002), 2(4): 359-384.

Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division (with Efe Ok)

The Rand Journal of Economics, (2001), 32: 263-283.

Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction

Games and Economic Behavior, (2000), 36: 219-240.

The English Auction is Optimal among Simple Sequential Auctions

Journal of Economic Theory, (1998), 82: 144-166.

Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance

Industrial and Corporate Change, (1996), 5: 1013-1028.