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CHOICE OF INVENTORY ACCOUNTING
METHODS: A RICARDIAN MODEL

by

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I. Introduction

It is a common belief that, in an inflationary era, the LIFO method can save tax expenditures vis-à-vis the FIFO method for every firm. In the past decade, the economy has gone through double-digit inflation. Although hundreds of firms have switched their accounting to the LIFO method, thousands more keep using the FIFO method. Biddle (1980) estimated that the 105 FIFO firms in his study paid an average of nearly $25 million each in additional federal income tax. What made these FIFO firms so reluctant to switch accounting methods?

A review of the literature provides two possible explanations for the pattern of inventory accounting choice; one is political cost theory and the other is agency theory.¹ Both theories assert that managers apply inventory accounting methods for number-manipulation so as to achieve a goal other than maximizing the firm's value. Since the economic variables (such as goal incongruency) in these two theories are not observable, the empirical studies are based on the examination of proxy variables. In general, there is no consistent evidence to support agency theory. Research studies in support of political cost theory have only one kind of evidence in common, which is the size effect on the choice of inventory accounting methods. There is also strong evidence of an industrial effect, but no behavioral theory has been attached to such an effect. In this paper we will examine the size effect and industrial effect.

The inventory accounting choice is not a fertile ground for the study of political cost theory and agency theory. The traditional explanations are not consistent with the principle of tight prior equilibrium.² There are many ways to manipulate accounting numbers; for example, Hagermann and Zmijewski (1979) suggested four accounting methods that can be adopted for
Manipulating accounting numbers through inventory accounting incurs a large opportunity cost — the potential tax savings. Consequently, inventory accounting is not an efficient instrument for number-manipulation. Moreover, the effect of inventory accounting on financial reports depends on the movements of inventory prices and quantities. Unless inventory prices and quantities are under managerial control, tampering with inventory accounting does not necessarily yield the "desired" financial report. Hence, inventory accounting is an ineffective instrument for number-manipulation. Finally, the manager does not have complete freedom in the choice of inventory accounting method. Therefore, inventory accounting is an inefficient, ineffective, and sometimes unfeasible instrument for number-manipulation.

Even if political cost theory and agency theory did actually motivate managers' behavior, one should not find empirical evidence from the study of inventory accounting choice.

This paper proposes a Ricardian model of inventory accounting choice. We have examined the production-investment opportunity sets of both the LIFO firms and the FIFO firms. We have found that managers make their choice of inventory accounting method according to the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage so that the value of the firm can be maximized. The size effect claimed by political cost theory is spurious, because size is so often related to the production-investment opportunity set. We have also found a satisfactory explanation for the industrial effect of inventory accounting choice.

The body of this paper is organized into seven sections. Section II briefly surveys the current literature. Section III elaborates a Ricardian model of inventory accounting choice. Section IV summarizes the proxy
variables for the three theories of managerial behavior: agency theory, political cost theory and value-maximization theory. Many of the proxy variables of political cost theory and value-maximization theory overlap. That is why some researchers in the literature have thought that they have found empirical evidence for the political cost theory. Section V describes the attributes of our data and elaborates a simple univariate analysis. Since a univariate analysis can only measure the gross effect of a proxy variable, it is difficult to use it to discriminate between political cost theory and value-maximization theory. Therefore, Section VI develops two models of multivariate analysis, namely, the logit model and the probit model, to measure the marginal explanatory power of each proxy variable. The results of the multivariate analyses are discussed in Section VII. The last section concludes this paper by suggesting implications of the current literature of inventory accounting research.

II. Theories of Managers' Behavior

In order to understand how managers choose of inventory accounting methods, we should first analyze their motives and behavior in the decision-making process. The literature provides three theories of managers' behavior: (1) agency theory, (2) political cost theory, and (3) value maximization theory. The first two theories have been adopted by other researchers to explain managers' choice of inventory accounting method. This paper will employ the third theory to develop a Ricardian model of inventory accounting choice.

Agency theory elaborates the conflicts of interests between management and ownership on one hand and between stockholders and bondholders on the other. Much of the literature in Accounting on economic consequences has its origins in the Jensen-Meckling's principal-agent framework. According
to agency theory, since management compensation packages include profit sharing in excess of a target level, and since that target is typically stated in terms of accounting net income, managers would accordingly choose the accounting method that can increase current accounting net income. Agency theory also asserts that corporate lending agreements impose restrictions on the activities of borrowers, and that many of these restrictions are expressed in terms of accounting numbers. Accordingly, the restrictions of bond covenant would lead managers to prefer the accounting method that gives rise to a higher accounting income.

Political cost theory is elaborated and advocated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978). Federal, state, and local governments and regulatory bodies base their economic policies, with respect to firms and industries, on accounting numbers. Moreover, a firm's accounting numbers can affect its public image. The political visibility that derives from abnormally high accounting income often centers unfavorable public attention on the firm. According to political cost theory, managers prefer an accounting method that reduces accounting income.

Value maximization theory asserts that managers always try to maximize the present value of cash flows. As Fama (1980) points out, in a competitive managerial labor market the ex post settling-up will lead managers to be loyal and faithful to the ownership. Moreover, internal competition and mutual monitoring among managers also forces them to act in the interest of the organization. Finally, being loyal and faithful to claimholders would benefit the managerial class as a whole. If a manager can be identified with a certain class, it is in his interest to maintain the integrity of his class.
None of the above three theories is believed to hold exactly. Each serves only as a "first approximation," and the three are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The economic factors, such as bond covenant, in agency theory and political cost theory can be viewed as institutional constraints on a manager's value maximization behavior. As was pointed out in Section I, these institutional constraints may not have any effect on the choice of inventory accounting method. Since the inventory accounting method is an inefficient and ineffective instrument for the manipulation of accounting numbers, a manager would not apply it to meet those targets implied by the agency theory and the political cost theory.

Before 1978, the literature on the choice of inventory accounting method provided little more than a rudimentary exploration of statistical association. For example, Copeland and Shank (1971) used a questionnaire survey to measure managers' perspective on the inventory accounting methods. They found that the LIFO-adopting manager often perceives a significant tax benefit in the LIFO method while the non-LIFO-adopting manager often perceives no such tax benefits. However, they did not attempt any rational explanation. In this paper, we provide one.

Eggleton-Penman-Twombly (1976) showed a significant statistical association between the changes of inventory accounting method and the change of management, industrial category and auditor. But they did not derive any consistent rational behavioral explanations for their findings. In this paper, we will discuss the industrial effect on the choice of inventory accounting methods. Because we are concerned with the choice of accounting methods, not the change of accounting methods, we will not discuss the effects of change of management.
In 1979, studies started exploring the application of agency theory and political cost theory to the choice of inventory accounting method. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) asserted that the existence of a managerial profit sharing scheme would encourage the manager to adopt the FIFO method. They also argued, based on political cost theory, that higher industrial concentration, larger firm size and higher capital intensity would lead to the adoption of the LIFO method. But none of the estimated coefficients of their probit analysis is statistically significant.  

Morse and Richardson (1983) found that only tax benefits and size were significant in explaining a firm's inventory decision which deviated from the industrial norm. The tax effect can be clearly attributed to the value-maximizing theory. But the size effect can be attributed to both the value maximizing theory and the political cost theory. They tried to use several other proxy variables to measure the effects arising from agency cost theory and political cost theory, but none showed any significance. Biddle (1980) matched a sample of 105 firms that adopted or extended the use of LIFO in 1972-1975 with FIFO firms that had at least the same two-digit SIC codes and were of similar size. He found that there were significant tax benefits to LIFO adoption and was puzzled by the inertia of the FIFO firms.  

Abdel-Khalik (1983) found that executive compensations did not play a major role in decisions to change the inventory valuation method to the LIFO. But he also concluded that the political cost theory was the most likely motivation for managers to switch to LIFO. The statistically significant proxy variables were total assets and capital intensity. In this paper we will demonstrate that these variables are proxy for production-investment opportunity sets.
III. A Ricardian Model

In this section, we develop a Ricardian Model of inventory accounting choice. Because the difference in inventory accounting methods can affect the net present value of a firm, if managers behave in conformity with the value maximization theory, all firms with an identical production-investment opportunity set should choose the same inventory accounting method.\(^\text{10}\) For firms with heterogeneous production-investment opportunity sets, the value-maximizing manager would adopt an inventory accounting method according to a Ricardian principle of comparative advantage.\(^\text{11}\)

IIIA. IRS Tax Regulation and Ricardian Principle of Comparative Advantage

While a manager's choice of other accounting methods need only comply with the FASB, which requires consistency but leaves managers free to choose among alternatives, the choice of inventory accounting method is under strict IRS regulation. There are four regulatory rules relevant to a manager's decision:\(^\text{12}\)

1. Only the cost method of valuation can be used in conjunction with the LIFO method. There cannot be any write-downs to market value.

2. LIFO may not be used if the taxpayer uses any different inventory method for credit purposes or for financial reports.

3. In general, once a taxpayer elects the LIFO method, a subsequent change is not available without approval from the IRS commissioner. Automatic approval is available if the taxpayer agrees to a 10-year spread of any positive adjustments.

4. The IRS has established a list of four situations that may warrant the termination of the LIFO election:

   (1) violation of the reporting conformity requirements;
   (2) failure to restate inventories for the preceding year to cost;
   (3) failure to elect properly; and
   (4) failure to maintain adequate records with respect to LIFO.
According to Rule 1, the LIFO method precludes write-downs to market value, hence those firms with large inventory price fluctuations should have a comparative advantage in adopting the FIFO method and those firms with steady price movements should have a comparative advantage in adopting the LIFO. According to Rules 2 and 3, the LIFO method requires better bookkeeping and is under closer scrutiny by IRS, therefore the larger and technologically more advanced firms have comparative advantages in adopting the LIFO method. However, the bookkeeping and tax-reporting costs, due to their relatively small magnitude, may play only a marginal role in a manager's decision.

The tax benefit of the LIFO method requires steadily increasing year-end inventories. Firms with large year-end inventory fluctuations have comparative advantages in adopting the FIFO method. Moreover, according to Rule 3, firms are free to switch from FIFO to LIFO but not vice versa. Hence the value of adopting the FIFO method includes the value of the option of switching to the LIFO in the future. Since this option is freely disposable, its value is non-negative. Finally this option is an American option with a "dividend," where the "dividend" is the tax-savings in the year of switching to the LIFO method. It has been established that the American option with zero dividend is equivalent to a European option which is exercised at maturity. Initially, all firms adopt the FIFO method. Only those firms with a large "dividend" would switch to the LIFO method. According to Rule 4.(2)., this large "dividend" requires a high inflation rate in the year preceding the accounting switch and again a high inflation rate in the year of switch. Other firms would find a comparative advantage in maintaining the status quo.
III.B Production-Investment Opportunity Set and Proxy Variables

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the comparative advantage in adopting an inventory accounting method depends on three factors: (1) the fluctuation of inventory prices, (2) the fluctuation of year-end inventory quantities, and (3) the bookkeeping and tax-reporting cost. In this subsection we discuss six proxy variables that are associated with the above three factors and with the other relevant characteristics of production-investment opportunity sets. They are: accounting income variability, absolute firm size, relative firm size, capital intensity, inventory intensity, and industry classification. In the next section, we will demonstrate that some of these proxy variables overlap with those derived from agency theory and political cost theory.

Accounting income variability is a proxy for a firm's operational volatility which depends on the nature of the output market, production technology, factorial intensity and general economic environment. When a firm operates smoothly, it is less costly to control inventory; hence the firm has a comparative advantage in adopting the LIFO method. Moreover, when accounting income is stable from year to year, tax planning is less costly and the LIFO method generates more tax benefit.

The LIFO-related bookkeeping and tax-reporting costs seem to be mostly independent of scale of operation. Consequently, larger firms have a comparative advantage in adopting the LIFO method. However, absolute firm size is also a proxy variable for operational volatility and inventory controllability. Because of economies of scale, larger firms tend to attain more stable operation and better inventory control. The bookkeeping and tax-reporting costs do not seem to be very large and should not be of primary concern in the manager's choice of inventory accounting method.
Since the nature of the output market, production technology and factoral intensity varies from industry to industry, another measurement of economies of scale should be the relative firm size within each industry.

One important aspect of the production-investment opportunity set is the relative factoral intensity. In a capital-intensive firm, where a large portion of cost is fixed in nature, good financial and production planning is much more crucial to its prosperity and survival than in a labor-intensive firm. Since the LIFO method needs more control and planning than the FIFO method, the capital-intensive firm has a comparative advantage in adopting the LIFO method. When the nature of business activities requires a firm to make a relatively larger investment in inventories than other firms do, the firm would devote more resources to inventory management, which in turn gives the firm a comparative advantage in adopting the LIFO method. Besides, the relatively large inventory investment also implies a large tax benefit that could be accrued from the LIFO method.

Finally, production-investment opportunity sets vary from industry to industry. Hence, industry classification is a proxy variable for production-investment opportunity sets. However, this is a very robust proxy variable that could be consistent with many competing theories.

IIIC. Measurement of Variables

We do not have data on the bookkeeping and tax-reporting costs. The measurements of the other eight variables are discussed in this subsection.

1. Inventory Variability

Inventory variability can be measured by the variance/mean ratio of the year-end inventory.  However, if the inventory variability were so measured, our results would be subject to simultaneous equation bias
because inventory variability is an endogenous variable which depends on the choice of accounting methods.

To elaborate this issue, we define the ex ante inventory variability as the optimal inventory variability in the manager's value maximization plan under zero tax rate, and the ex post inventory variability as the observed variability. The difference between the ex ante and ex post inventory variability is attributable to random errors in measurement and in operation and to the systematic factor of tax effect. When the tax rate is actually zero, the conditional expected value of ex post inventory variability is equal to its ex ante value. For illustration, the 45° line in Figure 1 shows the relationship between the conditional expectation of the ex post and the ex ante inventory variability. In this case the inventory variability measured by the variance/mean ratio of year-end inventory should be an unbiased estimate of a firm's inventory controllability; the inventory control decision is independent of accounting choice.

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Insert Figure 1 Here
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When the inventory price is increasing and the tax rate is positive, the tax expenditure depends on the inventory control activities and the accounting method. Managers can trade off the tax benefit of the LIFO method with the marginal cost of additional inventory control. The marginal firm, with ex ante inventory variability $o_a$, needs to incur so much cost to reduce the expected ex post inventory variability by $o_b$ that the net benefit of adopting the LIFO method is zero. For those firms with ex ante inventory variability larger than $o_a$, the net benefit of adopting the LIFO method is negative. Therefore, with respect to a given positive
tax rate the relationship between expected ex post and ex ante inventory variability is illustrated as oobd in Figure 1. Those firms with ex ante inventory variability smaller than oa are ex ante LIFO firms and those with inventory variability larger than oa are ex ante FIFO firms.

The ex ante inventory variability is not observable; when we use the ex post inventory variability as a proxy, we will generate bias in the measurement of the unobservable ex ante variability. To solve this problem of measurement bias, we transform the ex post inventory variability into a rank-order variable and use it as an instrument variable for the unobservable ex ante inventory variability. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the rank-order relationship between the expected ex post and the ex ante inventory variability is independent of inventory accounting methods.

2. Accounting Income Variability

The accounting income variability, like inventory variability, is an endogenous variable. The above argument applies here too. We will use the rank-order of variance/mean ratios of before-tax accounting income to measure the accounting income variability.

3. Price Variability

The data of inventory price are not available in the Compustat tape. The price data are collected from the DRI (Data Resources Institute) tape. Although we have tried to match closely, down to the SIC four-digit level, between the descriptions of price indices in the DRI tape and the SIC code used in the Compustat tape, the problem of measurement errors may not have been totally resolved. To avoid the measurement error problem, we chose a simple but robust measurement — the relative frequency of positive inflation. For each SIC four-digit industry, we have calculated the relative frequency of positive price change for the period of 1960-1980.
When the relative frequency is large, it implies that the price index is moving smoothly upward.

4. Absolute Firm Size

Absolute firm size is measured in terms of amounts of assets and net sales of the firm.

5. Relative Firm Size

Relative firm size is the ratio of a firm’s assets to the total assets of the SIC four-digit industry. Relative firm size is also measured in terms of net sales.

6. Capital Intensity

Gross capital intensity is the ratio of gross fixed assets to net sales. Net capital intensity is the ratio of net fixed assets to net sales. We have tried both variables in our probit and logit analysis and found that the gross capital intensity generated a slightly more significant result. We will only report the result with gross capital intensity in Section VII.

7. Inventory Intensity

Inventory intensity is measured by the inventory/net sales ratio and the inventory/total assets ratio. Since the amount of inventories is endogenously determined, we have transformed the inventory intensity ratios into a rank-order variable to avoid measurement bias.

8. Industry Dummies

To keep the number of industry dummy variables small and manageable, we have assigned a dummy variable to each of the two-digit SIC industries. We have 20 industry dummy variables as a result.
IV. Hypotheses and Proxy Variables

Generally a proxy variable can stand for many competing theories. Variables such as size and industry are consistent with almost any theory. In this section, we will demonstrate that some proxy variables that have been studied under the political cost theory overlap with the proxy variables in our Ricardian model of accounting choice.

Insert Table 1 Here

Table 1 summarizes all proxy variables that have been studied in the literature of inventory accounting choice, in which most of the sixteen variables are not statistically significant in explaining a manager's behavior. The five variables that have shown statistical significance are (1) absolute firm size, (2) potential tax savings of LIFO over FIFO, (3) industry, (4) auditor, and (5) total debts/total assets. Among these five variables, absolute firm size and industry are also proxy variables in the Ricardian model. Since the Ricardian model elaborates the economic conditions for potential tax savings of the inventory accounting method, all the variables discussed in Section III are proxy for the potential tax savings.

Because the big-eight firms have developed their own comparative advantage in industry, the identity of the auditor in Eggleton-Penman-Twombly's univariate test can be only a proxy for industry. Besides, there is no theory to relate a specific auditor to a manager's behavior. We will not discuss this variable in our paper. The total debts/total assets ratio is associated with the agency theory and will be examined in our empirical work.
According to the Ricardian model, when the bookkeeping and tax-reporting costs of the LIFO method are small, the fundamental proxy variables that determine the choice of the inventory accounting method are (1) the variability of price, (2) the variability of inventories, and (3) the inventory intensity. The other proxy variables discussed in Section III are merely associated with these three variables. If the Ricardian model is descriptively valid, the inclusion of these three fundamental proxy variables in a multivariate analysis should turn the explanatory power of other proxy variables into insignificance. However, if the bookkeeping and tax-reporting costs were fixed and large, the absolute firm size would become a fundamental proxy variable for the economies of scale in administering the LIFO method. It should be significant in spite of the other three fundamental proxy variables.

V. Data and Univariate Analysis

The data were collected from the Compustat File. All firms in the sample had adopted either the strictly LIFO method or the strictly FIFO method for at least seven uninterrupted years. For those firms which had adopted the same inventory accounting method for longer than seven years, we collected the data for the entire period. The data collection period of each firm varies from seven years to twenty years. Over all, 799 firms were chosen, of which 127 firms had adopted LIFO and 672 firms had adopted FIFO. Table 2 lists the distribution of data in terms of the SIC two-digit code and the inventory accounting method. Except in the steel industry, the FIFO method is the method adopted by the majority of firms.

Insert Table 2 Here
The attributes of the LIFO firms and the FIFO firms are summarized in Table 3. The first eleven variables will be examined extensively throughout the remainder of this paper. The variables $V_{12}$ to $V_{19}$ are briefly discussed in this section. Most of the attribute difference between column (1) and column (2) of Table 3 can be traced to some sort of managerial behavior. Column (3) lists the possible theories of managerial behavior discussed in the literature. The univariate test of hypothesis concerning managerial behavior is accomplished by calculating the statistic $t_i$ which is defined in equation (1):

$$
(1) \quad t_i = \frac{127 V_{lf}^i - 627 \sum_{f=1}^{127} V_{lf}^i}{\frac{(127 - 1) S_{1l}^2 + (672 - 1) S_{lf}^2}{127 + 672 - 2}}
$$

where

- $i$ = attribute index;
- $l$ = index of LIFO firms, $l = 1, \ldots, 127$;
- $f$ = index of FIFO firms, $f = 1, \ldots, 672$;
- $V_{il}, V_{lf}$ = value of variable $V_i$ of firm $l$ and $f$ respectively;
- $S_{1l}^2, S_{lf}^2$ = sample variance of variable $V_i$ of all LIFO firms and FIFO firms respectively.

The hypothetical sign of $t_i$ is given in column (4) and the calculated $t$-statistic is given in column (5).

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Insert Table 3 Here

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The results in column (5) of Table 3 seem to support the value-maximization theory and the political cost theory and reject the agency theory. Putting Tables 1 and 3 together, we can see that there is no
evidence in the literature of inventory accounting choice that is consistent with the agency theory. Although there is evidence that is consistent with the value-maximization theory and the political cost theory, it is difficult to differentiate between these two theories which employ an overlapping set of proxy variables.

Except for \( V_5 \), the first eleven variables in Table 3 are all significant with the correct hypothetical sign. As discussed in Sections III and IV, \( V_3, V_4, V_5, V_7 \) and \( V_{11} \) are fundamental proxy variables that are directly associated with the choice of inventory accounting method under the value-maximization theory. \( V_1, V_2, V_8, V_9 \) and \( V_{10} \) are the attributes that are related to \( V_3, V_4, V_6 \) and \( V_7 \); hence, they are indirectly associated with the choice of inventory accounting method under the value-maximization theory. In a univariate analysis, all these proxy variables have gross explanatory power. Since the indirect proxy variables for the value-maximization theory overlap with the proxy variables for the political cost theory, it is impossible to differentiate between these two theories in a univariate analysis. However, in a multivariate analysis where the marginal explanatory power of each proxy variable can be measured, we shall expect that if the value-maximization theory is descriptively valid, then the indirect proxy variables, \( V_1, V_2, V_8, V_9 \), and \( V_{10} \), should have little marginal explanatory power. On the other hand, if the political cost theory is descriptively valid, then \( V_3, V_4, V_6, V_7 \) and \( V_{11} \) should show little marginal explanatory power and \( V_1, V_2, V_8, V_9 \), and \( V_{10} \) should be the fundamental attributes that determine the manager's choice of inventory accounting methods. In the next section, we will develop two methods of multivariate analysis to measure the marginal explanatory power of each proxy variable.
Before leaving this section, we will briefly discuss $V_{12}$ to $V_{19}$. Both $V_{12}$ and $V_5$ measure the stringency of bond-covenant; they are neither statistically significant, nor do they have the hypothetical sign. In Section VII, we will only report the results on $V_5$. We will also calculate the marginal effect of $V_{12}$ and get the same results. The $V_{14}$, which is somewhat related to $V_4$, is only an indirect proxy for value-maximization theory; it is not statistically significant in multivariate analysis as well as in univariate analysis. Both $V_{19}$ and $V_{11}$ measure the price movement of inventories, but $V_{19}$ is not statistically significant in either univariate analysis or multivariate analysis. The $V_{18}$ considers the depreciation in calculating the capital intensity. The multivariate and univariate analysis results from $V_{10}$ are more significant than from $V_{13}$. Using either variable would not change our conclusion.

Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) presumed that the LIFO method has a tax-benefit over the FIFO method, hence, the larger the effective tax rate is, the more desirable the LIFO method would be.

However, the LIFO method does not necessarily result in tax savings for all the firms. A good counter-example is that in an industry with a declining price-level, the FIFO method should have a tax-benefit over the LIFO method. Hence the effective tax rate cannot represent the relative attractiveness of the LIFO method. We do not have any hypothesis about the statistic $t_{13}$. Table 3 shows that there is no significant difference on effective tax rate between LIFO firms and FIFO firms. The $V_{15}$ and $V_{16}$ show that the inventories of FIFO firms grow faster and grow more frequently than those of LIFO firms.
VI. Methodology of Multivariate Analysis

VI.A. Logit and Probit Binary Choice Models

In this section, we discuss two multivariate methods to measure the marginal explanation power of each proxy variable. We deal with the binary choice facing a firm—whether to use LIFO or FIFO as its inventory accounting method. For simplicity, we shall refer to the choice variable as \( i \), where \( i = 1 \) for FIFO and \( i = 2 \) for LIFO. We postulate that the decision \( i \) is a function of elements in the production-investment opportunity set, factors of political cost and factors of agency cost.

Since these variables are not directly observable, we use a set of proxy variables to measure these economic variables. The specification of the vector of proxy variables \( Z \) was provided in Section IV. The relations between \( i \) and \( Z \) is summarized by the model \( P_{iz}(\theta) \), which is the probability of observing choice \( i \) given the set of proxy variables \( Z \), and a vector of unknown parameters \( \theta \) to be estimated from the data.

There are two popular methods of modelling \( P_{iz}(\theta) \). The first is the logit model. It assumes that the logarithm of \( P_{iz} \) is linear in \( Z \):

\[
(2) \quad P_{iz} = e^{Z^T \Gamma_i}, \quad i = 1, 2.
\]

Since \( P_{1z} + P_{2z} = 1 \), we must normalize the probabilities:

\[
(3) \quad P_{1z} = \frac{e^{Z^T \Gamma_1}}{e^{Z^T \Gamma_1} + e^{Z^T \Gamma_2}}; \quad P_{2z} = \frac{e^{Z^T \Gamma_2}}{e^{Z^T \Gamma_1} + e^{Z^T \Gamma_2}}.
\]

In other words, we have

\[
(4) \quad P_{1z} = \frac{e^{Z^T(\Gamma_1 - \Gamma_2)}}{1 + e^{Z^T(\Gamma_1 - \Gamma_2)}}; \quad P_{2z} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{Z^T(\Gamma_1 - \Gamma_2)}}.
\]
Reparametrizing the model in terms of \( \theta = \Gamma_1 - \Gamma_2 \), we have

\[
(5) \quad P_{1z}(\theta) = \frac{e^{Z\theta}}{1 + e^{Z\theta}} ;
\]

\[
(5) \quad P_{2z}(\theta) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{Z\theta}} .
\]

The logit model is consistent with a "random utility" model (see McFadden [1982]). It has wide appeal to models of consumer choice theory, but does not have much theoretical grounding in the context of a profit maximizing firm.

The second method we use is the probit model. It assumes that the discrete choice decision is based on an unobserved continuous variable:

\[
(6) \quad y = Z\beta + \epsilon ,
\]

where \( \epsilon \) is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance \( \sigma^2 \) and \( \epsilon \) is independent of \( Z \).

The variable \( y \) can be interpreted as the comparative advantage in adopting the FIFO method versus the LIFO method. The firm chooses FIFO \((i=1)\) if \( y \) is below the threshold level \( L \) (such as \( oA \) in Figure 1), and chooses LIFO \((i=2)\) if \( y \) exceeds \( L \), i.e.,

\[
(7) \quad i = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } y \leq L \\
2, & \text{if } y > L .
\end{cases}
\]

Therefore the probability of observing \( i = 1 \), given \( Z \), is:

\[
(8) \quad P(i=1 \mid Z) = P(y \leq L \mid Z) \\
= P(Z\beta + \epsilon < L \mid Z) \\
= P(\epsilon < L - Z\beta \mid Z) \\
= \Phi \left( \frac{L - Z\beta}{\sigma} \right) ;
\]
where $\phi$ is the cumulative normal distribution. Also

(9) \[ P(i=2) \mid Z = 1 - \phi \left( \frac{L - Z\beta}{\sigma} \right). \]

Obviously, the data can only allow us to estimate $\frac{L}{\sigma}$ and $\frac{\beta}{\sigma}$. By setting $\theta = \left( \frac{L}{\sigma}, \frac{\beta}{\sigma} \right)$ we have:

(10) \[ P_{12}(\theta) = \phi \left( \frac{L - Z\beta}{\sigma} \right); \]

\[ P_{22}(\theta) = 1 - \phi \left( \frac{L - Z\beta}{\sigma} \right). \]

VIB. Estimation and Inferences

Our purpose is to find an estimate of the parameter $\theta$, for either the logit or the probit model. The statistical significance of the estimated parameter indicates the marginal explanatory power of the proxy variable in $Z$. For simplicity of notation, let us denote:

(11) \[ P_{1z} = F(\theta, Z); \]

\[ P_{2z} = 1 - F(\theta, Z). \]

Suppose we have a random sample of size $T$ from the population. Let $(i_n, Z_n)$ denote the choice and the conditioning variables observed for the $n$-th observation in the sample and define:

(12) \[ d_n = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i_n = 1; \\ 1 & \text{if } i_n = 2. \end{cases} \]

A standard method to estimate $\theta$ is to maximize in $\theta$ the log-likelihood function of the sample, conditioned on the observed $Z$'s:

\[ \max_{\theta} L(\theta) = \sum_{n=1}^{T} d_n \log F(\theta, Z_n) + (1 - d_n) \log \{1 - F(\theta, Z_n)\}. \]
where \( n \) is the observation index and \( T \) is the sample size. We must restrict \( \theta \) to a compact set \( H \) in \( \mathbb{R}^k \). The \( \theta \) at which \( L(\theta) \) is maximized is called the maximum likelihood estimator and is denoted by \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} \). In the case of logit and probit, \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} \) is consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient. (See Theil [1971], pp. 384-397). Furthermore, the \( L(\theta) \) is globally concave in \( \theta \), and so a unique maximum exists.

A numerical method, which is programmed by the junior author, for finding the \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} \) is briefly described as follows.\(^{21} \) Pick any \( \hat{\theta}_0 \in H \) as a starting value, then search along the Newton-Raphson direction for the highest value of \( L(\theta) \). Call this new point \( \hat{\theta}_1 \), i.e.,

\[
\hat{\theta}_1 = \hat{\theta}_0 + \lambda \left[ -L_{\theta \theta}(\hat{\theta}_0) \right]^{-1} \left[ L_\theta(\hat{\theta}_0) \right],
\]

where the subscripts in \( L_{\theta \theta} \) and \( L_\theta \) denote partial derivatives and \( \lambda > 0 \). If \( \left[ -L_{\theta \theta}(\hat{\theta}_0) \right] \) is positive definite, then there always exists a \( \lambda > 0 \) for which the \( L(\theta) \) will increase. We iterate this step until certain convergence criteria are met, namely,

(1) the increment in \( L(\theta) \) is sufficiently small, and

(2) \( L_{\theta \theta} \left[ -L_{\theta \theta} \right]^{-1} L_\theta \) is sufficiently small.

In our experience, convergence is usually achieved in less than ten iterations, starting at any arbitrary point. At convergence, the value of \( \theta \) in the last iteration is \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} \).

We calculate the covariance of \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} \) by taking a Taylor series expansion around the true parameter \( \theta^* \).

\[
0 = L_\theta(\hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}}) = L_\theta(\theta^*) + L_{\theta \theta}(\bar{\theta}) \left( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} - \theta^* \right)
\]

where \( \bar{\theta} \) is between \( \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} \) and \( \theta^* \). Rewriting, we have

\[
T(\hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}} - \theta^*) = \left[ -L_{\theta \theta}(\bar{\theta}) \right]^{-1} [T L_\theta(\theta^*)].
\]
The random variable $T(\theta_{\text{MLE}} - \theta^*)$ is asymptotically normal with mean zero and covariance $V_{\text{MLE}}$, where

$$V_{\text{MLE}} = [-L_{\theta \theta} (\theta^*)]^{-1}.$$  

We can consistently estimate $V_{\text{MLE}}$ by

$$\hat{V}_{\text{MLE}} = [-L_{\theta \theta} (\theta_{\text{MLE}})]^{-1}.$$  

To test the restriction $\theta^* \in \Omega$, where $\Omega$ is a proper compact subset of parameter space $\Theta$, we can employ the likelihood ratio test. First, maximizing $L(\theta)$ with respect to $\theta \in \Theta$, we can get the unrestricted maximum likelihood estimator $\theta_{\text{MLE}}^1$. Second, maximizing $L(\theta)$ with respect to $\theta \in \Omega$, we can get the restricted maximum likelihood estimator $\theta_{\text{MLE}}^R$. Under the null hypothesis that

$$H : \theta^* \in \Omega,$$

the log-likelihood ratio as defined in eq.(19):

$$LR = -2 \log \left[ \frac{L(\theta_{\text{MLE}}^1)}{L(\theta_{\text{MLE}}^R)} \right],$$

has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with $q$ degrees of freedom, where

$$q = \text{Dim } (\Theta) - \text{Dim } (\Omega).$$

The LR statistic defined in eq.(19) measures the marginal explanatory power of a set of explanatory variables.

VII. Multivariate Analyses

It has been well documented that there is a size effect and a industrial effect on the choice of inventory accounting methods (for
example, Eggleton-Penman-Twombly [1976], and Morse and Richardson [1983]). It is generally agreed upon that the size effect and industrial effect are just proxies for more fundamental economic variables whose nature and characteristics are yet to be determined. In this section, we shall identify some of these underlying fundamental economic variables from our logit and probit multivariate analysis.

We start the multivariate analysis by measuring the industrial effect. We set twenty dummy variables to represent the twenty SIC two-digit industries defined in Table 2. Then we estimate the logit and probit models and report the results as Analysis 1 in Table 4. Each entry in Table 4 is the t-statistic of the marginal effect of a given proxy variable on the inventory accounting choice. If the t-statistic is larger than two, then the given proxy variable is deemed to have significant marginal explanatory power. The marginal explanatory power of all industrial dummies is measured by the likelihood ratio test statistic:

\[ LR = -2 \left[ -349.900 - (-293.030) \right] = 113.740 \]

With degrees of freedom of 10, LR is significant at the 0.01% level. From Analysis 1 we can see that the industrial effect does significantly "explain" the manager's choice of inventory accounting method. With knowledge of the SIC two-digit code to which the firm belongs, we can correctly predict the firm's inventory accounting method 85.98% of the time. This prediction power is much better than Hagerman-Zmijewski's agency and political cost model which has only 58.00% correlation rate.

One possible explanation of this industrial effect is the industrial price movement. Only when the price of inventories goes up would a firm benefit from adopting the LIFO method. For example, the economic life of books is usually very short; if a new edition cannot be sold out in the
first year, it would usually be moved to the bargain section in the
following year. Writing down year-end inventories is a common practice in
the publishing industry. This alone can explain why all firms in the SIC
2700 industry (publishing) adopt the FIFO method.

To examine whether industrial price movements actually explain the
industrial effect, we include industrial dummies and \( V_{11} \) (relative fre-
quency of price increases) together in our estimations of the logit and
probit models. The result is reported as Analysis 2 in Table 4. If the
industrial dummies are nothing but proxies for the inventory price move-
ment, then including \( V_{11} \) in the estimation of logit and probit models
should greatly reduce the singificance of the t-statistics of the dummy
variables. The evidence from Analysis 2 suggests that the industrial
dummies are not proxies for inventory price movements. In fact, the
industrial dummies and \( V_{11} \) jointly and complementarily determine the
inventory accounting choice. When \( V_{11} \) is included in the estimation, the
value of t-statistics of many industrial dummies increases.

Another possible explanation of the industrial effect is that firms in
different industries have different production-investment opportunity sets.
Except for the \( V_5 \), the ten variables, i.e., \( V_1-V_{10} \), listed in Table 5 are
proxy variables for production-investment opportunity sets. The four
variables \( V_3, V_4, V_6 \) and \( V_7 \) can be directly indentified with the
value-maximization theory. The other five variables, \( V_1, V_2, V_8, V_9 \) and
\( V_{10} \), have been interpreted as proxies for political cost in the literature.
Before exploring the relationship between industrial effect and production-
investment opportunity sets, we should first examine the descriptive
validity of the value-maximization theory versus the political cost theory.
The $V_1$ and $V_2$ are size variables which can be incorporated into a large number of competing theories of the firm. The $V_3$ and $V_9$, which can be interpreted as the market share of a firm, are alternative ways of measuring firm size. If the value-maximization theory is descriptively valid, then the size effect is spurious. The univariate association between size and inventory accounting choice documented in Table 3 is due to the association between size and $V_3$, $V_4$, $V_6$ and $V_7$. By including all these variables in a multivariate analysis, the size effect should disappear. On the other hand, if the political cost theory were descriptively valid and the size variables are close proxies for political cost, then the size effect should be significant in both the univariate and the multivariate analysis.

The results of Analysis 3 strongly support the value-maximization theory; not only do all the estimated coefficients show the correct sign, they are also highly significant. Moreover, the significance of the size effect disappears. The results of Analysis 4 are very similar to those of Analysis 3 except that the total assets seem to be a less appropriate component in the measurement of factorial intensity than the net sales. The estimated $R^2$, the percentage correctly predicted and the absolute value of log-likelihood function are all measurements of goodness of fit. The fit is better when the value of the first two measurements are higher and the absolute value of the last measurement is lower. The goodness of fit in Analysis 4 is somewhat less than that in Analysis 3. The estimated coefficient of $V_7$ (inventory intensity) has an incorrect sign.

To explain the industrial effect in terms of the production-investment opportunity set suggested by the Ricardian Model of inventory accounting choice, we include $V_1-V_{11}$ and $D_1-D_{20}$ in estimations of logit and probit
policy in production and investment. The capital market ought to react to this important signal. However, the current literature (for example, Biddle [1980]) assumes a stationary production-investment opportunity set and calculates the potential tax-saving accordingly. This calculation often leaves a puzzling question: why don't all firms take advantage of the tax benefit? This study demonstrates that not all firms can find tax advantages in the LIFO method.

In order to achieve the conditions of "ceteris paribus," many studies (for example, Ricks [1982] and Brown [1980]) try to match the LIFO firms and the FIFO firms according to size and industrial code. Our study implies that LIFO firms and FIFO firms are fundamentally different in production-investment opportunity set; the matching of the LIFO firms and the FIFO firms will not generate a well-controlled sample. If a LIFO firm and a FIFO firm of the same industry has about the same size, they would be different in other important aspects such as capital intensity and inventory controllability.

If the LIFO firms and the FIFO firms were identical except for the inventory accounting method, then an unexpected inflation would benefit the LIFO firms relative to the FIFO firms because of the unexpected tax savings. The capital market would react favorably to the LIFO firms relative to the FIFO firms in a period of unexpected inflation. However, for a FIFO firm having such a production-investment opportunity set that it cannot extract any tax-benefit by switching to the LIFO method, the unexpected inflation would not generate any unexpected opportunity cost of adopting the FIFO method; consequently, the unexpected inflation would not inversely affect the market's assessment of such a FIFO firm. Our study indicates that the FIFO firms have less potential of saving tax through the LIFO
method than the LIFO firm; hence, the effect of unexpected inflation on the relative price movements of LIFO securities over FIFO securities is smaller than it would be if both the LIFO firms and the FIFO firms had homogeneous production-investment opportunity sets. This implication is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Lee (1983).
models. The results are reported as Analysis 5 and Analysis 6 in Tables 4 and 5. When the economic variables, $V_3$, $V_4$, $V_6$, $V_7$ and $V_{11}$, that are directly associated with the Ricardian Model of inventory accounting choice are included in estimations, the significance of industrial effect disappears. Hence the industrial effect documented in Analyses 1 and 2 is attributable to the cross-industrial differences in production-investment opportunity sets.

Overall, our study provides evidence for several interesting issues. First, the agency theory does not describe the manager's choice of inventory accounting method. Second, the size effect which is so prominent in the univariate analysis disappears in the multivariate analysis. The size effect on inventory accounting choice is probably due to its close association with the economy of scale in inventory control. Third, the industrial effect can also be explained by the cross-industrial differences in the production-investment opportunity set. Finally, our evidence strongly supports the value-maximization theory that the manager makes the inventory accounting choice according to the Ricardian principles of comparative advantage.

As elaborated in the introductory section, the inventory accounting method is an inefficient and ineffective instrument for the accounting number manipulation prescribed in the political cost theory and the agency theory. Hence a rational manager would not employ the inventory accounting method for that purpose. However, it does not imply that the political cost theory and agency theory are completely irrelevant to the manager's behavior. We have only demonstrated that the choice of inventory accounting methods is not a fertile ground for the study of the political cost theory and the agency theory.
VIII. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, our empirical evidence strongly suggests that firms with different production-investment opportunity sets would adopt different inventory accounting methods according to the Richardian principle of comparative advantage. This finding sheds an interesting light on the current literature of accounting choice.

If the manager faithfully follows the rule of value-maximization, than all of the firms which could have extracted economic rent from adopting the LIFO method would have done so. The incipient firm which is about to adopt the LIFO method is the marginal firm to which the cost of adopting LIFO is just equal to the benefit. Hence the value of the incipient LIFO-adopting firm is independent of the change of inventory accounting method. A rational capital market would not react to the change of inventory accounting method per se.

However, since the change of inventory accounting method reflects the change of production-investment opportunity set, a rational capital market would react to this change of underlying real economic factors. For example, the LIFO firms have lower variability in inventories and accounting incomes than the FIFO firms. The literature suggests that the variability of accounting income is positively associated with the market risk of securities (see Beaver-Kettler-Scholes [1970]). Consequently, our study implies that when a firm switches to the LIFO method, the market risk of its securities should decline. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence in Biddle and Lindahl (1982).

Since the LIFO firms tend to be larger, more capital intensive, and have better inventory control than the FIFO firms, the switch of accounting method from LIFO to FIFO signals the manager's intention to change business
\[ \varepsilon(EPIV \mid EAIV) \]

Figure 1  Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Inventory Variability

Note: EAIV: ex ante inventory variability
      EPIV: ex post inventory variability
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy Variables</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Significance at 5% level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absolute firm size</td>
<td>Hagerman and Zmijewski (79)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morse and Richardson (83)</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdel-Kalik (83)</td>
<td>political cost or value maximization</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>growth of accounting income</td>
<td>Morse and Richardson</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dividend/unrestricted R.E.</td>
<td>Morse and Richardson</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income/interest expense</td>
<td>Morse and Richardson</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>net tangible assets</td>
<td>Morse and Richardson</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>long-term debts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-if cost of goods (potential tax savings of LIFO over FIFO)</td>
<td>Biddle (80)</td>
<td>value-maximization</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morse and Richardson</td>
<td>value-maximization</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concentration ratio</td>
<td>Hagerman and Zmijewski</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capital intensity</td>
<td>Hagerman and Zmijewski</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdel-Kalik</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risk (beta)</td>
<td>Hagerman and Zmijewski</td>
<td>political cost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective tax rate</td>
<td>Hagerman and Zmijewski</td>
<td>agency and political cost</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>change of corporate personnel</td>
<td>Eggleton-Penman-Twombly</td>
<td>N/A&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industry</td>
<td>Eggleton-Penman-Twombly</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor</td>
<td>Eggleton-Penman-Twombly</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Profit sharing dummy</td>
<td>Hagerman and Zmijewski</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO compensation</td>
<td>Abdel-Kalik</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total debt/Total Assets</td>
<td>Zmijewski-Hagerman (81)</td>
<td>agency</td>
<td>yes&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  
<sup>a</sup> The number in bracket indicates the publication year  
<sup>b</sup> It is significant only in the sample of small firms.  
<sup>c</sup> Eggleton-Penman-Twombly did not elaborate any theory of management motivation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIC Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of LIFO firms</th>
<th>Number of FIFO firms</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>foods and beverages</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>textile products</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>2300</td>
<td>textile-apparel mfrs.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>2400</td>
<td>forest products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500</td>
<td>home furnishings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>2600</td>
<td>paper products</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2700</td>
<td>publishing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2800</td>
<td>chemicals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2900</td>
<td>petroleum products</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000</td>
<td>rubber and plastic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3300</td>
<td>steel products</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3400</td>
<td>metal products</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>3500</td>
<td>machinery</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td>3600</td>
<td>appliances</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>131</td>
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<td>3700</td>
<td>motor vehicle and aircraft</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>3800</td>
<td>instruments</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>3900</td>
<td>leisure goods</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>5100</td>
<td>drug stores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>5300</td>
<td>department stores</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5400</td>
<td>grocery stores</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>672</strong></td>
<td><strong>799</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>(1) LIFO firms</td>
<td>(2) FIFO firms</td>
<td>(3) Behavioral Theory</td>
<td>(4) Hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_1$ net sales</td>
<td>445M$^a$</td>
<td>152M$^a$</td>
<td>P.C., V.M.</td>
<td>$t_1 &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_2$ total assets</td>
<td>349M$^a$</td>
<td>110M$^a$</td>
<td>P.C., V.M.</td>
<td>$t_2 &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_3$ variability of inventories</td>
<td>194$^b$</td>
<td>439$^b$</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_3 &lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_4$ variability of before-tax income</td>
<td>237$^b$</td>
<td>421$^b$</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_4 &lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_5$ long-term debt/equity ratio</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>$t_5 &lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_6$ inventories/net sales</td>
<td>413$^b$</td>
<td>330$^b$</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_6 &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_7$ inventories/total assets</td>
<td>317$^b$</td>
<td>279$^b$</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_7 &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_8$ relative size in net sales</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>P.C., V.M.</td>
<td>$t_8 &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_9$ relative size in total assets</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>P.C., V.M.</td>
<td>$t_9 &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{10}$ gross capital intensity</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>P.C., V.M.</td>
<td>$t_{10} &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{11}$ relative frequency of price increases</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_{11} &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{12}$ debt/equity ratio</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>$t_{12} &lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{13}$ effective tax rate</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>$t_{13} &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{14}$ variability of EPS</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_{14} &lt; 0$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$V_{15}$ inventory growth rates</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>$t_{15} &gt; 0$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$V_{16}$ relative frequency of year-end inventory increases</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>$t_{16} &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{17}$ relative frequency of profitable fiscal years</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>$t_{17} &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{18}$ net capital intensity</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>P.C., V.M.</td>
<td>$t_{18} &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_{19}$ variability of inflation rates</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>V.M.</td>
<td>$t_{19} &lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
$^a$ M represents million dollars.  
$^b$ Average rank, where rank order varies from 1 to 699.  
$^c$ P.C. stands for political cost theory; V.M. for value maximization theory; A. for agency theory; and N.A. for no particular theory applied.  
$^d$ With degree of freedom of 697, the t-statistics are normally distributed.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinant Variable</th>
<th>Analysis 1</th>
<th>Analysis 2</th>
<th>Analysis 3</th>
<th>Analysis 4</th>
<th>Analysis 5</th>
<th>Analysis 6</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit</td>
<td>Probit</td>
<td>Logit</td>
<td>Probit</td>
<td>Logit</td>
<td>Probit</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_1 (2000)</td>
<td>-2.869</td>
<td>-3.012</td>
<td>-3.876</td>
<td>-4.050</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_2 (2200)</td>
<td>-1.319</td>
<td>-1.341</td>
<td>-2.851</td>
<td>-2.786</td>
<td>+0.516</td>
<td>+0.398</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_3 (2300)</td>
<td>-5.007</td>
<td>-6.071</td>
<td>-5.362</td>
<td>-6.081</td>
<td>-1.746</td>
<td>-1.596</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_4 (2400)</td>
<td>-2.773</td>
<td>-3.121</td>
<td>-3.815</td>
<td>-4.114</td>
<td>-0.334</td>
<td>-0.360</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_5 (2500)</td>
<td>-2.550</td>
<td>-3.012</td>
<td>-3.642</td>
<td>-4.044</td>
<td>-1.616</td>
<td>-1.792</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_6 (2600)</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>-2.191</td>
<td>-2.010</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
<td>-0.377</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_8 (2800)</td>
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<td>-5.821</td>
<td>-5.412</td>
<td>-6.039</td>
<td>-1.226</td>
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<td>D_9 (2900)</td>
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<td>-1.872</td>
<td>-3.171</td>
<td>-3.173</td>
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<td>-1.366</td>
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<td>D_10 (3000)</td>
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<td>-3.027</td>
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<td>-3.993</td>
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<td>-0.380</td>
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<td>D_11 (3300)</td>
<td>+2.193</td>
<td>+2.228</td>
<td>+1.574</td>
<td>+1.303</td>
<td>+1.440</td>
<td>+1.364</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_12 (3400)</td>
<td>-4.440</td>
<td>-4.731</td>
<td>-4.117</td>
<td>-4.481</td>
<td>-0.720</td>
<td>-0.858</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_13 (3500)</td>
<td>-7.759</td>
<td>-8.765</td>
<td>-4.613</td>
<td>-5.349</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_14 (3600)</td>
<td>-7.517</td>
<td>-8.954</td>
<td>-7.858</td>
<td>-9.570</td>
<td>-0.753</td>
<td>-0.893</td>
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<td>D_15 (3700)</td>
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<td>-1.082</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_16 (3800)</td>
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<td>-5.022</td>
<td>-1.047</td>
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<td>D_17 (3900)</td>
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<td>-3.662</td>
<td>-4.123</td>
<td>-4.521</td>
<td>-1.753</td>
<td>-0.953</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_18 (5100)</td>
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<td>-3.012</td>
<td>-3.493</td>
<td>-3.928</td>
<td>-1.850</td>
<td>-2.150</td>
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<tr>
<td>D_19 (5300)</td>
<td>+0.000</td>
<td>+0.000</td>
<td>+1.997</td>
<td>+1.785</td>
<td>+0.000</td>
<td>+0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D_20 (5600)</td>
<td>-2.706</td>
<td>-2.845</td>
<td>-3.776</td>
<td>-3.932</td>
<td>-1.333</td>
<td>-1.539</td>
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<tr>
<td>V_11 Price movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+2.655</td>
<td>+2.714</td>
<td>+2.336</td>
<td>+2.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated R^2</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% correctly predicted</td>
<td>85.98</td>
<td>85.98</td>
<td>85.98</td>
<td>85.98</td>
<td>88.24</td>
<td>87.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE:

1. D_1, D_2, ..., D_20, are dummy variables for SIC two-digit industries as indicated in bracket. The description of SIC codes is given in Table 2.

2. V_11 is the relative frequency of price increases during 1960-1979.

3. The value of log-likelihood function when all coefficients are restricted to be zero is -349.900 (same for both logit and probit).

4. The entry is Table 4 is the t-statistic of the estimated coefficient of each proxy variable. Because the degree of freedom is very large, each t-statistic is deemed normally distributed.
Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Determinants</th>
<th>$1.00</th>
<th>$2.00</th>
<th>$3.00</th>
<th>$4.00</th>
<th>$5.00</th>
<th>$6.00</th>
<th>$7.00</th>
<th>$8.00</th>
<th>$9.00</th>
<th>$10.00</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inventory</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-Term Assets</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Liabilities</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Liabilities</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Equity</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each entry is the t-statistic of estimated coefficient.
FOOTNOTES

1. For example, please see Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981), Morse and Richardson (1983), and Abdel-Khalik (1983). A brief literature survey will be given in the next section.

2. The principle of tight prior equilibrium asserts that decision makers so allocate the resources under their control that there is no alternative allocation such that any one decision maker could have his expected utility increased without a reduction occurring in the expected utility of at least one other decision maker. For detail, see Reder (1982).

3. The four accounting methods are (1) depreciation, (2) inventory, (3) investment tax credit and (4) pension costs amortization.

4. In general, once a taxpayer elects the LIFO method, a subsequent change is not available without approval from the Commissioner of IRS.

5. This does not preclude the possibility of finding supporting evidence from the manager's choice of other accounting methods, such as depreciation.

6. For a detailed survey of the literature on the economic consequences of accounting choice, please see Holthausen and Leftwich (1982).

7. Akerlof (1983) provides an interesting theory stating that well-trained, well-meaning bureaucrats (such as managers in large corporations) act selflessly according to their best conscience, yet nevertheless manage to earn more than the competitive wage. Parents often teach their children to be honest, even to the children's own detriment.

8. It is possible that the constrained optimum is so close to the unconstrained optimum that they are empirically indistinguishable. To find empirical support for agency theory and political cost theory, one has to find a case in which the institutional constraint deeply "bites." Since institutional constraints are not binding on the choice of inventory accounting methods, inventory accounting choice is a sterile case for the study of agency theory and political cost theory.

9. There was a peculiarity in Hagerman-Zmijewski's sample. Their "random sample" of firms consisted of 151 FIFO firms and 149 LIFO firms. A careful study of the Compustat file reveals that the population ratio of LIFO firms/FIFO firms is less than one to six. Many firms cannot be classified into either category.

10. Goneses (1979) has an extensive discussion of this point.

11. In International Economics, the Ricardian model explains the trade pattern in terms of production-investment opportunity set and Heckscher-Ohlin model in terms of relative factorial intensity. Here, we explain "accounting pattern" in terms of production-investment opportunity set; hence we call our model Ricardian.
12. For a more detailed discussion, please see McCarthy, Crumbley and Davis (1983, Ch. 15).

13. Lee and Petrucci (1983) developed a stochastic model of inventory accounting choice. They first model stochastic processes of the movements of inventory prices and quantities. Then they derive a modified Black-Scholes formula to evaluate the adoption of an inventory accounting method.

14. Merton (1973) and Black and Scholes (1973) discuss in detail the conditions of rational option pricing.

15. LIFO was deemed acceptable for tax purposes in 1939, and it has been used in the steel and petroleum industries since the late 1940s. A large number of firms switched to LIFO in 1974 and 1975.

16. In this paper, we examine the firms which have strictly adopted the LIFO or the FIFO method for at least seven years. Hence we are not concerned with the switch of accounting methods. Lee and Petrucci (1983) calculated the "dividend" and study the optimal timing of the accounting switch.

17. This ratio is called coexistence of variance which is unit-neutral and is generally independent of firm size.

18. Here, I implicitly assume that the FIFO firms cannot subtract tax benefit from additional inventory control. Lee and Petrucci (1983) show that when a FIFO firm anticipates switching to the LIFO method, it is profitable to increase inventory variability.

19. The issue of simultaneous equation bias can be viewed as a special case of errors-in-variables problem. For reference, see Griliches (1974). However, our results are not changed by this consideration.

20. We also measured the price variability in terms of the coefficient of variance of inflation rate. Under this measurement, our estimation of the effect of price variability on choice of accounting method is not statistically significant.

21. The junior author is responsible for the programming and computation, and the senior author is responsible for all the remaining errors.
References

Abdel-Kalik, A.R. "The Decision To Change To LIFO: The Role of Executive Compensation and the Political Cost Hypothesis." Working paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983.


