38.620
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 03.05.2006
C(2006) 1766 final

COMMISSION DECISION

of 03.05.2006

relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty

and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/F/38.620 – Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate)

(Only the English, French and Italian texts are authentic)

Version to be notified to:

Akzo Nobel NV
Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB
Eka Chemicals AB
Degussa AG
FMC Corporation
FMC Foret S.A.
Kemira OYJ
Solvay SA/NV

(Text with EEA relevance)
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Remark:
Throughout the decision, '[Deleted]' signifies a passage which was removed for publication purposes by the Commission.
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and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/F/38.620 – Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate)

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(Text with EEA relevance)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and, in particular, Articles 7(1) and 23(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Commission Decision of 26 January 2005 to initiate proceedings in this case,

Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the objections raised by the Commission pursuant to Article 27(1) of Regulation EC No 1/2003 and Articles 10 and 12 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty,

After consulting the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions,

Having regard to the final report of the Hearing Officer in this case,

Whereas:

_________________________________________________________________________

1. SUMMARY OF THE INFRINGEMENT

(1) This Decision is addressed to the following undertakings:

- Akzo Nobel NV
- Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB
- EKA Chemicals AB
- Degussa AG
- Edison SpA
- FMC Corporation
- FMC Foret S.A.
- Kemira OYJ
- L’Air Liquide SA
- Chemoxal SA
- Snia SpA
- Caffaro Srl
- Solvay SA/NV
- Solvay Solexis SpA
- Total SA
- Elf Aquitaine SA
- Arkema SA

(2) The addressees of this Decision participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement regarding hydrogen peroxide and its downstream product sodium perborate, covering the whole EEA territory, hereinafter “the infringement”. The infringement started at least on 31 January 1994 and lasted at least until 31 December 2000 and consisted mainly of competitors exchanging commercially important and confidential market- and/or company relevant information, limiting and/or controlling production as well as potential and actual capacities, allocating market shares and customers, and fixing and monitoring (target) prices.
2. THE INDUSTRY SUBJECT TO THE PROCEEDING

2.1. The products

(3) Hydrogen peroxide (hereinafter “HP” or “H₂O₂”) is a strong oxidising agent which has several industrial applications. It is a clear, colourless liquid which is available commercially as an aqueous solution in concentrations mainly ranging from 30% to 70%. It is usually stored at 50% concentration. Some properties of HP are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Properties of hydrogen peroxide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific gravity at 25° C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freezing point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₂O₂ partial pressure at 25° C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiling point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) HP can be transported safely at concentrations up to 70%. To ensure safe transport and to limit decomposition if the solution is diluted for on-site storage HP solutions are often stabilised with additives. Transport costs are an important item in the calculation of the ultimate selling price. The investigation has shown that the logistics (transport and storage) costs amount to over one third of the total HP production costs.

(5) As a final product HP is used as a bleaching agent in the pulp and paper manufacturing industries, for the bleaching of textiles, for disinfection and for other environmental applications such as sewage treatment. HP is also used as a raw material for the production of other downstream peroxigen products, such as persalts (which include sodium perborate and sodium percarbonate) and peracetic acid.

(6) In particular, a chemical reaction between HP, caustic soda and boron-minerals (such as sodium borate) produces sodium perborate (hereinafter “PBS”), which is mainly used as an active substance in synthetic detergents and washing powders, whilst a reaction between HP and soda ash produces sodium percarbonate (hereinafter “PCS”), also mainly employed for the manufacturing of detergents and washing powders. PCS could be considered a technical development of PBS, differing from PBS as regards the degree of effectiveness and the resulting differences in the (downstream) production chain.

(7) Information provided to the Commission by several undertakings uses the term “persalts” when referring to PBS and/or PCS. Persalts can be considered a group of crystalline chemicals which are manufactured from HP and a number of secondary raw materials. Although other types of persalts exist, in the current Decision the term “persalts” refers solely to PBS and PCS jointly.

(8) Persalts are used exclusively as a raw material in the formulation of powdered detergents (in both powder and tablet form). They are not themselves active ingredients but serve as carrier substances for active oxygen, which is released as H₂O₂ carried within the persalts, and is the actual bleaching agent. The incorporation of persalts in washing powders therefore enables the active oxygen to be released into the water.
PBS accounted for approximately 45% of all persalts production in 2002 (around 380 KTons), while PCS accounted for 55%. The production percentage of PCS has progressively been increasing over the last five/six years, during which a gradual substitution of PBS by PCS has taken place, due to the lower environmental concerns related to PCS. Other factors are that PCS has dual functionality (as a bleaching agent and source of alkali), a higher dissolution rate, reduces the chemical load per wash and avoids the large-scale use of boron, which is not environmentally-friendly. However, some detergent manufacturers have deliberately chosen not to change their production formula containing PBS, either in order to minimize the risks inherent to changing formula or because they also sell detergents in countries having a particularly hot and humid climate (the stability of PCS in such conditions being inferior to that of PBS). For those reasons amongst others, there exists only a limited level of substitutability between PBS and PCS, in spite of their similar uses.

PBS exists in several nearly identical varieties, the two most important of which are sodium perborate monohydrate ("PBS1") and sodium perborate tetrahydrate ("PBS4"). The reference to these two varieties is made because of their use as reference products for the price increases that were discussed between the producers of PBS. PBS4 is manufactured by reacting HP with sodium metaborate under aqueous conditions followed by crystallisation, separation by centrifuge and fluid bed drying. Sodium metaborate is prepared by the reaction of caustic soda with boron. PBS1 is manufactured by further fluid bed drying of PBS4 to remove the water of crystallisation. PBS1 provides a high available oxygen content equivalent to 32% HP, namely 50% more active oxygen than the same weight of PBS4.

PBS1, PBS4 and PCS contain different concentrations of available oxygen:

- **PBS1**: 15% available oxygen
- **PBS4**: 10% available oxygen
- **PCS**: 13% to 13.5% available oxygen.

This means that a washing powder needs a different concentration of persalts, depending on which type is used, in order to deliver the same volume of available oxygen for the washing process.

In previous merger decisions\(^4\), the Commission considered the market for HP to be distinct from those of other bleaching agents, including that of persalts. For some applications and when it is used as a raw material for persalts, there are no possible substitutes for HP. For disinfecting applications, other possible products could be used but there is no alternative product which is as environmentally friendly.

A number of other bleaching chemicals exist, which could theoretically be in competition with HP and PBS/PCS respectively, since they have similar applications, such as peracetic acid and chlorine dioxide. Peracetic acid is mainly used for bleaching of pulp and paper and for disinfecting. Chlorine dioxide is used for pulp and paper bleaching and as a raw material for the production of sodium chlorite (used for water purification). However, the latter products do not enter into competition with HP and PBS/PCS because they could become substitutable products only if major changes were made in the production chain used by the customers. Their equipment is adapted to a particular group of bleaching agents, so that switching to a different agent involves very high switching costs.

Even though PBS and PCS have been jointly referred to by certain undertakings involved in the current proceedings, the investigation has not shown that the infringing behaviour also extended to PCS. This Decision therefore covers unlawful behaviour only as regards HP and PBS, not as regards PCS.

2.2. The Market Players

The following undertakings participated in the agreements and/or concerted practices relating to HP and PBS described in this Decision.

2.2.1. Akzo Nobel, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding and EKA Chemicals

The Akzo Nobel group of companies is active in the areas of healthcare, coatings, chemicals, and, until the end of 1999, fibres. The ultimate holding company of the group is Akzo Nobel N.V. based in Arnhem, the Netherlands.

Since 1993-1994, the Akzo Nobel group has been organised on the basis of a two-layer structure: a "corporate centre" and directly underneath approximately 20 Business Units ("BUs"). The corporate centre co-ordinates the most important tasks with regard to general strategy of the group, that is to say finance, legal affairs and human resources. The BUs each have their own General Manager, management team and supporting services responsible for the entire operational management of the BU. The BU management operates within the limits of the financial and strategic targets set out by the corporate centre and are bound by the "Business Principles" and "Corporate Directives" applicable to the entire Akzo Nobel group. The person in charge of each organisational unit at a specific level has a duty to report on those activities to a higher level.

The BU responsible for HP production and sales during the period 1994 to the present day has been the Pulp & Paper Chemicals BU, which consists of the following legal entities active in the EU and/or EEA:

- Eka Chemicals AB, Bohus, Sweden, active in production and sales;
- Eka Kemi AB, Alby, Sweden, a HP production unit for EKA Chemicals which later merged into Eka Chemicals AB in 1999;

The information about Akzo has been drawn from the replies to Commission’s requests for information as well as from the Akzo and EKA corporate internet sites. [Deleted] See the website www.ekachemicals.com as well as the webpage www.akzonobel.com/company/business.asp.
– Eka Chemicals Rjukan A/S, Rjukan, Norway, which is 100% owned by Eka Chemicals Norge A/S, which is in turn 100% owned by EKA Chemicals AB.

(19) Eka Chemicals AB (hereinafter “EKA”) is a company incorporated under Swedish law based in Bohus, near Gothenburg. Founded in 1895 under the name ElektroKemiska Aktiebolaget AB, EKA started to manufacture HP in 1930. It was acquired by Nobel Industrier in 1986 and was renamed EKA Nobel AB. On 25 February 1994, Nobel Industrier was acquired by Akzo and became a part of the Akzo Nobel Group. Following this, EKA Nobel AB changed its name into EKA Chemicals AB in April 1996. After the acquisition by Akzo, the company directly and wholly controlling EKA was, until 31 December 2003, the Swedish (holding) company Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB, which in turn was controlled by Akzo Nobel AB, Stockholm, Sweden. This last company was in turn controlled by Akzo Nobel NV. On 1 January 2004 the latter acquired direct control over EKA Chemicals AB, which is therefore currently 100% controlled by Akzo Nobel NV (hereinafter “Akzo”)

(20) EKA still manufactures HP but it produced and sold PBS only until 1996-1997, when it developed the capacity to produce PCS which it manufactured up to 2001. Hence, currently EKA does not produce persalts any longer.

(21) The world-wide turnover of Akzo was EUR 13,000 million in 2005. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB had no turnover in 2005 while EKA’s turnover in 2005 was EUR 437 million world-wide. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnover relating to the HP business during the last years of the infringement was as follows (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[85-95]</td>
<td>[50-60]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[90-100]</td>
<td>[45-55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(22) EKA belongs to the undertaking that is headed by Akzo Nobel N.V. Akzo controlled EKA through a number of intermediary companies (all with 100% shareholding) until 1 January 2004, when EKA became a direct 100% subsidiary of Akzo. Even though the highest entity of the undertaking that participated in the infringement is Akzo (or its predecessors), the undertaking will be referred to as EKA for the purposes of this Decision, given that this was the name of the legal entity belonging to the Akzo group that was directly involved in the infringement and to which the evidence used in this Decision refers.

2.2.2. Degussa

(23) Degussa AG, (hereinafter “Degussa”) based in Düsseldorf, Germany, was founded in 1873. It started manufacturing HP in 1908 and PBS in 1904. PCS has been produced since the 1970s, but only since 2002 has it been sold in large quantities.

(24) Degussa’s main shareholder is currently the German company RAG AG (the former Ruhrkohle AG, hereinafter “RAG”), based in Essen, which holds more than 97% of the shares. The remaining approximately 3% is floated.
Between 1994 and 1997 the major shareholder in Degussa was the German Gesellschaft für Chemiewerte mbH (“GFC”) with a 36.4% shareholding, the other shares being dispersed. Between 1997 and 2000, Degussa’s main shareholder was Veba AG (via 64.6%), which acquired GFC’s 36.4% share. Degussa merged with the chemical undertaking Hüls AG, the result being the company Degussa-Hüls AG. The E.ON Group, in turn, resulted from the merger between Viag AG and Veba AG on 16 June 2000. From 16 June 2000 until 31 January 2001, E.ON held 64.7% in Degussa-Hüls AG. On 1 February 2001, Degussa-Hüls AG and SKW Trostberg AG merged and the current Degussa was created. From 1 February 2001 until 31 January 2003, E.ON held 64.5% of Degussa. Following a public offering in January 2003, RAG and the E.ON Group of companies each held 46.5% of Degussa until 30 June 2004. From 1 July 2004 until January 2006, RAG held 50.1% and E.ON held 42.86%, with 7.04% being floated. On 25 January 2006, RAG made a public acquisition offer to the remaining shareholders of Degussa which enabled RAG to acquire more than 4% of the floated shares. After that, E.ON transferred its shares to the RAG Projektgesellschaft mbH, a wholly owned (indirect) subsidiary of RAG. Consequently, as stated in the previous recital, RAG AG today holds more than 97% of Degussa’s shares.

Degussa manufactures various specialty chemicals. It currently has three divisions: Technology Specialties, Consumer Solutions and Specialty Materials. The “Construction Chemicals division” was sold to the BASF group in early 2006, although the sale is subject to the approval of the competent competition authorities.

Degussa’s other subsidiaries involved in the production and sales of the products concerned are:

– MedAvox Srl (hereinafter MedAvox), which is a company incorporated under Italian law active in the production and sales of persalts. MedAvox was founded in October 2001, that is to say, after the end of the infringement. Initially it was equally owned (50/50) by Degussa and Ausimont SpA. The members of the Board were appointed by Ausimont and Degussa. Following the Commission’s decision of 9 April 2002, in the framework of the acquisition of Ausimont by the Solvay group, Ausimont’s 50% share in Medavox was sold to Degussa with effect from 1 January 2003. Thus MedAvox is today a 100% subsidiary of Degussa.

– Aktivsauerstoff GmbH, which is a company incorporated under Austrian law founded in 1994 and active in the production and sale of PBS and PCS in Austria and in eastern European countries. Degussa CEE GmbH (a wholly owned subsidiary of Degussa) owns a 51% share, whereas the Austrian Company Treibacher Industrie AG owns the remaining 49%. Both Degussa CEE and Aktivsauerstoff GmbH are consolidated in Degussa.

Degussa’s world-wide turnover (including its direct subsidiaries) was EUR 11,750 million in 2005. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnovers relating to the HP and PBS business were as follows (in EUR millions):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[140 - 150]</td>
<td>[25 - 35]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[160 - 170]</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[200 - 230]</td>
<td>[25 - 35]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[55 - 65]</td>
<td>[40 - 50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[70 - 80]</td>
<td>[40 - 50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[80 - 90]</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP and PBS world-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
<th>HP and PBS EEA-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[285 - 315]</td>
<td>[65 - 75]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.3. **Edison (and Ausimont)**

(29) Edison SpA (previously named Montedison SpA) is based in Milan, Italy and listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. It functions as a holding company for a group of companies involved, mainly, in power production, with about 10,000 MW of hydroelectric, fossil-fuelled and wind-powered generating capacity. Before the restructuring that was completed in 2003, the former Montedison group achieved about 70% of its turnover through subsidiaries that produce food, starch, animal feed, and so on. For the period of the infringement described in this Decision, the entity within the Edison group involved in the production and sales of HP and persalts was the company **Ausimont SpA** (see section 2.2.4). During this period (until 2000) Ausimont was 100% controlled by the company Montecatini SpA, which in turn was wholly owned by Montedison SpA. In the restructuring, Montedison absorbed its electricity and natural gas production subsidiary “Edison”. It was joined with other businesses controlled by the company Italenergia Bis SpA, which operated as the vehicle for the restructuring. Montedison then adopted the current Edison name in 2002. Italenergia Bis completed the reorganisation in 2003 by absorbing Edison into Italenergia SpA, a separate subsidiary of Italenergia Bis. Italenergia SpA then took on the “Edison” name. The current **Edison SpA** (hereinafter **“Edison”**) exercised control over Ausimont until the sale of Ausimont SpA to Solvay, which took place in 2002 (see also recital (47)).

(30) Edison’s world-wide turnover was EUR 4,065 million in 2005 while the Edison group of companies in 2005 had a world-wide turnover of approximately EUR 6,650 million.
2.2.4. Ausimont (currently Solvay Solexis)

(31) The Italian company **Solvay Solexis SpA** (hereinafter “**Solexis**”, to avoid any confusion with the current parent company Solvay SA) was formerly named **Ausimont SpA** (hereinafter “**Ausimont**”). It was founded in 1981 and was wholly owned by Montecatini SpA, which in turn was 100% controlled by Montedison SpA (now Edison SpA, see section 2.2.3) until 2000. Between the year 2000 and the sale of the company to Solvay, in May 2002, Ausimont was a majority owned subsidiary of Montedison SpA through the intermediate company Agorà SpA. Agorà SpA, which had a 100% shareholding in Ausimont, was controlled at 80% by Montedison, the remaining 20% being owned by the company Longside International SA. After the sale to Solvay in May 2002 (thus after the end of the infringement) and the subsequent restructuring, Ausimont merged into Agorà SpA, which changed its name to Ausimont SpA in the summer of 2002. On 1 January 2003 Ausimont SpA was renamed Solvay Solexis SpA and it is now [indirectly nearly] 100% owned by Solvay.

(32) Ausimont was active in the development, production and marketing of fluorine materials and peroxigen products, including HP and persalts. After Solvay’s acquisition, as part of an overall business strategy, Ausimont’s assets were joined with the fluoropolymer activities of Solvay. In the course of 2002 the assets relating to the production of HP in Italy and to all persalts were sold to Degussa.

(33) The 2005 world-wide turnover of Solexis was EUR 256.2 million. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnovers relating to the HP and PBS business of Ausimont were as follows (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP and PBS world-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
<th>HP and PBS EEA-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[70 - 80]</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.5. FMC Corporation/FMC Foret

(34) FMC Foret S.A. (hereinafter “FMC Foret”), based in San Cugat del Vallés, Barcelona, Spain, is a company wholly owned by FMC Corporation (hereinafter “FMC”), based in Philadelphia, USA. FMC’s ownership of FMC Foret is effected through FMC Chemicals Netherlands B.V., based in Farmsum, the Netherlands, a (holding) company which holds 100% of shares of FMC Foret and is in turn wholly owned by FMC.

(35) FMC Foret sells the goods manufactured by FMC Industrial Chemicals B.V., a company incorporated in the Netherlands, which was until 1999 directly controlled by FMC Foret. In 1999 FMC Foret sold its 100% shareholding in FMC Industrial Chemicals BV to FMC Chemicals Netherlands B.V.

(36) FMC Foret’s activities are organised in five product lines, one of which is the “peroxigens” line, including HP and persalts. Two thirds of the sales of these products relate to detergent applications. The manufacture of PBS started in 1945 while the commercialisation of PCS started only in 2002.

(37) In 2005 FMC Foret’s total turnover was EUR 221.8 million, whereas FMC’s world-wide turnover was USD 2,150 million\(^6\). The world-wide and EEA-wide turnovers relating to HP and PBS business were as follows (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[25 - 35]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[30 - 40]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[40 - 50]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[35 - 45]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HP and PBS world-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
<th>HP and PBS EEA-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[55 - 65]</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) According to FMC Corp’s estimates, this corresponds to 1,822 million EUR.
2.2.6. Kemira

(38) Kemira is a Finnish undertaking established in 1933 and based in Helsinki. The company name has changed several times over the years. Between 1972 and 1997 its name was Kemira Chemicals OY, a limited company listed on the Helsinki stock exchange as from 1994. On 1 September 1997 Kemira changed its name into Kemira OYJ. The chemicals business was operated under the company Kemira Chemicals and was wholly owned by the holding company Kemira OYJ. As from 1 January 2004 Kemira Chemicals merged into Kemira OYJ (hereinafter “Kemira”) and was dissolved as a separate legal entity. The Finnish State holds at present 56.2 % of Kemira’s shares and votes. The core areas of its business are pulp and paper chemicals, water treatment chemicals and paints and coatings. Plant nutrients and industrial chemicals are also significant products. Kemira is active in the production, marketing and sales of HP and PCS (the latter since 1998). It does not manufacture PBS.

(39) Other companies of the Kemira group (all 100% owned by Kemira) involved in the production and/or sales of the products concerned (HP only, Kemira not producing PBS, but PCS) in the EEA are:

- Kemira Chemicals BV, Rozenburg, the Netherlands (production and sales);
- Kemira Kemi AB, Helsingborg, Sweden (production and sales);
- Kemira Chemie GmbH, Alzenau, Germany (sales);
- Kemira Chimie SA, Paris, France (sales);
- Kemira Iberica SA, Barcelona, Spain (sales);
- Kemira Chemie GmbH, Krems, Austria (sales).

(40) The name used in this Decision to refer to all entities in the Kemira group that participated in the infringement is ‘Kemira’.

(41) Kemira Group’s world-wide net sales were EUR 1,994 million in 2005. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnover relating to the HP business was as follows (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
<td>[35 - 45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[80 - 90]</td>
<td>[40 - 50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[90 - 100]</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.7. L’Air Liquide/Chemoxal

(42) Founded in 1902 and based in Paris, France, L’Air Liquide SA (hereinafter “Air Liquide”) is a leading company in the sector of industrial and medical gases and related services. The company's core business is the supply of oxygen, nitrogen,
hydrogen and many other gases and services to various industries. In the period until 1998 (when the group exited the markets) the following companies of the Air Liquide group were involved in the production and sale of HP and persalts:

- **Chemoxal SA** (hereinafter “Chemoxal”), Paris, France, which was founded in 1990 under the name Altichem SA and was 100% controlled by Air Liquide. The company was renamed Chemoxal SA shortly after. In March 1991 responsibility for marketing activities in relation to bleaching agents, including HP and persalts, which did not belong to the core business of Air Liquide, was allocated to Chemoxal. In the sector of bleaching agents Chemoxal sold HP and persalts (mainly PBS) manufactured by Oxysynthèse SA (and later also by Oxysynthèse Deutschland GmbH) only until 1998, when it stopped being active in that industry. More precisely, Chemoxal stopped selling persalts in 1994 and the sales of HP mid 1998.

- Chemoxal Chemie GmbH was the 100%-owned German sales subsidiary of Air Liquide Deutschland GmbH (itself a 100% subsidiary of the Air Liquide group) until June 1998, when it was sold to the Elf Atochem group. It used to sell the products purchased from Chemoxal SA in Germany.

- Oxysynthèse SA was, until May 1998, jointly owned (50/50) by Air Liquide and Atochem (for the description of Oxysynthèse SA see section 2.2.10) and produced both HP and persalts. In June 1998 Air Liquide sold its share to Elf Atochem.

- Oxysynthèse Deutschland GmbH, 50/50 equally owned by Air Liquide Deutschland GmbH and Elf Atochem Deutschland GmbH, owned the production plant of Leuna. The 50% share was also sold by Air Liquide to the group Elf Atochem in 1998.

(43) In this Decision Air Liquide’s name is used to indicate the activities of the Air Liquide group in the business and in the infringement.

(44) The Air Liquide group of companies had a consolidated world-wide turnover of EUR 10,400 million in 2005. Chemoxal had a turnover of EUR [1-10] million in 2005. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnovers relating to the HP and PBS business in the last full years of sales of each product (in EUR millions) were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>[15 - 25]</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>[5 - 15]</td>
<td>[5 - 15]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>[0 - 10]</td>
<td>[0 - 10]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.8. **Snia/Caffaro**

(45) Caffaro SpA based in Milan, Italy, was established in 1906 and was listed on the Italian stock exchange until 2000. After the delisting, Caffaro SpA, at that stage wholly controlled by Snia SpA (hereinafter “Snia”), formerly “Snia BPD SpA”, a holding company quoted on the Italian stock exchange, merged into Snia. Subsequently, Caffaro Spa’s 100% subsidiary Industrie Chimiche Caffaro SpA was renamed Caffaro SpA, today Caffaro Srl (hereinafter “Caffaro”). Snia was the major shareholder in Caffaro SpA throughout the period of the infringement described in this Decision. Caffaro SpA (only) produced PBS, until 1994 directly and from 1994 to 1999 through Industrie Chimiche Caffaro SpA. In 1999 the group ceased the production of PBS and exited the market of bleaching agents. In this Decision Caffaro’s name is used to indicate the activities of all entities of the Snia group in the infringement.

(46) The Snia group had a world-wide turnover of EUR 124 million in 2005 while Caffaro had a total turnover of EUR 120 million in 2005. Caffaro had the following world-wide and EEA-wide turnover relating to PBS business in the last full years of sales of the product (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
<td>[5 - 15]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.9. **Solvay**

(47) Solvay SA/NV (hereinafter “Solvay”) based in Brussels, Belgium, is a public limited company. Its shares are listed on the Euronext Brussels stock exchange and certain other stock exchanges. Solvac SA, an investment company whose sole activity is to hold shares in Solvay, holds approximately 26% of all Solvay shares. One of the 16 directors of Solvay is also a director of Solvac, but is said not to have any influence on the policy and strategic decisions of Solvay. Solvay is active in many chemical sectors and organised into four main sectors (according to the BUs): (a) chemical sector, (b) plastics sector, (c) processing sector, (d) pharmaceutical sector. Until 1997, the BU “chemical sector” was split into two units, namely the alkali products and the peroxygen products. The latter dealt with the HP and persalts business. The new chemical sector was divided into a number of different “Strategic Business Units” (SBUs). The SBUs of relevance are the “Hydrogen Peroxide SBU” (which covers HP and Sodium Chlorate) and the “Detergents SBU” (which covers persalts).

(48) The subsidiaries that are involved in the production and sales of HP and persalts are:

- Finnish Peroxides OY/AB (hereinafter “Finnish Peroxides”), renamed Solvay Chemicals Finland OY/AB as of 1 January 2006, based in Voikkaa, Finland, which manufactures and sells HP mainly in the Nordic countries. The company was initially a four-way JV between Solvay, Laporte, Nokia and Kymmene. In 1991 the Solvay group acquired Laporte’s 25% shareholding through the subsidiary Solvay Interox Holding BV (see below) and in 1997 it acquired
Nokia’s 25% shareholding directly. Subsequently Solvay transferred its shareholding in Finnish Peroxides to Solvay Interox Holding BV. In March 2005 Solvay acquired the remaining 25% shareholding from UPM-Kymmene. The holding of 50% of the shares in the period 1991-1997 allowed Solvay, as Solvay itself has stated, to exercise decisive influence over the business of Finnish Peroxides. Therefore it is the Commission’s conclusion that Finnish Peroxides formed part of the undertaking Solvay for the entire duration of the infringement;

- Ausimont SpA, which was acquired on 7 May 2002 from Montedison SpA (now Edison, see recital (31)) and Longside International SA. Following the merger decision of the Commission of 9 April 2002\(^7\), Ausimont’s Italian HP business and its entire persalts business (mainly administrated by MedAvox) were sold to Degussa in December 2002. Ausimont SpA changed its name to Solvay Solexis SpA as from 1st January 2003 (see heading 2.2.4);

- Solvay Interox SA, Brussels, Belgium;

- Solvay Interox Holding BV, Weesp, the Netherlands, which is also a vehicle for the possession of holdings in other subsidiaries, such as Finnish Peroxides;

- Solvay Interox SA, Paris, France;

- Solvay Chimica Italia SPA, Milan, Italy;

- Solvay Interox SA, Barcelona, Spain;

- Solvay Interox GmbH, Hanover, Germany;

- Solvay Interox Production Peroxidados Lda, Lisbon, Portugal;

- Solvay Interox Ltd, Warrington, United Kingdom.

(49) The name used in this Decision to refer to all legal entities in the Solvay group that participated in the infringement is ‘Solvay’.

(50) The consolidated world-wide turnover of the Solvay group amounted to EUR 8,562 million in 2005. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnover relating to the HP and PBS business was as follows (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[180 – 210]</td>
<td>[60 - 70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[190 - 220]</td>
<td>[65 - 75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[215 - 245]</td>
<td>[70 - 80]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Case COMP/M.2690, quoted above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[90 - 100]</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[95 - 105]</td>
<td>[50 - 60]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[90 - 100]</td>
<td>[40 - 50]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP and PBS world-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
<th>HP and PBS EEA-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[310 - 340]</td>
<td>[120 - 130]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.10. **Total/Elf Aquitaine/Arkema**

(51) **Arkema S.A.** (hereinafter “Arkema”), based in La Defense, Puteaux, France, was created under the name Atochem S.A. (hereinafter “Atochem”) on 30 September 1983 from the merger of Cloè Chimie (a joint venture company then owned by Elf, CFP and Rhone-Poulenc), Ato Chimie and the biggest part of the chemical activity of the group Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann. During the infringement, **Elf Aquitaine SA** (hereinafter “Elf Aquitaine”) was the main shareholder (97.5%) of Atochem which had changed its name to Elf Atochem SA in 1992. The company became Atofina SA (hereinafter ‘Atofina’) on 17 April 2000, after a takeover of the Elf group by the TotalFina group by means of a public offering. Atofina changed its name to Arkema on 4 October 2004. Since April 2000 Atofina has been controlled (96.48%) by Elf Aquitaine, which is now in turn almost wholly owned (99.43%) by **Total SÀ** (formerly TotalFinaElf SA, hereinafter “Total”), a company listed on the Paris stock exchange. Atochem/Atofina was involved in the production and sale of both HP and persalts. However, the PBS plants were closed down in September 1999.

(52) Another company of the Total group involved in the production of HP and persalts was:

- **Oxysynthèse SA**, Paris, France. Until May 1998 this company was owned equally (50/50) by Elf Atochem SA and Air Liquide SA (see above, section 2.2.7), both of which had an equal right to appoint the members of the board. Oxysynthèse SA was active in the production of both HP and persalts (the latter only until 1994). The products manufactured by Oxysynthèse used to be sold to both Atochem and Chemoxal, which dealt with the marketing and sales. In May 1998 Atochem bought Air Liquide’s 50%-share becoming the sole stakeholder of Oxysynthèse SA. In 1999 Oxysynthèse was incorporated into Elf Atochem SA and disappeared as a separate legal entity.

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[Deleted] See also the Atofina corporate website http://www.atofina.com/groupe/gb/f_elf_2.cfm
(53) The name used in this Decision to refer to all entities in the Total group is “Atochem” or “Atofina”, since most documents referred to use Arkema’s previous names Elf Atochem, Atochem and Atofina. Atofina’s new name Arkema will be used to report its replies to the Statement of Objections.

(54) The world-wide consolidated turnover of Arkema was approximately EUR 5.7 billion in 2005, whereas the consolidated turnover of Elf Aquitaine in 2005 was approximately EUR 120 billion and the consolidated turnover of Total in 2005 was EUR 143.2 billion. The world-wide and EEA-wide turnovers relating to the HP and PBS business in the last years of the infringement were as follows (in EUR millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP World-wide</th>
<th>HP EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
<td>[20 - 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[100 - 110]</td>
<td>[35 - 45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>[125 - 135]</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PBS World-wide</th>
<th>PBS EEA-wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
<td>[10 - 20]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[5 - 15]</td>
<td>[5 - 15]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HP and PBS world-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
<th>HP and PBS EEA-wide in the last year of the infringement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>[110 - 120]</td>
<td>[45 - 55]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. Description of the market

2.3.1. The supply

(55) HP: in the EEA there were six main suppliers throughout the period of the infringement: the leading company was Solvay with an approximate market share of [20-30]%, followed by EKA. The other players were Atochem, Kemira, Degussa and FMC Foret. Air Liquide and Ausimont sold HP until June 1998 and May 2002 respectively. Finally there were a small number of resellers importing HP from Eastern European countries and from outside Europe. There have been no new market entrants in recent years.
PBS: the undertakings active in the EEA during the whole of, or part of, the period of the infringement were: Degussa, FMC Foret, Solvay, Caffaro (which however suspended its production in 1999), Atochem (which ceased production in 1999), Air Liquide (stopped in 1994) and Ausimont.

The total amount of HP sales in the EEA was approximately EUR 340 million in 2000\(^9\). Estimated EEA-wide market shares for HP\(^10\) in 1999 and 2000 were as follows:

### EEA-wide market shares for HP in 1999 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eka</td>
<td>[10-20] %</td>
<td>[10-20] %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemira</td>
<td>[10-20] %</td>
<td>[10-20] %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atochem/Atofina</td>
<td>[10-20] %</td>
<td>[10-20] %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Liquide/Chemoxal</td>
<td>[0-10] %</td>
<td>[0-10] %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others(^11)</td>
<td>[0-10] %</td>
<td>[0-10] %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^9\) The size of the market estimated by the Commission is based on the various responses given by the undertakings to the Commission’s request for information. However, the sum of the sold quantities declared by each of the companies is greater than the total market dimension indicated by everyone. The Commission considers that the size of the market is more likely to correspond to the sum of the individual sales. On this basis the Commission has calculated the market share for each competitor both in 1999 and in 2000.

\(^10\) The estimated market shares are based on sales (Euros). In case of data submitted in other currencies, the yearly exchange rates published on the website [http://www.ecu-activities.be/documents/statistiques/yearly_average_1975_1998.htm](http://www.ecu-activities.be/documents/statistiques/yearly_average_1975_1998.htm) fixed as from 1999 were used.

\(^11\) “Others” are represented by small players, like the companies Aragonesas, Sokolov, Belinka, Pulawy etc. i.e. actors operating in local markets (for example in Spain or in the Eastern countries) but with very little market share at EEA level.
The total amount of PBS sales in the EEA was approximately EUR 135 million in 2000\(^{12}\). Estimated EEA-wide market shares for PBS\(^{13}\) in 1999 and 2000 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>1999 EEA</th>
<th>2000 EEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solvay</td>
<td>[30-40]%</td>
<td>[30-40]%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degussa</td>
<td>[20-30]%</td>
<td>[25-35]%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMC Foret</td>
<td>[10-20]%</td>
<td>[10-20]%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausimont</td>
<td>[10-20]%</td>
<td>[10-20]%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caffaro</td>
<td>[0-10]%</td>
<td>[0-10]%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atochem</td>
<td>[0-10]%</td>
<td>[0-10]%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.2. The demand

During the period of the infringement, in the EEA the main purchasers of HP were relatively small in number (six to eight) and mainly from the pulp and paper segment, which negotiated EEA-wide contracts at EEA-wide prices.

Major customers (such as Scandinavian and German pulp and paper manufacturers) negotiated contracts with a single price for multi-site supplies throughout the EEA. Transport costs were thus borne by the supplier, who may therefore have had an interest in obtaining HP from a source situated geographically close to the plants of the customers.

In the persalts domain during the period of the infringement, a very small number of large multinational companies existed on the demand side: 75-80% of EEA purchases of persalts was concentrated in the hands of four of the so-called “big soapers”: Unilever, Procter&Gamble, Henkel and Recklitt-Benckiser. They each had centralised European purchasing operations that negotiated purchases twice a year.

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\(^{12}\) The size of the PBS market estimated by the Commission is based on the various responses given by the undertakings to the Commission’s request for information. However, the sum of the sold quantities declared by each of the companies is greater than the total market dimension indicated by everyone. The Commission considers that the size of the market is more likely to correspond to the sum of the individual sales. On this basis the Commission has calculated the market share for each competitor both in 1999 and in 2000.

\(^{13}\) The estimated market shares are based on sales (in Euros). In case of data submitted in other currencies, the yearly exchange rates published on the website http://www.ecu-activities.be/documents/statistiques/yearly_average_1975_1998.htm fixed as from 1999 were used.
year. They usually purchased persalts from more than one supplier, seeking to maintain a certain degree of competitive pressure.

2.3.3. Geographic scope

(62) The infringement covered the whole of the EEA where demand of the products under investigation existed.

3. PROCEDURE

3.1. The Commission’s investigation

(63) /Recitals (63) – (76) deleted and summarised as follows/: Following Degussa’s application for immunity pursuant to the Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (“the Leniency Notice”14) on 13 December 2002 the Commission carried out inspections at the premises of the undertakings Atofina, Solvay and Degussa on 25 and 26 March 2003 in accordance with article 14 of Regulation n° 1715, first regulation implementing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. The Commission later received other leniency applications from the involved undertakings EKA, Solvay, Atofina, Solexis and Kemira.

(77) On 26 January 2005, the Commission initiated proceedings in this case and adopted a Statement of Objections notified to the addressees of this Decision.

(78) The companies had access to the Commission’s investigation file in the form of a CD ROM, sent contemporaneously with the Statement of Objections, which contained accessible material in the file. Regarding five oral statements, the parties were given the opportunity to listen to the recordings and to read the transcripts at the Commission’s premises. On 3 May 2005 the Commission sent to all parties another CD-ROM with additional documents to which access could be granted.

(79) Having replied in writing to the Statement of Objections, all the addressees of this Decision also attended the oral hearing, which was held on 28-29 June 2005.

(80) On 21 and 24 February 2006 the Commission addressed requests for information under Article 18 of Regulation No 1/2003 asking for turnover figures and further company details which have been included in the present Decision.

3.2. Previous investigations

(81) The markets for HP and PBS were the subject of a Commission decision concerning Article 85 of the Treaty (currently Article 81) in 198416. The undertakings involved in the agreements and/or concerted practices concerned

were Solvay, Laporte Industries Plc\textsuperscript{17}, Degussa, Air Liquide and Produits Chimiques Ugine Kuhlmann (“PCUK”, which then became part of Atochem, now merged into Atofina/Arkema).

(82) According to that Commission decision, those producers had conducted their commercial operations in HP and PBS in the Community on the basis of an agreement or understanding applicable from 1961 onward that each national market was to be reserved for the producers which manufactured inside the territory in question (the “Home Market Rule”).

(83) Fines were imposed on the following undertakings in respect of the infringements found in so far as they applied after the coming into force of Regulation No 17:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Solvay et Cie, Brussels, ECU 3 000 000
  \item Laporte Industries (Holdings) plc, London, ECU 2 000 000
  \item Degussa AG, Frankfurt, ECU 3 000 000
  \item L'Air Liquide SA, Paris, ECU 500 000
  \item Atochem SA, Paris (as successor of PCUK), ECU 500 000
\end{itemize}

(84) No appeal was introduced against that decision of the Commission.

3.3. The main evidence relied on in this Decision

(85) The facts as set out in the next section are based principally, but not exclusively, on the following evidence:

\begin{itemize}
  \item the immunity application submitted by Degussa on 13 December 2002 as well as its subsequent statements and replies to questions;
  \item documents collected during the inspections carried out under Article 14 of Regulation No 17 at the premises of Atofina and Solvay on 25/26 March 2003;
  \item leniency applications from EKA dated 29 March 2003, by Atofina dated 3 April 2003 and by Solvay dated 4 April 2003, as well as further submissions by these companies;
  \item answers to various requests for information, in particular those made in the period from 16 April 2003 to 18 March 2004.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{17} In 1992 the Solvay Group acquired the HP and persalts’ business of Laporte Plc. On 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2001 Degussa acquired the undertaking Laporte.
The evidence relied on in this Decision is based on (contemporaneous) documents as well as written and oral statements provided by various parties. The content of the statements has been generally corroborated by statements from other parties or by (documentary) evidence in the Commission file, as referred to in the Decision. In so far as the Commission relies on facts or occurrences for which the source is a statement from a single undertaking, the Commission considers the information to be reliable in view of the other evidence in its possession and in view of the fact that the information has remained uncontested. Notably as regards the information supplied by Degussa, the Commission considers that the evidence obtained from other parties confirms to a very significant degree the information supplied by Degussa in its application for immunity and/or in its later submissions. As a result, the Commission believes that the facts described in this Decision for which the statement of Degussa is the only source to be sufficiently credible to allow the firm conviction that they took place as described. The same is true for the facts that are based on statements by other parties, in so far as no other corroborating sources have been mentioned. Further aspects which add to the credibility of the evidence supplied in those statements are that the evidence is based on information obtained from company employees who directly participated in (and were therefore direct witnesses of) the unlawful contacts\(^\text{18}\). Also, these individuals often held senior positions, which adds to the credibility of the information. Furthermore, the information was supplied to the Commission after mature reflection. Another aspect is that the facts to which the information relates have remained uncontested after the Statement of Objections, unless indicated. Lastly, and more generally, where information from a single source is used, it is considered credible in the light of the existence of a body of consistent evidence, that consists to a larger degree of documentary, contemporaneous information.

### 3.4. Inter-state Trade

(87) There are a limited number of European sites where HP and PBS were manufactured.

(88) During the period of the infringement, the European producers sold their products in almost every EEA country, both directly to end-users and through a network of subsidiaries or independent distributors in the different European countries. Therefore, the market was characterised by important trade flows between Member States of the Community, as well as between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

\(^{18}\) For Degussa, for instance, the persons concerned are [Deleted] (Head of the business line Active Oxygen from 1996 to July 2003) and [Deleted] (Head of department bleaching chemicals until November 1998 and General Manager Bleaching Chemicals from November 1998 to May 2003, directly subordinated to [Deleted]).
4. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

(89) The complex of agreements and concerted practices described in this Decision and in contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty has to be seen in the light of a number of developments between the end of the 1980s and mid 1990s in the sectors of HP and PBS, as described in recitals (90) to (97).

4.1. Technical developments in pulp bleaching: a limited switch from ECF to TCF technology by customers of HP

(90) At the beginning of the 1990s environmental activist groups claimed that the “ECF-method”\(^{19}\) for bleaching pulp was not environmentally-friendly and exercised pressure to replace ECF by a TCF process, using HP as a bleaching agent instead, as it was thought that TCF was more environmentally-friendly.

(91) Therefore, in the first half of the 1990s, there were strong expectations in Europe that HP would become increasingly important as a bleaching agent. Several pulp and paper producers developed projects to substitute ECF-based production processes with TCF-based processes. However, the view that TCF was the less polluting method and thus preferable was subsequently renounced as further research showed that the environmental advantages were much less than foreseen. TCF-methods, therefore, did not develop as much as expected and remained mainly used in the Nordic countries.

(92) In the meantime, all HP producers in Europe were investing extensively and building new production facilities or extending capacity in the existing ones. However, the increase in demand did not meet the expectations of the HP producers so that the additional HP production plants built from 1992 onwards, mainly in Eastern Germany and in the Netherlands, led to an HP overcapacity.

4.2. Captive production: the switching from PBS to PCS

(93) Further market turbulence was created by the structural changes in captive demand that resulted from the switch from PBS to PCS, and which started in the mid 1990s. Almost all existing manufacturers in the EEA, except Atofina and EKA, are vertically-integrated producers and use part of their HP production for captive production of persalts. Whilst the total amount of HP consumed for the production of persalts remained constant, the switch from PBS to PCS had particular effects on the HP capacity utilisation of producers not having PCS production plants and thus not prepared to make, or not capable of making, the switch from PBS production process to PCS. The subsequent reduction of the production of PBS caused therefore a decrease of captive use of HP by the producers of HP and PBS only, who consequently experienced a further increase in unused capacity.

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\(^{19}\) ECF is a chlorine dioxide-based technology for bleaching pulp, where chlorine dioxide is used as a bleaching agent in addition to HP. Alternatively, sulphate pulp can also be bleached with the TCF-method which uses a combination of oxygen, HP and ozone and contains no chlorine-containing agents. The bleaching element in TCF-method is HP.
4.3. Nordic countries: expansion of the producers active in Scandinavia to continental Europe

(94) Until approximately 1994, a certain division within Western Europe existed between on the one hand the continental European market and on the other hand the Nordic market (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland). There were certain differences between these two regions as regards producers (basically EKA was present in the Nordic market only and Kemira’s exports, to Benelux, Germany and France, were of limited size), and prices (according to Degussa, the prices for HP in the Nordic region were steadily below the prices in continental Europe until 1994 and transport costs were too high to make the sales profitable). Also, in terms of demand the regions showed different characteristics, the customers in the Nordic countries consisting principally of pulp producers, whereas in continental Europe textile and detergent producers constituted an important outlet market. Also, consumption patterns (ECF-TCF) resulted in differences in quantity used.

(95) Towards the mid 1990s, however, the manufacturers in Northern Europe increased their supplies in continental European countries, mainly as a result of the building of a new plant by Kemira in the Netherlands in 1992, and a production facility in Helsingborg, Sweden. EKA too started selling into continental Europe, though later (in 1999-2000). Therefore competitive pressure throughout the European area became stronger.

4.4. Former German Democratic Republic (GDR). New plants built using available State aid

(96) Between 1991 and 1992 Solvay, Atochem and Ausimont announced the building of new plants in the eastern part of Germany, respectively at Bernburg, Leuna and Bitterfeld, as the Federal Republic of Germany was striving to re-launch chemical production in the territory of the former GDR. [Deleted] Between 1995 and 1997 the production in those new plants started. As a result, some 115 000 tons of HP, more than 10% of the EEA capacity existing at that time, were added just as demand was stabilising.

(97) This increase of the production capacity had an effect on the European-wide prices of HP, and partially on downstream products, which dropped steadily until they achieved a low point (around 250 EUR per metric ton) in 1997.

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20 Actually, the plant of Leuna used to belong to Oxysynthèse SA, the JV between Atochem and Air Liquide. As from 1999, following the merger of Oxysynthèse into Atochem, the Leuna plant was also transferred to Atochem.

21 According to information provided by EKA “In the late 1990s, the total EEA production capacity for HP amounted to 1.015.000 tons, whereas the total EEA production volume is estimated at 807 000 tons and the consumption (in EEA+Switzerland) at 764 000 tons. From this total EEA volume, it is considered that the Nordic market amounts to approx. 200 000 tons. The value of the EEA HP market in the late 1990s was estimated at 520 million DEM”. The investigation has furthermore shown that the name plate capacity in Western Europe at the end of 1997 was 1.064.000 tons while the actual capacity at the end 1998 was 1.110.000 tons. It arose to 1.170.000 tons at the end of 2001, namely +9.9% in four years. [Deleted]
4.5. **Organisation and structure of the cartel**

4.5.1. **General organisation**

(98) The illicit contacts described below were not based upon any precise formula, although there was some pattern in the contacts that can be discerned. There were generally multilateral meetings every six months and furthermore bilateral contacts at irregular intervals as well as telephone contacts. The cartel meetings were held at different levels: preparatory meetings at the Business Unit level, that took place at different locations (but mainly in Brussels, in Paris or in different cities in Germany), meetings at top management level usually surrounding the half yearly meetings of the CEFIC association (European Chemical Industry Council).

4.5.2. **The essential features of the collusive behaviour**

(99) The infringing behaviour described below in section 4.6 concerning both HP and PBS shows a number of common features:

- a core group of the same undertakings, namely Solvay, Atofina, Degussa, EKA (although it closed down PBS production in 1997), FMC Foret and Ausimont (which sold HP until May 2002) were involved in the anti-competitive behaviour relating to both products;

- there is a direct link between the products under investigation as a considerable part of the HP produced is used as a raw material for the production of its downstream product PBS;

- certain meetings involved anti-competitive arrangements for both products;

- a number of representatives of the undertakings involved in the anti-competitive arrangements had responsibility for both products;

- the same mechanisms applied to both HP and PBS\(^{22}\).

(100) As of 31 January 1994 competitors exchanged and discussed confidential market information about production volumes, their possible reduction and/or the prevention of new capacity being brought onto the market. The competitors also discussed the allocation of clients and market shares and discussed selling prices. [Deleted] By the above mentioned exchange of confidential market information the competitors also ensured the implementation of the cartel agreements by the monitoring scheme instituted by the conspirators whereby they regularly exchanged confidential market- and/or company relevant information, sales volumes and prices information. There is evidence of the implementation of price increases for both HP and PBS which were recognized and monitored at meetings among competitors. In addition the competitors engaged in reducing/mothballing capacity and regularly reviewed the market shares development at the multilateral meetings which made it possible to monitor the developments of each other’s market shares. As regards PBS initial talks occurred where market sensitive data

\(^{22}\) For details on these common features see recital (332).
was exchanged with the aim of achieving an anti-competitive agreement and the ground was prepared for an outright agreement at least as of 15 May 1998.

4.6. The operation of the cartel

4.6.1. The general framework for the meetings between competitors: initial meetings

4.6.1.1. Initial meetings regarding HP

(101) As stated above, competitors involved in HP and persalts production generally met twice a year at CEFIC meetings. Sometimes meetings took place more frequently. At occasions general conversation about the HP market situation took place.

4.6.1.2. Initial meetings regarding PBS

(102) As regards PBS specifically, in the period between 1986 and 1997 official meetings of the working group “Perborates” took place twice a year in the fringe of CEFIC assemblies.

4.6.1.3. Other bilateral and multilateral meetings between Degussa and other competitors in the years 1992-1994 regarding HP

(103) [Deleted]

4.6.2. Meetings during the period of infringing behaviour

(104) [Deleted: Recitals (104)-(285)]

4.6.3. Years 2001-2002, other bilateral contacts between competitors regarding both HP and PBS

(286) [Deleted]

5. THE TREATY AND THE EEA AGREEMENT

5.1. Relationship between the Treaty and the EEA Agreement

(287) The arrangements described in section 4.6 applied to the whole of the territory of the EEA for which a demand for hydrogen peroxide and perborate existed, as the cartel members had sales in practically all the Member States and in the EFTA States which are parties to the EEA Agreement.

(288) The EEA Agreement, which contains provisions on competition analogous to those of the Treaty, entered into force on 1 January 1994.

(289) In so far as the arrangements affected competition in the Common Market and trade between Member States, Article 81 of the Treaty is applicable; as regards the
operation of the cartel in EFTA States which are part of the EEA and its effect upon trade between the Community and EEA States or between EEA States, this falls under Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

5.2. Jurisdiction

(290) In the present case, the Commission is the competent authority to apply both Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement on the basis of Article 56 of the EEA Agreement, since the cartel had an appreciable effect on competition in the Common Market as well as on trade between Member States, as described in section 4.6.

6. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81 OF THE TREATY AND ARTICLE 53 OF THE EEA AGREEMENT

6.1. Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agreement

(291) Article 81(1) of the Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the common market all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions, limit or control production and markets, or share markets or sources of supply.

(292) Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (which is modelled on Article 81(1) of the Treaty) contains a similar prohibition. However, the reference in Article 81(1) of the Treaty to “trade between Member States” is replaced in the former provision by a reference to “trade between Contracting Parties” and the reference to competition “within the common market” is replaced by a reference to competition “within the territory covered by … [the EEA] Agreement”.

6.2. The nature of the infringement in the present case

(293) Articles 81(1) of the Treaty and 53(1) of the EEA Agreement prohibit agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices, where the conditions for the application of those provisions are met.

6.2.1. Agreements and concerted practices

6.2.1.1. Principles concerning agreements and concerted practices

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23 The case-law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in relation to the interpretation of Article 81 of the Treaty applies equally to Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. See Article 6 of the EEA Agreement, Article 3(2) of the EEA Surveillance and Court Agreement. Reference will therefore be made only to Article 81, it being understood that the same considerations apply to Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.
An agreement for the purposes of Article 81(1) of the Treaty can be said to exist when the parties adhere to a common plan which limits or is likely to limit their individual commercial conduct by determining the lines of their mutual action or abstention from action in the market. It does not have to be made in writing; no formalities are necessary, and no contractual sanctions or enforcement measures are required. The fact of agreement may be express or implicit in the behaviour of the parties. Furthermore, it is not necessary, in order for there to be an infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty, for the participants to have agreed in advance upon a comprehensive common plan. The concept of agreement in Article 81(1) of the Treaty would apply to the inchoate understandings and partial and conditional agreements in the bargaining process which lead up to the definitive agreement.24

In Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij N.V. and Others v. Commission (PVC II)25, the Court of First Instance stated that “it is well established in the case-law that for there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article [81(1)] of the Treaty it is sufficient for the undertakings to have expressed their joint intention to behave on the market in a certain way”.26

Although Article 81 of the Treaty draws a distinction between the concept of “concerted practice” and that of “agreements between undertakings”, the object is to bring within the prohibition of these Articles a form of co-ordination between undertakings by which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, they knowingly substitute practical co-operation between them for the risks of competition.

The criteria of co-ordination and co-operation laid down by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, far from requiring the elaboration of an actual plan, must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition, according to which each economic operator must determine independently the commercial policy which it intends to adopt in the common market. Although that requirement of independence does not deprive undertakings of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conduct of their competitors, it strictly precludes any direct or indirect contact between such operators the object or effect of which is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to


26 Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, [1972] ECR, p.619, at paragraph 64.
such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.\(^{27}\)

(298) Thus, conduct may fall under Article 81(1) of the Treaty as a concerted practice even where the parties have not explicitly subscribed to a common plan defining their action in the market but knowingly adopt or adhere to collusive devices which facilitate the co-ordination of their commercial behaviour.\(^{28}\) Furthermore, the process of negotiation and preparation culminating effectively in the adoption of an overall plan to regulate the market may well also (depending on the circumstances) be correctly characterised as a concerted practice.\(^{29}\)

(299) Although in terms of Article 81(1) of the Treaty the concept of a concerted practice requires not only concertation but also conduct on the market resulting from the concertation and having a causal connection with it, it may be presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, that undertakings taking part in such a concertation and remaining active on the market will take account of the information exchanged with competitors in determining their own conduct on the market, all the more so when the concertation occurs on a regular basis and over a long period. Such a concerted practice is caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty even in the absence of anti-competitive effects on the market.\(^{30}\)

(300) Moreover, it is established case law that the exchange, between undertakings, in pursuance of a cartel falling under Article 81(1) of the Treaty, of information concerning their respective deliveries, which not only covers deliveries already made but is intended to facilitate “constant monitoring of current deliveries in order to ensure adequate effectiveness of the agreement”, constitutes a concerted practice within the meaning of that Article.\(^{31}\)

(301) In the case of a complex infringement of long duration, it is not necessary for the Commission to characterise the conduct as exclusively one or other of these forms of illegal behaviour. The concepts of agreement and concerted practice are fluid and may overlap. The anti-competitive behaviour may well be varied from time to time, or its mechanisms adapted or strengthened to take account of new developments. Indeed, it may not even be possible to make such a distinction, as an infringement may present simultaneously the characteristics of each form of prohibited conduct, while when considered in isolation some of its manifestations could accurately be described as one rather than the other. It would however be...

\(^{27}\) Joined cases 40-48/73, etc. Suiker Unie and others v Commission, [1975] ECR, p.1663.

\(^{28}\) See also the judgment of the Court of First Instance in case T-7/89 Hercules v Commission, [1991] ECR, II-1711, at paragraph 256.


\(^{30}\) See also the judgment of the European Court of Justice in case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission, [1999] ECR, I-4287, at paragraphs 158-166.

artificial analytically to sub-divide what is clearly a continuing common enterprise having one and the same overall objective into several different forms of infringement.

(302) In *PVC II*\(^{32}\), the Court of First Instance confirmed that “[i]n the context of a complex infringement which involves many producers seeking over a number of years to regulate the market between them, the Commission cannot be expected to classify the infringement precisely, for each undertaking and for any given moment, as in any event both those forms of infringement are covered by Article [81] of the Treaty”.

(303) An agreement for the purposes of Article 81(1) of the Treaty does not require the same certainty as would be necessary for the enforcement of a commercial contract at civil law. Moreover, in the case of a complex cartel of long duration, the term “agreement” can properly be applied not only to any overall plan or to the terms expressly agreed but also to the subsequent implementation of what has been agreed on the basis of the same mechanisms and in pursuance of the same common purpose. As the Court of Justice, upholding the judgment of the Court of First Instance, has pointed out in *Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA*\(^{33}\) it follows from the express terms of Article 81(1) of the Treaty that agreement may consist not only of an isolated act but also of a series of acts or a course of conduct.

**6.2.1.2. Application to the case**

(304) *[Deleted]* It is described how, at least as from 31 January 1994, the producers of HP and PBS met on a regular basis to exchange market-sensitive information that was relevant to the assessment of their competitive position in the market. As regards HP the facts *[Deleted]* show, more particularly, that at least as from 31 January 1994 competitors had discussions about production volumes, their possible reduction and/or the prevention of new capacity being brought onto the market *[Deleted]*. As regards PBS initial talks occurred where market sensitive data was exchanged with the aim of achieving an anti-competitive agreement in view of an outright agreement that existed at least as of 15 May 1998. Competitors discussed the allocation of clients and market shares *[Deleted]* and discussed selling prices *[Deleted]*.

(305) The purpose of the contacts was to restrict competition *[Deleted]*. It follows from the evidence shown *[Deleted]* that the collusive contacts in the earlier period of the cartel, with a view to restricting competition, led to an outright agreement on prices and market allocation. The earlier period can equally be regarded as forming part of the collusive scheme. In *HFB* the Court of First Instance, after observing that at least at a certain moment, the undertakings concerned had expressed their

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\(^{32}\) Judgment of the Court of First Instance Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others (*PVC II*) quoted above in footnote35, at paragraph 696.

common wish to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way, stated that “it must therefore be found that, even if there was no agreement on all the elements forming the subject-matter of the negotiations, a common wish to restrict competition determined the course of the negotiations” 34.

(306) As stated above in recital (294), and taking into account PVC II, where the Court of First Instance stated that for an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty it is sufficient for the undertakings to have expressed their joint intention to behave on the market in a certain way (see recital (295)), this concept of agreement applies to the inchoate understandings and partial and conditional agreements in the bargaining process which lead up to the definitive agreement. [Deleted].

(307) Also, in Suiker Unie 35, the Court of Justice ruled that any direct or indirect contact between competitors the object or effect of which is to influence the conduct on the market of a competitor or to disclose the course of conduct which they have decided to adopt is strictly precluded.

(308) Furthermore, the content of the discussion between the competitors that took place at least as from 31 January 1994, [Deleted], (exchanges of information on sales volumes, prices and customers) were of such a nature as to allow the producers in question to take account of this information when determining their own behaviour on the market. The Commission presumes therefore in the light of the cited case law (Hüls and Suiker Unie) that, having taken part in such concertation and being active on the market, those undertakings took account of the information exchanged with competitors in determining their own conduct on the market, all the more so because the concertation occurred on a regular basis and over a long period. According to the case law, such a concerted practice is caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty even in the absence of anti-competitive effects on the market.

(309) On the basis of those considerations, the Commission considers that the competitors’ behaviour, even if during the earlier period of the infringement it had not reached the stage where an agreement properly so called was concluded, can at least be characterised, in line with the above case law, as falling under the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) of the Treaty. Indeed, the complex of collusive behaviour in its various forms, [Deleted] presents all the characteristics of an agreement and/or a concerted practice for the purposes of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

(310) Several parties (Solvay, Atofina, Solexis), in their reply to the Statement of Objections, raised arguments that the economic indicators in the period up to 1997/1998 showed conduct inconsistent with any collusive behaviour by the

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35 Judgment of the European Court of Justice in case Suiker Unie and others quoted, paragraphs 174-175.
competitors. They pointed to the increases in production capacity and decreasing prices in the period until 1997 for HP and 1998 for PBS, from which it is apparent that any contacts could not be said to have had any influence on the conduct of the producers in the market and that therefore any contacts that had taken place between competitors were without any effect. At the oral hearing Solvay produced a study used to demonstrate that the economic indicators in the period up to 1997 were rather contrary to the existence of a collusive pattern and based on this analysis concluded that there was no behaviour that could be classed either as a concerted practice or as an agreement in breach of Article 81 of the Treaty.

(311) The Commission replies to these arguments as follows. Regarding the general argument that no agreement or concerted practice could have existed due to the fact that the market indicators (falling prices, increases in capacity) were inconsistent with the existence of an infringement, reference is made to recital (297) where it is explained that the prohibition contained in Article 81(1) of the Treaty strictly precludes any direct or indirect contact between such operators the object or effect of which is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor, or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or are contemplating adopting on the market and that this is the case regardless of its actual effect on the market. Also, the issue of the collusion having had a particular impact on the market should be distinguished from the question whether the information exchange was capable of influencing the market behaviour of the individual operators. In the Commission’s view, the answer to the latter question must in the circumstances of the case be positive. It is nonetheless clear [Deleted] that the collusion had, as from the beginning, the object of restricting competition.

(312) Solvay also raised the argument that the evidence as regards the start of the infringement is insufficient as it was based on evidence from a meeting between EKA and Kemira. According to Solvay, this evidence, provided by EKA, has been left unconfirmed by Kemira, it was second-hand hearsay, the references to ‘discussions’ and ‘negotiations’ are too vague, no understandings or agreements had been reached and the evidence related to a bilateral cartel between EKA and Kemira.

(313) Solvay also presented further specific arguments and notably that the contacts between January 1994 and April/May 1995 could not be classed as an agreement or concerted practice prohibited by Article 81 of the Treaty. For the period between April/May 1995 until August 1997, Solvay indicated that although during this period Solvay shared “some commercial information”, no agreement had been reached and that there was in any case no effect on the market (Solvay did admit, however, that in the period after August 1997 behaviour in breach of Article 81 of the Treaty had taken place).

(314) Solexis used similar arguments as regards the period of its involvement, namely from April/May 1995 until mid-1997 and in particular stated that the ‘playing rules’ were not actually fixed until September 1997 following discussions
which, however, did not lead to an outright agreement and therefore cannot be classified as an agreement and/or concerted practice.

(315) In reply to the arguments raised by Solvay and Solexis, the Commission firstly recalls with regard to the standard of proof in general, that “since the prohibition on participating in anti-competitive agreements and the penalties which offenders may incur are well known, it is normal for the activities which those practices and those agreements entail to take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, most frequently in a non-member country, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum. Even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing unlawful contact between traders, (…) it will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstitute certain details by deduction. In most cases, the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which taken together may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules”\textsuperscript{36}.

(316) In practice, the Commission is often obliged to prove the existence of an infringement under conditions which are hardly conducive to that task, when several years may have elapsed since the time of the events constituting the infringement. Indeed, in \textit{JFE Engineering}, the Court of First Instance ruled that while sufficiently precise and consistent evidence must be produced to support a firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place, “it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement”\textsuperscript{37}.

(317) Therefore, the arguments presented by Solvay do not undermine the Commission’s conviction that at this time exchanges of information were taking place between the competitors, and that, given the reference in the document provided by EKA, Solvay was at that time also party in those contacts. As regards the argument that these contacts had no effect, reference is made to recitals (297) and (304), where it is explained that the Commission considers that exchange of information of the type identified in this case has had the effect of putting the competitors in a position to adapt their market behaviour in the light of the information exchanged and that the exchange took place with the object of restricting competition.

(318) 


\textsuperscript{37} Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 8 July 2004, \textit{JFE Engineering Corp. et al. v Commission}, joined cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 and T-78/00 (\textit{Seamless Steel Tubes}), not yet reported, at paragraph 180.
In relation to the arguments by Solvay and Solexis that during the period April/May 1995 – August 1997 no behaviour contrary to Article 81 of the Treaty took place, the Commission refers to recitals (304) and (311). In addition, the Commission, [Deleted] considers that firstly, the exchange of information of the type identified during that period has had the effect of putting the competitors in a position to adapt their market behaviour in the light of the information exchanged, and, secondly, that it served to prepare the ground for the price increases and market sharing practices that followed. [Deleted]. As stated, it is not relevant in that respect whether any particular effect on the market was discernible or whether the company itself (Solvay) had decided that the information would not be used to alter its commercial decisions. That is all the more true in the particular instance where the parties were discussing the anticipated increase in capacity in the market, Solvay being one of the undertakings involved in the construction of a new plant. Solexis, in particular, although it contested the conclusions drawn by the Commission as regards the meetings held in 1995, did admit to these contacts having taken place in order to exchange market-related information.

Solexis argued that the Commission should specify in the present case which allegedly unlawful conduct is to be classed as “agreements” and which as “concerted practices”. However, the Commission considers that the consolidated case-law quoted in recitals (301) and (302) constitutes an exhaustive reply to that argument.

The Commission has already clarified that in its view the collusive contacts until mid-1997 are to be seen as part of an overall scheme, as the contacts in the period 1994-1997 may be viewed as having served in preparation of outright agreements established then. However, as argued in section 6.2.1.1, even if the collusive behaviour in the period prior to 1997 were to be considered separately, the exchange of information of the type identified was of such a nature, and occurred on so many occasions, that it is considered to have had the effect of putting the competitors in a position to adapt their market behaviour in the light of the information exchanged, in contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty. That conclusion holds true also for Ausimont, for instance as regards the meetings [Deleted] in which it participated.

FMC Foret denied having participated in any illegitimate meetings concerning either HP or PBS throughout the period of the infringement, although it did not deny in its replies to the Statement of Objections that certain producers engaged in anticompetitive activities. The Statement of Objections stated that Ausimont and FMC Foret were at least informed about the outcome of the discussions and in particular FMC Foret received telephone calls from competitors after a number of meetings between Degussa, Solvay and Kemira, during which an agreement was reached to increase HP prices. FMC Foret argued in reply to the Statement of Objections that the allegations made by its competitors were too vague to provide precise and consistent evidence that FMC Foret actually received such telephone calls and therefore took part in the infringement. In fact FMC Foret stated that it had not been invited to these meetings of which it had allegedly been informed.
[Deleted]. FMC Foret pointed out that it is difficult to disprove the allegations, that is to say, to show that someone did not receive a telephone call.

(323) In reply to the arguments of FMC Foret, the Commission considers that it has been sufficiently established, from the various facts and indicia referred to in the factual part of this Decision, that FMC Foret did take part in the infringement regarding the products under investigation. Evidence has been provided that FMC Foret was either a participant in, or was informed of, contacts between competitors that were of an illicit nature. Reference is made in particular to the following sections that refer to FMC Foret’s participation in meetings or to the exchange of information between competitors in connection with cartel meetings [Deleted]. The participation of FMC Foret in the collusive behaviour, even though it often differed in manner from that of other undertakings, was referred to by various other parties in the proceedings and, in the case of particular contacts, corroborating information was provided. The Commission therefore concludes, on the basis of an assessment of the available evidence as a whole, that FMC Foret was party to the agreements and concerted practices and that its denial is not credible.

6.2.2. Single and continuous infringement

6.2.2.1. Principles

(324) A complex cartel may properly be viewed as a *single and continuous infringement* for the time frame in which it existed. The agreement may well be varied from time to time, or its mechanisms adapted or strengthened to take account of new developments. The validity of this assessment is not affected by the possibility that one or more elements of a series of actions or of a continuous course of conduct could individually and in themselves constitute a breach of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

(325) Although a cartel is a joint enterprise, each participant in the agreement may play its own particular role. One or more may exercise a dominant role as ringleader(s). Internal conflicts and rivalries, or even cheating may occur, but will not however prevent the arrangement from constituting an agreement/concerted practice for the purposes of Article 81(1) of the Treaty where there is a single common and continuing objective.

(326) The mere fact that each participant in a cartel may play the role which is appropriate to its own specific circumstances does not exclude its responsibility for the infringement as a whole, including acts committed by other participants but which share the same unlawful purpose and the same anti-competitive effect. An undertaking which takes part in the common unlawful enterprise by actions which contribute to the realisation of the shared objective is equally responsible, for the whole period of its adherence to the common scheme, for the acts of the other participants in pursuance of the same infringement. This is certainly the case where it is established that the undertaking in question was aware of the unlawful
behaviour of the other participants or could have reasonably foreseen or been aware of it and was prepared to take the risk\textsuperscript{38}.

(327) In fact, as the Court of Justice stated in \textit{Commission v Anic Partecipazioni}\textsuperscript{39}, the agreements and concerted practices referred to in Article 81(1) of the Treaty necessarily result from collaboration by several undertakings, who are all co-perpetrators of the infringement but whose participation can take different forms according, in particular, to the characteristics of the market concerned and the position of each undertaking on that market, the aims pursued and the means of implementation chosen or envisaged. It follows that infringement of that Article may result not only from an isolated act but also from a series of acts or from a continuous conduct. That interpretation cannot be challenged on the ground that one or several elements of that series of acts or continuous conduct could also constitute in themselves an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty\textsuperscript{40}.

6.2.2.2. Application to the case

(328) The manufacturers of HP and PBS adhered to a common scheme which laid down the lines of their action in the market and restricted their individual commercial conduct. The infringement consisted of a complex of behaviour having a single economic aim, namely to distort the normal movement of prices in the EEA-wide market for HP and PBS.

(329) In the Statement of Objections (paragraphs 294-301) the Commission concluded that, based on the available evidence, the competitors were involved in a complex of collusive arrangements with the aim of influencing prices for both HP and PBS. The Commission reached that conclusion with reference to the fact that a common scheme had existed covering both HP and PBS\textsuperscript{41}, that competitors were involved in collusive behaviour as regards both products, that the purpose of the arrangements for both products was a single one (to distort the normal movement of prices for both HP and PBS), that all participants were in a position to be informed of and take account of the information exchanged with the competitors, that the same mechanisms were being used, and that the splitting-up of the arrangements into different infringements was artificial. Also, the Commission noted that account would be taken of the fact that not every undertaking participated in all constituent elements of the overall cartel. This conclusion is also supported by the Commission decision in \textit{Peroxygen products}\textsuperscript{42}, where HP and PBS were also part of a single infringement. Furthermore, in line with the

\textsuperscript{38} Judgment of the European Court of Justice in case C-49/92, \textit{Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni} mentioned above, at paragraph 83.

\textsuperscript{39} Judgment of the European Court of Justice in case C-49/92, \textit{Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni} mentioned above.

\textsuperscript{40} Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-49/92, \textit{Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni} mentioned above, paragraphs 78-81, 83-85 and 203.

\textsuperscript{41} PCS was also included among the products referred to in the Statement of Objections. However, as stated in recital (14), the investigation has not shown that the unlawful behaviour also extended to PCS. Commission decision of 23 November 1984, \textit{Peroxygen products}, quoted above. This decision was not appealed.

\textsuperscript{42} Commission decision of 23 November 1984, \textit{Peroxygen products}, quoted above.
judgment of the Court of First Instance in Specialty Graphite\(^43\), the conclusion is based on a number of ‘objective factors’.

(330) Several parties claimed that their actions as regards HP and PBS ought to be considered separately and that are insufficient grounds to consider them as part of a single infringement. The arguments raised can be summarised as follows: (a) the cartel concerned different products that belong to different product markets; (b) the collusion involved different companies; (c) the people involved in the businesses of HP and PBS were different within the companies; (d) the agreements for HP and PBS were concluded on different occasions and at unrelated meetings; (e) the collusive behaviour for HP and PBS had different durations. Additional arguments were raised by individual undertakings: (f) Caffaro referred to the fact that it was a customer for HP (it only manufactured PBS) and thus, according to it, could not be member of a cartel in HP, where it would have been a “victim” of the collusion itself; (g) Kemira stated in turn that as it did not produce PBS, it could not be considered to have been party to any agreement for PBS.

(331) Before answering the particular arguments of the parties, the Commission underlines that the undertakings’ respective actions regarding HP and PBS constitute behaviour contrary to Article 81 of the Treaty also when looked upon separately for each of those products. However, as the Commission indicated in the Statement of Objections, to split the behaviour as regards HP and PBS into separate infringements, leading to a calculation of a separate fine for each, would be artificial, in view of the particular facts of the case and the various links that exist, as will also be demonstrated in the next recital. It is also noted that whilst the Commission remains of the view that what is at stake is a single infringement covering both HP and PBS, it will take into account for the setting of the fine the particular circumstances of this case, notably the fact that the collusion regarding PBS commenced later than that regarding HP and ceased earlier and that three undertakings were involved in collusive behaviour only as regards one of the two products.

(332) In answer to the particular points raised by the parties, the Commission replies as follows:

- (a) As regards the product(s): the existence of different products that may belong to different product markets (as economically defined) in no way means that these products cannot be part of a single collusive scheme. In this regard, reference may also be made to the fact that within CEFIC, until 1997, both products were dealt with within the same CEFIC working group. In any case, it is settled case law that a market definition is not required in order to determine the scope of a cartel

\(^43\) See the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 15 June 2005 in joined cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. and Others v Commission, not yet reported (see OJ C 205 of 20.8.2005, p.18), paragraph 124.
infringement. Secondly, in this case there is a direct link between the products under investigation as a considerable part of the HP produced is used as a raw material for the production of its downstream product PBS. From that point of view, the two markets are closely related. Economically this means that a change in the quantities produced and/or a change in the price of HP would have a bearing on the price and/or quantities produced for PBS, and vice versa. Thirdly, the content of the meeting [Deleted] between Degussa, Solvay and FMC Foret demonstrates the connection between the products under investigation. As described in that section, Atofina was thinking of closing down its PBS production, but that would have left it with a large unused quantity of HP. At this meeting the three attendees agreed to present an offer to Atochem that Solvay would buy Atochem’s PBS technology while Degussa would purchase Atochem’s unused HP quantities. Solvay and FMC Foret would subsequently agree on compensation to Atochem. Atofina eventually agreed to the proposal presented by Solvay and Degussa. This shows that the effects of the agreements regarding HP were intertwined with the arrangements regarding PBS. Lastly, and more generally, the simple fact that some participants in the cartel were not vertically integrated and were therefore not active in the production and sales of the cartelised products does not change the nature and the object of infringement which was to distort the normal movement of prices with regard to all the products. From the facts described [Deleted] it appears that all participants in the anti-competitive arrangements adhered and contributed, to the extent they could (that is, to the extent they were active in one or more of the products concerned by the arrangements), to this anti-competitive plan.

- (b) As regards the participating undertakings: the competitors for both HP and PBS were essentially the same, and a core group of the same undertakings was involved in the anti-competitive arrangements for both products. Solvay, Arkema, Degussa, EKA (although it closed down PBS production in 1997), FMC Foret and Ausimont (which sold HP until May 2002) were all active in the production of HP and PBS, and together represented respectively [60-70]% and [90-100]% of turnover in these markets in 1998. Only three companies, Kemira, Chemoxal and Caffaro, were not vertically integrated and each produced either HP or PBS. More precisely, Kemira produced HP and PCS, Chemoxal shut down its PBS production plants in 1994 while Caffaro has never produced HP. In the Commission’s view, the fact that only one or two different undertakings per product from the remainder of the group of six/seven are not vertically integrated, also weighs against a conclusion that separate collusive schemes existed.

- (c) As regards the involvement of individuals: firstly, in a number of instances, anti-competitive contacts concerning HP and PBS concerned representatives from the undertakings who had responsibility for both products within those undertakings and were therefore aware, or should have been aware, of the existence of anti-competitive arrangements covering both HP and PBS. Examples are [Deleted]. Secondly, certain individuals participated in illicit contacts that concerned both products: [Deleted]. Thirdly, as regards the meetings relating to

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HP and PBS that had been held separately, there were representatives who attended both the meetings related to HP and the meetings related to PBS45.

- (d) As regards the cartel meetings: firstly, whilst it is true that most meetings identified between the cartel members concerned HP and PBS separately, at least two important meetings were held where the discussions for HP and PBS were directly connected: [Deleted]. Secondly, Solexis underlined that the idea for PBS was to repeat what had successfully been set up for HP. [Deleted]. Lastly, the existence of a single and continuous infringement in this case is easily compatible with the existence of two or more arrangements which, taken singly, could constitute in themselves infringements of Article 81 of the Treaty.

- (e) As regards the difference in duration between the collusion on HP and PBS, the Commission notes that the fact that the collusion on PBS commenced later and ceased earlier does not mean that the two products could not have been the subject of the same infringement. That said, the fact that the infringement did not cover both products for the whole of its duration will be taken into account for the determination of the appropriate level of the fines.

- (f) and (g) Regarding the assertion by Caffaro and Kemira, that they could not have been involved in a cartel for a product they did not produce (HP and PBS respectively), the Commission notes that although these undertakings may not have participated in the entirety of the infringement, this does not mean that the infringement as such, covering the participants and the products as established in this Decision, could not have existed as a single collusive scheme. However, the fact that an undertaking did not participate directly in all the constituent elements of the overall infringement, in that it may have been unaware of some of them, may be taken into account when determining the amount of the fine to be imposed on it.

(333) On the basis of the foregoing arguments (notably the links between the collusive practices, the competitors concerned, the individuals involved, the commonality of contacts), and in line with the case-law cited 46, there are sufficient links to conclude that the different agreements and concerted practices for HP and PBS were connected in such a way that it would be artificial to separate them into different infringements. Therefore, the Commission considers that the complex of collusive arrangements constitutes a single and continuous infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

(334) Such a conclusion is not at odds with the principle that responsibility for such infringements is personal in nature; nor does it neglect individual analysis of the evidence adduced, in disregard of the applicable rules of evidence, or infringe the rights of defence of the undertakings involved. Also, the existence of a single and continuous infringement in this case is easily compatible with the existence of two

45 Examples are [Deleted]. It merits to be noted that [Deleted] Solexis submitted that the players active on the HP market were largely the same with regard to persalts. [Deleted].

46 Judgment of the European Court of Justice in case C-49/92, Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni, mentioned above.
or more arrangements which, taken singly, could constitute in themselves infringements of Article 81 of the Treaty. This is particularly the case where the common elements outweigh the differences among them, as demonstrated.

6.3. Restriction of competition

(335) Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agreement expressly include as restrictive of competition agreements and concerted practices which:

- directly or indirectly fix selling prices or any other trading conditions;
- limit or control production, markets or technical development;
- share markets or sources of supply.

(336) These are the essential characteristics of the horizontal arrangements under consideration in the present case. The various collusive arrangements and mechanisms adopted by the producers were all ultimately aimed at inflating prices for their benefit. By limiting and/or controlling the production of HP and PBS and by fixing volume quotas, the producers refrained from putting more supplies on the market and from competing for market share with the aim of increasing the market price. Price fixing and control/allocation of volume quotas by their very nature restrict competition within the meaning of both Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

(337) More particularly, in the present case, the principal aspects of the complex of agreements and concerted practices which can be characterised as restrictions of competition in breach of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement are:

(a) exchange of commercially important and confidential market- and/or company relevant information;
(b) limitation and/or control of production as well as of potential and actual capacities;
(c) allocating market shares and allocating customers;
(d) the fixing and monitoring of (target) prices.

(338) This complex of agreements and concerted practices has as its object the restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and has been described in detail in the factual part of this Decision.

47 The list is not exhaustive.
(339) It is settled case-law that for the purposes of the application of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement there is no need to take into account the actual effects of an agreement when it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market. Consequently, it is not necessary to show actual anti-competitive effects where the anti-competitive object of the conduct in question is proved48.

(340) It follows that, in this case, breach of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement occurred even where the customer allocations or certain price increases agreed upon by the competitors may not have proved successful or were not even implemented. This applies, for instance, to the failed agreement regarding the HP prices to be applied as of 1 January 1996 [Deleted] or the PBS price increase and the market shares of 13 December 1999 [Deleted].

(341) In the present case, however, the Commission considers that, on the basis of the elements put forward in the factual part of this Decision, it has also proved that the anti-competitive arrangements were implemented and that therefore actual anti-competitive effects of the arrangements have taken place:

(a) the implementation of the cartel agreements was ensured by the monitoring scheme instituted by the conspirators whereby they regularly exchanged confidential market- and/or company relevant information, sales volumes and prices information. In the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the competitors in question took into account the information exchanged in determining their own pricing conduct in the market [Deleted];

(b) the competitors engaged in reducing/mothballing capacity [Deleted];

(c) the regular review of the trend of market shares at the multilateral meetings made it possible to monitor the developments of each other’s market shares [Deleted];

(d) there is furthermore evidence of the implementation of price increases for both HP and PBS which were recognised and monitored at meetings between competitors [Deleted].

6.4. Effect upon trade between Member States and between EEA Contracting Parties

(342) The continuing agreement between the HP and PBS producers had an appreciable effect on trade between Member States and between EEA Contracting Parties.

(343) Article 81(1) of the Treaty is aimed at agreements which might harm the attainment of a single market between the Member States, whether by partitioning national markets or by affecting the structure of competition within the common

As explained in recital (88), the markets for HP and PBS were characterised by a substantial volume of trade between Member States during the period of the infringement. There is also a considerable volume of trade between the Community and EFTA countries belonging to the EEA.

The application of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to a cartel is not, however, limited to that part of the members’ sales that actually involve the transfer of goods from one State to another. Nor is it necessary, in order for these provisions to apply, to show that the individual conduct of each participant, as opposed to the cartel as a whole, affected trade between Member States. Cartel agreements such as those involving price fixing and market sharing covering several Member States are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between Member States. Cross-border cartels harmonise the conditions of competition and affect the interpenetration of trade by cementing traditional patterns of trade. In the present case, the cartel arrangements indeed covered all trade throughout the Community and EEA. The existence of a price-fixing mechanism and a quota allocation system must have resulted in the automatic diversion of trade patterns from the course they would otherwise have followed.

6.5. Provisions of competition rules applicable to Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Sweden

In the period 31 January to 31 December 1994, the provisions of the EEA agreement applied to the EFTA Member States which had joined the EEA; the cartel thus constituted a violation of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement as well as of Article 81(1) of the Treaty, and the Commission is competent to apply both provisions. The restriction of competition in the EFTA states during this one year period falls under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

After the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Community on 1 January 1995, Article 81(1) of the Treaty became applicable to the cartel insofar as

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50 See also the Commission Notice – Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ C 101 of 27.4.2004, p.81, paragraph 64.
it affected those markets. The operation of the cartel in Norway remained in breach of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

(350) In practice, it results from the foregoing that in so far as the cartel applied to Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, it constituted a violation of the EEA and/or Community competition rules as from 31 January 1994.

6.6. Duration of the unlawful behaviour

6.6.1. Beginning of the infringement

(351) The first (documentary) evidence that confirms the statements made by Degussa about illicit collusion, in particular as regards Degussa, EKA, Kemira and Solvay, dates from 31 January 1994. [Deleted]. The Commission will thus take 31 January 1994 as the relevant date for the start of the infringement for Degussa, EKA, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding (formerly Nobel Industrier AB), Kemira and Solvay.

(352) On 25 February 1994 EKA became part of the Akzo Nobel group of companies. Hence, the Commission will take 25 February 1994 as the relevant beginning date for determining duration in the case of Akzo. As regards Chemoxal, Atofina and Ausimont [Deleted] the Commission will take 12 May 1995 as the relevant beginning date for determining duration for Air Liquide, Chemoxal, Elf Aquitaine, Atofina, Ausimont and Edison. As regards Caffaro and FMC Foret, the Commission has evidence that these companies participated in the cartel meeting of 29 May 1997. Hence, the Commission will take this date as the relevant beginning date for determining duration for Snia, Caffaro, FMC and FMC Foret. Total acquired control of Elf Aquitaine in April 2000. Since then Total has controlled directly or indirectly the capital of all operating companies of the group. Hence, the Commission will take 30 April 2000 as the relevant beginning date for determining duration in the case of Total.

(353) As referred to, Solvay and Solexis stated that until mid-1997 no agreement was reached among the competitors, not even a general understanding. Solvay admitted to having participated in an infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty consisting of price fixing and market sharing between August 1997 and May 2000 and conceded that in the period between April/May 1995 and August 1997 exchanges of sensitive commercial information took place. It disputed however that the evidence contained in the factual part of the present Decision is sufficient to establish the existence of a longer infringement. Solexis used similar arguments, arguing in particular that the meetings between 1995 and mid-1997 in which it participated cannot be taken as evidence of the existence of concerted practices since no agreement on market sharing or pricing was reached nor a common course of conduct on the market established, in spite of what the Commission stated at paragraph 283 of its Statement of Objections.

(354) For the Commission’s reply to these arguments put forward by Solvay and Solexis reference is made to recitals (315)-(319).
6.6.2. End of the infringement

(355) Concerning the end of the unlawful behaviour, it has been established that the participants discussed, [Deleted] in May 2000, [Deleted]. Although it is likely that discussions continued in 2001, the available evidence does not support the conclusion that an agreement was reached for 2001. Nor does it clarify whether the effects on prices were actually prolonged until 2001, [Deleted].

(356) In Krupp Thyssen Stainless 52 the Court of First Instance stated in relation to cartels which have formally ceased to be in force, that it is sufficient, in order for Article 85 [now 81] of the EC Treaty, and by analogy Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, to be applicable, that those cartels continue to produce their effects. The same applies a fortiori where the effects of the agreement last until adoption of a decision to exit the cartel or the market, without the agreement having been formally brought to an end. Where companies do not cease applying the reference prices agreed at the cartel meetings they took part in, the Commission takes the view that the particular agreement in question lasts until the moment when new changes are agreed.

(357) Atofina confirmed that [Deleted] there was a general consensus on maintaining the price levels and that the effect on prices lasted throughout the year 2000. Since this is consistent with other evidence, it can be considered that the effect on prices lasted at least for the semester subsequent to the last meeting, given that price changes were usually discussed for the subsequent six months, in this case the 2nd semester of 2000, [Deleted]. The Commission also has knowledge of bilateral contacts between Solvay and FMC Forêt at the end of 2000 concerning PBS customers in Spain. This shows that several competitors continued to behave unlawfully and to apply the cartel rules [Deleted] at least until the end of 2000.

(358) Solvay stated, in reply to the Statement of Objections, that after the meeting [Deleted], which took place on 18 May 2000, it withdrew from the cartel and ceased participating in any price fixing or market sharing arrangements. Solexis also admitted to the infringement until May 2000 but pointed out that [Deleted] nobody else had mentioned these discussions or confirmed Atofina’s allegations; therefore no accusations could be upheld against Solexis as of this date. Kemira stated that it did not attend the [Deleted] meeting in May 2000 and that the cartel did not last until either December 2000 or June 2001. According to Kemira, the documents on which the Commission based itself in the Statement of Objections contained no evidence (or only vague or ambiguous references) about anyone from Kemira participating in the discussions, or about which issues were actually discussed or what effects the discussions of May 2000 might have had on the market behaviour of Kemira and for how long.

(359) The Commission replies to the arguments of Solvay, Solexis and Kemira in the following manner. The addressees have neither provided evidence that they clearly

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distanced themselves from the cartel after the [Deleted] meeting of May 2000 nor demonstrated that they behaved in a different manner afterwards. Kemira admits that “vague” elements against it are present. The Commission is, on the contrary, convinced that these elements, are not vague as the pieces of evidence are submitted by different parties (Solvay and Atofina) and indicate the same participants, including Kemira.

(360) Therefore, in light of the reasoning set out in recital (355) et seq., the Commission takes 31 December 2000 as the relevant date for the end of the infringement in the case of Degussa, Edison, Kemira, Solvay, Solexis, Total, Elf Aquitaine and Arkema.

(361) Caffaro argued that the duration of the infringement in its case should be shortened as the company no longer participated in the cartel as of 1999 and that therefore the statute of limitations is applicable to it because the company was contacted by the Commission only in April 2004, thus more than five years after the end of its infringement.

(362) The Commission considers that Caffaro admits in the reply to the Statement of Objections to having engaged in illicit contacts for the period 29 May 1997 to 31 December 1998. The last evidence of the participation of Caffaro in illicit talks is related to the contacts [Deleted] in November 1998. [Deleted] Given that Caffaro adhered at least until 31 December 1998 to the collusive arrangements, the Commission will thus consider 31 December 1998 as the relevant ending date for determining duration in the case of Snia and Caffaro. Regarding the claim that the statute of limitations should apply to Caffaro, the Commission observes that the first action, as also recognised by Caffaro, took place on 25 March 2003 (the carrying out of the inspections). At that date, the five-year period laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 had not yet elapsed. The Commission therefore rejects Caffaro’s claim.

(363) In the application for leniency and in its reply to the Statement of Objections EKA admitted having taken part in arrangements in Europe - mainly via bilateral contacts focused on the Nordic area - until late 1999. As of 2000 EKA decided to massively penetrate the continental marketplace regardless of the attempts by other competitors, like Solvay and Degussa, to dissuade it from doing so. EKA communicated to other competitors that it would no longer take part in meetings with anti-competitive content. The behaviour of EKA was highlighted during several cartel meetings among other competitors in 2000.

(364) The last evidence of participation by EKA in a cartel meeting dates from 25-26 November 1998. EKA itself admits to having engaged in illicit activities until its entry into the continental market. It appears reasonable from the available evidence that EKA withdrew from the anti-competitive arrangements as of the end of 1999. Therefore the Commission will take 31 December 1999 as the relevant end date for determining duration in the case of Akzo, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding and EKA.
The last evidence of the participation of FMC Foret employees in a cartel meeting dates from 13 December 1999. It is therefore the Commission’s firm conviction that FMC Foret took part in the infringement until 13 December 1999. The Commission will therefore take 13 December 1999 as the relevant date for the end of the infringement in the case of FMC Corp and FMC Foret.

6.6.3. Application of the limitation period

Pursuant to Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the power of the Commission to impose fines or penalties for infringements of the substantive rules relating to competition is subject to a limitation period of five years. For continuing infringements, the limitation period only begins to run on the day the infringement ceases. Any action taken by the Commission for the purpose of the preliminary investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringement shall interrupt the limitation period and each interruption shall start time running afresh.

In this case, the Commission investigation started with the surprise inspections pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation No 17 on 25 March 2003. Hence, for infringements which ceased prior to 25 March 1998 no fines may be imposed.

As regards Air Liquide/Chemoxal, the Commission considers the date of 31 December 1997 as the relevant date for both Air Liquide and Chemoxal for determining the end of the infringement as well as for the calculation of the five-year limitation period.

In Sumitomo, the Court of First Instance stated that the fact that the Commission no longer has the power to impose fines on account of the expiry of the limitation period does not in itself preclude the adoption of a decision finding that past infringement has been committed. The Commission must however demonstrate the existence of a legitimate interest in doing so. Following the line taken by the Court of First Instance in GVL v Commission, there are strong reasons why the present case justifies the adoption of a Decision against Air Liquide. Firstly, there is a need to ensure that the undertaking behaves in accordance with the competition rules given that Air Liquide has already participated in the past in a cartel in the same sector. Air Liquide was found to have participated in a market sharing cartel which lasted approximately 20 years; the cartel consisted of a general agreement not to sell the products in question outside the "national" market, combined with agreements at the national level to share this market. This allowed the parties to keep a stable, anti-competitive market for almost two decades. The Commission

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53 Article 25(2) of Regulation No 1/2003.
54 Judgment of the Court of First Instance Krupp Thyssen Stainless quoted above, at recitals 181-182.
55 See the judgment of Court of First Instance of 6 October 2005 in joined Cases T-22/02 and T-23/02, Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd and Sumika Fine Chemicals Co. Ltd v. Commission, not yet reported, at paragraph 131.
denounced this behaviour in its decision of 23 November 1984 and therein also imposed fines on Air Liquide. Moreover, in Article 2 of the Decision, Air Liquide was requested to bring to an end the said infringements and to refrain from any agreement, concerted practice or measure which could have equivalent effect. It appears that the 1984 Commission decision, which concerned exactly the same products, did not produce a sufficient dissuasive effect on Air Liquide to stop its participation in cartel arrangements; consequently, there is an even greater interest and need to discourage any repetition of that infringement in the future. The fact that an undertaking, despite a previous finding of a similar infringement regarding the same product and despite the fine imposed on it, engaged again in unlawful conduct is a concrete sign that there is a risk of recidivism again in the future. By addressing this decision to Air Liquide the Commission seeks to ensure that any further infringement can be punished more severely as recidivist behaviour, which is considered to have a deterring effect of its own. Secondly, it is noted that there is ample evidence of Air Liquide’s participation in the infringement for the period it took part, and that its role was similar to that of the other parties. For this reason too, it is considered that Air Liquide should be an addressee of the decision, like the other undertakings that participated in the infringement. Finally, there is an interest in enabling the injured parties to bring matters before the national civil courts against all cartel participants.

6.7. Addressees of the Decision

6.7.1. Principles

(370) In order to identify the addressees of this Decision, it is necessary to determine to which legal entities responsibility for the infringement should be imputed.

(371) The subject of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement is the “undertaking”, a concept that is not identical with the notion of corporate legal personality in national commercial, company or fiscal law. In order to determine liability for an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty, it is necessary to identify the undertaking which can be held liable. The term “undertaking” is defined neither in the Treaty nor in the EEA Agreement, but it may refer to any entity engaged in a commercial activity. A decision concerning an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and/or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement may therefore be addressed to one or several entities having their own legal personality and forming part of this undertaking, and thus to a group as a whole, or to sub-groups, or to subsidiaries.

(372) It is accordingly necessary to define the undertaking that is to be held accountable for the infringement of Article 81 by identifying one or more legal persons to represent the undertaking. According to the case law, “Community competition law

57 Commission decision of 23 November 1984, Peroxygen products, quoted above in footnote 16.
58 The issue of who is the appropriate addressee of proceedings is entirely separate from the question of whether “agreements” between companies in the same group can fall under Article 81 EC or Article 53 EEA.
recognises that different companies belonging to the same group form an economic unit and therefore an undertaking within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty if the companies concerned do not determine independently their own conduct on the market.

If a subsidiary does not determine its own conduct on the market independently, its parent forms a single economic entity with the subsidiary, and may be held liable for an infringement on the ground that it forms part of the same undertaking.

(373) It is established case-law that the fact that the subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that its conduct may be attributed to the parent company.

(374) A parent company can be held responsible for the unlawful conduct of a subsidiary if that subsidiary “does not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company.” It is likewise established that “the Commission can generally assume that a wholly-owned subsidiary essentially follows the instructions given to it by its parent company without needing to check whether the parent company has in fact exercised that power.” The parent company can reverse the presumption by producing evidence to the contrary.

(375) The fact that it has been shown that a parent company is responsible for the conduct of its subsidiary does not in any way exonerate the subsidiary of its own responsibility. The subsidiary continues to be individually accountable for the anticompetitive practices in which it took part. Any responsibility on the part of the parent company, by reason of the influence and control it exercises over its subsidiary, is additional.

(376) Also, when an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and/or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement is found to have been committed, it is necessary to identify the natural or legal person who was responsible for the operation of the undertaking at the time when the infringement was committed, so that it can answer for it.

(377) If an undertaking commits an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and/or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and later disposes of the assets that were the vehicle of the infringement and withdraws from the market concerned, the

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60 See the judgment of the European Court of Justice in case 48/69 Imperial quoted; judgment of the Court of First Instance Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and others mentioned above (PVC II).

61 Case 48/69 Imperial quoted above, paragraphs 132-133.

undertaking in question will still be held responsible for the infringement if it is still in existence\textsuperscript{63}.

(378) Liability for unlawful behaviour may pass to a successor where the corporate identity which committed the infringement has ceased to exist in law. The Court of Justice considers that, if the legal person initially answerable for the infringement ceases to exist and loses its legal personality, being purely and simply absorbed by another legal entity, that entity must be held answerable for the whole period of the infringement and thus liable for the activity of the entity that was absorbed\textsuperscript{64}. The mere disappearance of the person responsible for the operation of the undertaking when the infringement was committed does not allow that undertaking to avoid liability\textsuperscript{65}.

(379) If the undertaking which has acquired the assets infringes Article 81 of the Treaty and/or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, liability for the infringement should be apportioned between the seller and the acquirer of the infringing assets\textsuperscript{66}.

\subsection{6.7.2. Addressees of the present Decision}

(380) In what follows the approach outlined in section 6.7.1 is applied in regard to each of the undertakings concerned. A distinction can be drawn between companies which directly participated in the infringement and those which are addressees of this Decision because they have also been identified as forming part of an economic entity responsible for the infringement.

\subsection{6.7.3. Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB and EKA Chemicals AB}

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\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{64} See the judgment of 16 November 2000 in case C-279/98P Cascades v Commission [2000] ECR I-9693, paragraphs 78 and 79: “It falls, in principle, to the natural or legal person managing the undertaking in question when the infringement was committed to answer for that infringement, even if, when the Decision finding the infringement was adopted, another person had assumed responsibility for operating the undertaking ... Moreover, those companies were not purely and simply absorbed by the appellant but continued their activities as its subsidiaries. They must, therefore, answer themselves for their unlawful activity prior to their acquisition by the appellant, which cannot be held responsible for it”.

\textsuperscript{65} See the judgment of the Court of First Instance in case PVC II, paragraph 953.

\textsuperscript{66} See Commission decision of 27 July 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/31.865, PVC II), OJ 1994, L 239 p.14, paragraph 41: “It is (...) irrelevant that an undertaking may have sold its PVC business to another: the purchaser does not thereby become liable for the participation of the seller in the cartel. If the undertaking which committed the infringement continues in existence it remains responsible in spite of the transfer. On the other hand, where the infringing undertaking itself is absorbed by another producer, its responsibility may follow it and attach to the new or merged entity. It is not necessary that the acquirer be shown to have carried on or adopted the unlawful conduct as its own. The determining factor is whether there is a functional and economic continuity between the original infringer and the undertaking into which it was merged”.
\end{flushright}
It is established by the facts as described in the factual part of this Decision that Eka Chemicals AB (the former Eka Nobel AB) participated in the overall arrangements from 31 January 1994 to 31 December 1999.

The merger with Akzo NV on 25 February 1994 meant that Nobel Industrier AB, 100% holding company of Eka Nobel AB, became a wholly owned subsidiary of Akzo Nobel NV. In 1996, Eka Nobel AB changed its name to Eka Chemicals AB and Nobel Industrier AB changed its name to Akzo Nobel AB. In 2003, Akzo Nobel AB became Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB, a 100% owned subsidiary of Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Akzo Nobel NV.

As from 1 January 2004, following a group restructuring, Akzo Nobel NV (“Akzo”) has become the 100% parent company of EKA.

EKA participated in the collusive behaviour from 31 January 1994. Nobel Industrier controlled EKA as 100% holding company between 31 January 1994 and 25 February 1994 and can therefore be presumed to be responsible for EKA’s unlawful conduct during this period; its responsibility has now been absorbed by Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB, due to the merger referred to above (recital (382)). Since 25 February 1994 EKA has been part of the Akzo Nobel group and has been 100% controlled by Akzo either directly or indirectly through several intermediate holding companies, as explained in section 2.2.1. Due to the 100% shareholding by Akzo the Commission considers that Akzo has exercised decisive influence on EKA since 25 February 1994 and no element was put forward to rebut this presumption.

In addition, there are other elements which confirm that Nobel Industrier and Akzo can be held liable for the infringements committed, given that they exercised a decisive influence over the behaviour of their respective subsidiaries. As explained in section 2.2.1, the Akzo Nobel group is organised on the basis of a two-layer structure: a "corporate centre" and directly underneath approximately 20 Business Units ("BUs"). The corporate centre co-ordinates the most important tasks with regard to general strategy of the group, finance, legal affairs and human resources. The BUs each have their own General Manager, management team and supporting services though the BU management operates within the limits of the financial and strategic targets set out by the corporate centre and is bound by the "Business Principles" and "Corporate Directives" applicable to the entire Akzo Nobel group.

Taking into account the 100% shareholding chain that existed at the time of the infringement between Eka Chemicals AB, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB (the former Akzo Nobel AB and Nobel Industrier AB) and Akzo Nobel NV, the Commission holds Eka Chemicals AB liable for the infringement committed for the period from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 1999 and Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB and Akzo Nobel NV jointly and severally liable for the

(387) Consequently, Eka Chemicals AB, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB and Akzo Nobel NV are addressees of the present Decision.

6.7.4. Degussa AG

(388) It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Degussa participated in the overall arrangements from 31 January 1994 to 31 December 2000. Consequently, Degussa is an addressee of the present Decision.

6.7.5. FMC Corporation and FMC Foret SA

(389) It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that FMC Foret participated in the overall arrangements at the least from 29 May 1997 until 13 December 1999. [Deleted].

(390) As described in section 2.2.5, FMC Foret is wholly owned by FMC Chemical Holding B.V. (now FMC Chemicals Netherlands BV), which is in turn wholly owned by FMC. In the Statement of Objections the Commission concluded that both FMC Foret and FMC were to be held liable for the infringement committed by FMC Foret. That conclusion was based on the fact that FMC Foret is a (indirectly) wholly owned subsidiary of FMC.

(391) The Commission also referred to another element in relation to the decisive influence of FMC. [Deleted], who was party to several cartel contacts, was not only Managing Director and Chairman of FMC Foret from 1991 to April 2003, but also Vice President of FMC from 1994 to 2000. Furthermore, in referring to elements that showed the decisive influence of FMC on FMC Foret the Commission referred to the following facts: [Deleted] was a member of the Board at FMC Foret (from 1991 to June 1998), and of the Board at FMC Chemical Holding BV (from December 1992 to March 1999) as well as Vice President at FMC (from 1991 to 1998). In 1994 [Deleted] was also appointed as executive Vice President of FMC. Finally, [Deleted] was a member of the Board at both FMC Foret (between June 1996 and December 1999) and at FMC Chemical Holding BV (from August 1996 to March 1999). On these grounds, the Commission concluded that FMC exercised a decisive influence over FMC Foret. Furthermore, as stated by the Commission in the Statement of Objections, the role of [Deleted] as Vice President of FMC is another element to support the view that FMC knew or should have known about the participation in cartel activities.

(392) As regards the issue of the liability of FMC, in its reply to the Statement of Objections the company argued that its subsidiary FMC Foret operated independently of any influence of FMC and that therefore FMC could not be held liable for any infringement committed by FMC Foret. FMC considers its
shareholding in FMC Foret only as a financial investment and maintains that the autonomy of the subsidiary has not been affected. FMC stated that it “acquired 20% of the shares in [FMC] Foret in April 1966. It raised its shareholding to 50% in 1971 and then in stages culminating in 1992 it purchased the remainder. Its attitude to Foret has not changed since it was a minority investor and Foret has continued to operate on an autonomous basis. (...) The acquisition was treated by FMC Corp as an investment and no attempt was made to take over any of the functions of management or to interfere with the commercial operation of the firm. FMC Foret appoints autonomously all its own managers and Foret’s officers have never combined their roles at Foret with executive positions at FMC Corp”. According to FMC, if [Deleted] was appointed as Vice President at FMC, it was a purely non-executive position (his functions within FMC and FMC Foret were purely administrative; he simply oversaw the business and corporate strategy, that is to say, he was not involved in the day to day operation).

(393) FMC furthermore stated that in the file there would not be other elements showing that [Deleted] was actively involved in the cartel activities. Finally, the fact that three members of FMC Foret were also members of the Board of FMC Chemical Holdings B.V. is not so significant as the only purpose of this latter entity is to hold shares and it does not conduct any commercial activity.

(394) The Commission cannot accept the arguments presented by FMC. Firstly the exercise of decisive influence by FMC over FMC Foret does not follow only from a 100% shareholding relationship. The Commission also pointed to other circumstances as referred to in recital (391). In any case the Commission considers, on the basis of the information available, that FMC either directly or indirectly through FMC Chemicals Holding BV, exercised decisive influence over FMC Foret. The element which FMC Foret brings forward, namely that FMC has a separate department for the manufacturing of HP to be shipped to the American market, is not sufficient to establish that FMC did not exercise any control over the European branch. The “independent status” of FMC Foret is otherwise only demonstrated through statements by FMC employees who stated that FMC Foret operated on a stand-alone basis. However, FMC itself presents FMC Foret as an integrated part of its business. Indeed, FMC Corp is equally involved in producing the HP and PBS. FMC Foret operates as its European subsidiary in this regard67.

67 See for a recent reflection of that the the FMC Corp annual report for 2004, available under [http://www.fmc.com]. On page 14 of the document it reads as follows: “Our European subsidiary, FMC Foret, S.A. (“Foret”), headquartered just outside of Barcelona, Spain, is a leader in providing chemical products to the detergent, paper, textile, tanning and chemical industries. Foret is a large and diverse operation with seven manufacturing locations in Europe. Foret has positions in phosphates, hydrogen peroxide, perborates, percarbonates, sulfur derivatives, silicates, zeolites and sodium sulfate. Foret’s sales efforts are focused in Europe, Africa and the Middle East”. In the FMC press release of 6 February 2006 on 2005 full-year results it reads as follows: “North American hydrogen peroxide and FMC Foret also benefited from higher selling prices. Segment earnings of $83.9 million increased 46 percent versus the prior year, driven by higher selling prices across the group and improved earnings from Astaris, offset in part by Granger soda ash plant startup expenses and higher raw material, energy and transportation costs”, which suggests that FMC Foret is the entity within the group FMC which carries out the HP business outside North America, in particular in Europe, Africa and middle East.
The Commission considers that this confirms the other elements that point towards an effective exercise of influence during the period of the infringement.

(395) Taking into account the foregoing considerations, the Commission maintains that FMC Corporation and FMC Foret SA are jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed.

(396) Consequently, FMC Corporation and FMC Foret SA are addressees of the present Decision.

6.7.6. Kemira OYJ

(397) It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Kemira participated in the overall arrangements from 31 January 1994 to 31 December 2000.

(398) As to the end of the infringement, despite the objections of Kemira, it has been explained in recital (359) that Kemira’s participation has been ascertained until 31 December 2000. Consequently, Kemira is an addressee of the present Decision.

6.7.7. L’Air Liquide SA and Chemoxal SA

(399) It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Chemoxal participated in the overall arrangements from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 1997. As to the determination of the start date of the infringement, see recital (352).

(400) Although in 1990 Air Liquide created Chemoxal SA, a wholly owned68 subsidiary69, to which it transferred the entire HP and persalts business, that subsidiary was not able to decide independently upon its own conduct in the market. In fact, although there were no directors of Air Liquide on the Board of Directors of Chemoxal SA, Air Liquide safeguarded its right to appoint the members of the Board of Chemoxal SA. Chemoxal succeeded Air Liquide in the activities it already carried out before the creation of Chemoxal SA.

(401) As explained in section 2.2.7, Chemoxal used to sell HP and persalts (mainly PBS) manufactured by Oxysynthèse SA, the subsidiary jointly (50/50) controlled by Air Liquide and Atochem.

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68 It may be presumed that a wholly owned subsidiary, in principle, essentially follows the policy laid down by the parent company. See the judgment of the European Court of Justice in case 107/82, AEG v Commission, [1983] ECR p.3151, paragraph 50.

69 It is established case-law that the fact that the subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility that its conduct may be attributed to the parent company. See the judgment of the European Court of Justice in case 48/69, ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619.
As to the duration of the infringement, Chemoxal has disputed that it took part in any infringement. However, it has been explained in recital (368) that Chemoxal’s participation lasted until 31 December 1997. Currently Chemoxal still legally exists and operates a different business.

Given the 100% shareholding that existed at the time of the infringement between Chemoxal and Air Liquide as well as the power that Air Liquide had to appoint the Directors at Chemoxal, the Commission has presumed the exercise of decisive influence by Air Liquide over the conduct of its subsidiary Chemoxal.

Air Liquide disputed its joint and several liability for any infringement committed by Chemoxal SA. According to Air Liquide the power to appoint the members of the Board is not sufficient to prove absence of autonomy as it is the logical consequence of 100% ownership. The supply of HP by Oxysynthèse (which, as noted, was jointly run by Atofina and Chemoxal) does not establish the absence of autonomy either. Moreover, the companies did not have common managers. The mandate given to the Chemoxal’s Executive Director gave him full powers to run the company. In order to implement its commercial policy, Chemoxal had all the necessary services (such as marketing and sales, human resources, informatics and accounting as well as a research centre) of its own to do so. For the external services (such as legal, fiscal and insurance services) not directly linked with the commercial policy, Chemoxal used the facilities of Air Liquide only against payment. Chemoxal’s autonomy is also evident from the fact that it had direct contacts with the clients and defined its commercial projects independently. Finally there is no evidence in the file to suggest that Air Liquide instructed Chemoxal concerning its commercial policy.

The Commission does not agree with the opinion of Air Liquide. The 100% ownership leads in accordance with the case law to a presumption which can be rebutted by showing that, notwithstanding the full control by the parent company, the subsidiary benefits from a special autonomy. However, the elements presented by Air Liquide are insufficient to rebut that presumption. Firstly, the power to appoint the directors is indicative of the fact that Air Liquide carried out decisive influence on the day-to-day operations. Secondly, both customers and competitors were referring to the undertaking “Air Liquide” in the HP business; the external perception was clearly that Air Liquide was controlling the business of Chemoxal. Namely, Air Liquide ran the business and used its trade mark as well as its commercial power to exploit the peroxigen businesses, of which the subsidiary Chemoxal was the commercial part.

The criteria used in earlier cases to establish whether or not an agent and its principal form a single economic unit are satisfied in the present case because ETA did business on the market only in the name of and for the account of Minoan, it took on no financial risk in connection with that business and, lastly, the two companies were perceived by third parties and on the market as forming one and the same economic entity, namely Minoan” (emphasis added).
The Commission therefore maintains that L’Air Liquide SA and Chemoxal SA are part of the same undertaking that took part in the infringement, are therefore to be held jointly and severally liable for it and, consequently, are addressees of the present Decision.

6.7.8. Snia SpA and Caffaro Srl

It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Caffaro participated in the arrangements regarding PBS from 29 May 1997 until 31 December 1998. As to the determination of the duration of the infringement for this company reference is made to section 6.6.

Snia wholly controlled the subsidiary Caffaro during the infringement and, through Caffaro, also the company Industrie Chimiche Caffaro SpA at the time the PBS business was taken over by this latter company. Furthermore [Deleted] was, from 1991 to 1999, a member of the Board both at Snia and at Caffaro; [Deleted] was a member of the Board at both Caffaro and Industrie Chimiche Caffaro SpA between 1994 and 1997; [Deleted] was a member of the Board at both Caffaro and Industrie Chimiche Caffaro SpA between 1997 and 1999. Finally, all the members of the Board at Caffaro between 1991 and 1999 were appointed by Snia, which was the majority shareholder (with 53%-59%). The members of the Board at Industrie Chimiche Caffaro Spa were appointed between 1994, the year in which the PBS business was transferred to this company, and 1999 by the sole shareholder Caffaro.

Caffaro (ex Industrie Chimiche Caffaro SpA, also referred to as “ICC”) participated in the infringement regarding PBS at least until it closed down its PBS production in summer 1999. Thus, the duration of the infringement in Snia’s case is limited to the period from 29 May 1997 to 30 June 1999, when Snia decided to shut down its PBS production plant. As explained in section 2.2.8, in 2000 Caffaro merged into Snia and ICC became Caffaro.

Caffaro and Snia disputed the liability of the parent company Snia for the infringement. Snia stated in its reply to the Statement of Objections that during the period of the infringement the activity linked to the detergents (including PBS production) was directly carried out by ICC (today’s Caffaro Srl); the strategic and pricing policy was determined inside ICC in the framework of the division “Ausiliari per l’industria”, whose Director was [Deleted] and of the division “Chimica fine e specialità”, whose Director was [Deleted] These Directors reported directly to the general manager of ICC, namely [Deleted] never sat on the Board of Caffaro nor Snia. Also, the competitors in the PBS market always referred to ICC, or to Caffaro, but never referred to Snia. According to Snia and Caffaro, the current case-law requires the production of elements other than 100% ownership in order for a legal entity to be held liable for behaviour in which a subsidiary was involved. According to the companies, the Commission has failed to produce that additional evidence. Snia finally noted that the control by Snia over Caffaro at the time of the infringement was not 100%, but only 53-59%.
The Commission cannot share the opinion of Snia and Caffaro. As regards the last point raised by Snia, that the 53%-59% control of Caffaro would not suffice to establish a presumption of decisive influence, it should first be recalled that, contrary to Snia’s claim, its liability does not derive from its 53%-59% ownership of Caffaro in the period of infringement, but from the fact that Snia merged with the former Caffaro, which was the 100% parent company of ICC, the entity that was directly involved in the infringement. Thus, the question of the control between Snia and the former Caffaro is not the issue in this regard. What is to be analysed is the control relationship between the Snia/Caffaro entity (renamed Snia after the merger) and the subsidiary ICC (which was later renamed Caffaro Srl.). Caffaro stated that the decision to quit the PBS market was taken by the parent company Snia BPD during the directors’ meeting of 19 January 1999 [Deleted]. Given the 100% shareholding that existed at the time of the infringement between Caffaro (today merged with Snia) and ICC, as well as the proven dependence in the decision-taking process of Caffaro and Snia, and as the links in terms of managing personnel between the entities, the Commission takes the view that Caffaro exercised decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary and that the elements presented by Snia and Caffaro cannot rebut the presumption expressed in the Statement of Objections.

For these reasons Snia are therefore to be held jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed by Caffaro for this period. Consequently, both Snia SpA and Caffaro Srl are addressees of the present Decision.

6.7.9. Solvay SA/NV

It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Solvay SA/NV participated in the overall arrangements from 31 January 1994 to 31 December 2000. As to the end date of its infringement, see recital (359). Consequently, it is an addressee of the present Decision.

6.7.10. Solvay Solexis SpA

It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Ausimont SpA (now Solvay Solexis SpA) participated in the overall arrangements from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000.

Solvay, currently the parent company of Solexis, urged the Commission that the fine for Ausimont’s infringement should be addressed only to the former owner of Ausimont, namely (Mont)Edison, because the infringement was entirely committed under the ownership of (Mont)Edison. The Commission rejects this claim as it has been established that Ausimont, which existed as a separate legal entity at the time of its ownership by (Mont)Edison, participated in the infringement. It is therefore to be held liable for the infringement and is an addressee of the present Decision.

6.7.11. Edison SpA
Montedison used to directly control the company Ausimont SpA (now Solvay Solexis SpA), which was the entity within the Montedison group involved in the production and sale of HP and PBS during the period of the infringement. Following a restructuring Montedison incorporated its electricity and natural gas production subsidiary “Edison”. The latter was joined with other businesses controlled by the company Italenergia Bis SpA, which operated as the vehicle for the restructuring. Montedison then adopted the current Edison name in 2002. Italenergia Bis SpA completed the reorganisation in 2003 by absorbing Edison into Italenergia SpA, a separate subsidiary of Italenergia Bis. Italenergia SpA then took on the “Edison” name. Edison represents therefore the continuation of the economic activities of Montedison.

In its reply to the Statement of Objections Edison admits that the evidence contained in the file shows that an infringement took place which involved also its former subsidiary Ausimont, but disputes that the Commission could hold it jointly and severally liable for the infringement in which Ausimont was involved. In particular Edison submitted that its case is different from those of Solvay, Akzo, Air Liquide or FMC Forêt, as no individual having responsibilities in the parent company was ever involved in the illicit talks. Edison stated that between 1993 and 2002 it operated purely as a holding company without any direct industrial activity. Edison resumed its industrial activity as a power producer and provider only from 2002. (Mont)Edison had during the period of the infringement three subcommittees, namely the financial subcommittee, the organisational subcommittee and the strategic subcommittee. The monitoring of commercial activity was devolved to the internal auditing department as well as to an external auditing company. Therefore Edison affirms that the management of (Mont)Edison could not know, and would not even be in a position to know, about the cartel activities put in place by the subsidiary’s staff. The innocence of Edison is evident also from the fact that, on the occasion of the sale of Ausimont to Solvay, Edison signed a [Deleted]. According to Edison, it is plain that Solvay knew of the infringement and asked for [Deleted] whilst having knowledge of the cartel as Edison did not know about any possible infringement of competition law. In light of those arguments, Edison concludes that the only element according to which it could be held liable for the infringement at stake would be the 100% control of Ausimont. Against that, Edison quotes the opinion of Advocate General in the Stora case71 whereby “a mere 100% shareholding does not in itself suffice as a ground for the parent company's liability”72.

The Commission does not share Edison’s opinion. With regard to the last point raised by Edison, it should be mentioned that the Court of Justice stated in Stora that “the Court of First Instance did not hold that a 100% shareholding in itself sufficed for a finding that the parent company was responsible. It also relied on the fact that the appellant had not disputed that it was in a position to exert a decisive influence on its subsidiary's commercial policy, or produced evidence to

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71 Judgment of the European Court of Justice Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v. Commission quoted, in particular the conclusion of the AG Mischo.
72 Point 40 of the opinion quoted above.
support its claim that the subsidiary was autonomous”73. Hence, it was in absence of a rebuttal that the 100% shareholding was considered a sufficient element. It is also noted that the Court of First Instance, in Specialty Graphite, confirmed this point, where it stated that “the Commission can generally assume that a wholly-owned subsidiary essentially follows the instructions given to it by its parent company, without needing to check whether the parent company actually exercised that power”74. The question is therefore whether Edison has presented arguments that show that Ausimont was autonomous.

(419) Furthermore, in relation to the argument presented by Edison about the autonomy of Ausimont, the Commission points out that other elements are present that indicate the contrary, that is to say, that Ausimont was not an autonomous entity able to decide its own commercial strategy.

(420) Firstly, meetings between Degussa and the Board of Montedison were also held regarding the new Ausimont plant being built in the east of Germany and the fact that the market capacity would be considerably increased. It is noted that in March 1994 [Deleted] Chief Executive Officer and General Manager at Montedison and President of Ferruzzi Finanziaria (which was a major stakeholder of Montedison with 31% of the shares until 1996), met, together with Ausimont representatives, with Degussa. The purpose of the discussions was, amongst others, to get an impression of the readiness of Degussa to acquire Ausimont’s HP business or even the whole company, but the HP business in general was discussed too. Montedison was thus also involved in the decision to construct the new Ausimont factory. These two aspects show that Montedison was involved in the operation of Ausimont’s business activities.

(421) Secondly, the link between Ausimont and Montedison is established by the function of certain members of the management. In particular the position of [Deleted] has to be mentioned. During the period of the infringement [Deleted] was President of the Board of Directors at Ausimont (Presidente del Consiglio d’Amministrazione), as well as a member of the Board, between 1994 and 2000, at Montecatini, the intermediate (holding) company wholly controlled by (Mont)Edison which used to own the 100% share of Ausimont. Following the restructuring, the share owned by Montecatini was transferred to the company Agorà Spa which was 80% controlled by Montedison SpA. The power to take decisions for all subsidiaries remained, however, with Montedison, since Mr. [Deleted] President of Ferruzzi Finanziaria (the ultimate company) as well as Chief Executive Officer and General Manager at Montedison announced during a meeting of the Montedison’s Board of Directors the intention to dispose of the shareholding in Ausimont, in spite of the fact that Ausimont’s shares were held by the intermediate company Agorà Spa, showing therefore its direct influence over Agora’s decisions and, ultimately, over Ausimont. Meanwhile, Montedison has been incorporated into Edison and has therefore ceased to be a separate legal entity, so that its liability has been transferred to Edison.

73 Point 28 of the judgment of the European Court of Justice Stora.
74 See Court of First Instance in case Tokai, paragraph 60.
Lastly, the Commission considers that the other elements adduced by Edison, notably concerning the absence of any knowledge at Edison’s level of the cartel, do not suffice to rebut the Commission’s arguments that it exercised a decisive influence over Ausimont.

Hence, taking into account the involvement of (Mont)Edison in the commercial operations of Ausimont and the 100% shareholding chain that existed during the period of the infringement between Montedison, Montecatini SpA and Ausimont (and the subsequent restructurings which transferred the business responsibility to Edison SpA), the Commission holds Edison jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed by Ausimont for its entire duration, that is, from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000. The fact that Edison transferred its 100% shareholding in Ausimont to the Solvay group of companies in 2002 does not affect, in accordance with the case-law cited, the issue of liability since (Mont)Edison itself remains in existence as an undertaking.

Consequently, Edison is an addressee of the present Decision.

6.7.12. Total SA, Elf Aquitaine SA and Arkema SA

It is established by the facts as described in Section 4.6 that Atochem/Atofina, now Arkema, participated in the overall arrangements from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000.

As described in section 2.2.10, Atochem was created in 1983 from the merger of Cloë Chimie, Atochimie and the biggest part of the chemical activity of the group PCUK, under the name Atochem SA. In 1992 its name changed to Elf Atochem SA and in April 2000 to Atofina SA, after a takeover of Atochem’s parent company Elf Aquitaine SA by the TotalFina group. On 4 October 2004 Atofina was renamed Arkema. It is however the same legal person as directly participated in the infringement throughout its duration. Atofina SA is therefore an addressee of the present Decision.

The members of the board of Atofina were and are appointed by Elf Aquitaine. Taking into account this fact as well as the 98% shareholding that existed at the time of the infringement between Atofina and Elf Aquitaine SA, the Commission presumes that Elf Aquitaine SA exercises decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary Atofina SA. The Commission therefore holds Elf Aquitaine SA jointly and severally liable for the infringement committed by Atofina/Arkema.

In April 2000 TotalFina SA acquired control of the company Elf Aquitaine SA by means of a public offering, becoming TotalFinaElf SA. TotalFinaElf SA subsequently changed its name to Total SA. Since that date Arkema has been controlled (96.48%) by Elf Aquitaine, which is in turn almost wholly owned (99.43%) by Total SA.
In the exercise of its activity, Total SA controls directly or indirectly the capital of all operating companies of the group, including the companies that played a direct role in the behaviour described. Given these facts, the Commission presumes that Total SA exercises decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiaries Elf Aquitaine SA and Atofina SA.

Responses to the Statement of Objections were sent separately by Atofina on the one hand and by the other two companies involved in the investigation on the other hand. Total and Elf Aquitaine firstly observed that for the sake of good administration the Commission should wait for the judgment of the Court of First Instance in MCAA\textsuperscript{75} where the issue of the liability of a parent company in cartel cases was raised by Elf Aquitaine. According to Total and Elf Aquitaine, the MCAA Decision marks an audacious change in the Commission assessment of the liability of parent companies. For example, the Commission decision concerning Organic peroxides\textsuperscript{76} was addressed to Atofina alone.

Subsequently Atofina, Total and Elf Aquitaine made several remarks arguing that the Decision should be addressed solely to Atofina on the following main grounds:

1. fining a company other than that which committed the infringement would undermine the principle of the autonomy of a legal entity, and in particular its economic autonomy;

2. the Statement of Objections did not contain any element which could justify Total and Elf Aquitaine being punished due to anti-competitive practices, whereas for other groups of companies these elements were indicated (e.g. Akzo);

3. the attribution of liability to Total and Elf Aquitaine would be contrary to several principles at the basis of European law (personal liability, personality of sanctions, presumption of innocence, principle of equality of arms)\textsuperscript{77};

4. although Elf Aquitaine and Total nominate members of the Board of Atofina this does not prove the exercise of decisive influence. Atofina enjoys complete autonomy in its commercial policy and conduct on the market, which is not subordinated to instructions originating from Total and/or Elf Aquitaine (the reporting duty being limited to general information given within the framework of a normal functioning in a group of companies, focussed mainly on accounting, financing and auditing matters);

5. Atofina also pointed out that Total and Elf Aquitaine were not involved in the Commission’s investigatory procedure, received no requests for information from the Commission, were not subject to on the spot investigations and were not contacted by the Commission prior to receiving the Statement of Objections;

\textsuperscript{75} Commission Decision of 19 January 2005, MCAA, case COMP/37.773, not yet published.
\textsuperscript{76} Commission Decision of 10 December 2003, Organic peroxides, case COMP/37.857, not yet published.
\textsuperscript{77} See pages 37-49 of the reply of Total and Elf Aquitaine to the Statement of Objections. In the original French text such principles read as follows: « responsabilité du fait personnel, principe de la personnalité des peines, principe de la présomption d’innocence, principe de l’égalité des armes ».
the Commission’s power to calculate the fine is clearly circumscribed by the 1998 guidelines on fines and any fine imposed should be set at an equitable level; therefore it should not take the global turnover of the Total group as an indicator to establish the level of the fine.

(432) Finally Total and Elf Aquitaine pointed out that they are equally entitled to enjoy a possible reduction of any fines in the framework of the leniency programme, for which their subsidiary Atofina applied on 3 April 2003.

(433) In reply to these arguments the Commission responds, on the preliminary point, that the fact that a case is currently pending before the Court of First Instance does not prevent the Commission from taking other Decisions on similar matters.

(434) Furthermore, the fact that in a previous case the Commission addressed its decision to Atofina alone does not prevent the Commission in this case from addressing its decision to both Atofina and Total/Elf Aquitaine. The Commission has discretion to impute liability to a parent company in such circumstances and the fact that it has not done so in a previous decision does not prevent it from doing so in this case78.

(435) The Commission does not accept the argument that this Decision runs contrary to the principles of law referred to by the companies. For instance, neither the principle of the autonomy of a legal entity nor the principle of personality of the penalties are undermined by the fact that more than one company is held liable for an infringement.

(436) As regards the principle of personal liability according to which punishment should be applied only to the offender, the Commission would like to point out the following: the case-law of the Court of Justice recognises the principle of personal liability79. In line with the principles of parental liability laid down in section 6.7.1, Total/Elf Aquitaine participated in the infringement by virtue of the fact that they formed a single undertaking with their subsidiary Atofina, which was directly involved in the infringement. In the present case the Commission is not imposing a fine on any company other than those answerable for the infringement. The principle of the autonomy of a legal entity and economic autonomy are company law principles that are not relevant once a group of companies is held to form a single undertaking for the purposes of applying Article 81 of the Treaty.

(437) As regards the principles of presumption of innocence and equality of arms, Atofina, Total and Elf Aquitaine are confusing the notions of liability and imputation. Atofina, which belongs to a single undertaking with Total/Elf Aquitaine, has explicitly admitted to participating in the infringement in its

79 Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Anic Partecipazioni v Commission, quoted in footnote 33, at paragraph 78.
application for immunity and alternatively for a reduction of fines under the Leniency Notice. Therefore, the presumption of innocence has not been breached. The imputation of responsibility to Total/Elf Aquitaine follows from a presumption of decisive influence established by settled case-law and which has not been rebutted in the present case. Therefore, no separate set of evidence needs to be submitted to establish Total’s and Elf Aquitaine’s responsibility other than that used to demonstrate Atofina’s responsibility for the same infringement. Consequently the principle of equality of arms has not been breached.

(438) The fact that Total and Elf Aquitaine were not subject to on-site inspections and did not receive any requests for information has no bearing on the issue of the liability of parent companies for the acts of their subsidiaries. Inspections and requests for information are purely investigatory steps which the Commission is not obliged to address to undertakings before issuing a Statement of Objections.

(439) The argument that any fine imposed should be set at an equitable level and not discriminatory is assessed by the Commission in recital (465).

(440) The Commission, finally, will take account of the reduction accorded to Atofina in the framework of the leniency programme for determining the fine to be attributed to Total and Elf Aquitaine.

(441) The Commission confirms therefore its findings in order to address this Decision to Arkema SA, Elf Aquitaine SA and Total SA. Together those entities form part of the undertaking that is responsible for the sale of HP and PBS on the relevant market and they are jointly and severally liable for the participation in the cartel. Total SA can be held responsible for the infringement committed by Elf Aquitaine SA and Atofina SA (now Arkema SA) from the date of acquisition of the control over Elf Aquitaine SA (30 April 2000) until 31 December 2000.

6.8. Conclusions

(442) On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Commission considers that the following companies should be addressees of the present Decision:

- Akzo Nobel NV
- Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB
- EKA Chemicals AB
- Degussa AG
- Edison SpA
- FMC Corporation
• FMC Foret S.A.
• Kemira OYJ
• L’Air Liquide SA
• Chemoxal SA
• Snia SpA
• Caffaro Srl
• Solvay SA/NV
• Solvay Solexis SpA
• Total SA
• Elf Aquitaine SA
• Arkema SA

7. REMEDIES

7.1. Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003

(443) Where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty or Article 53 of the EEA Agreement it may require the undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end in accordance with Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

(444) While it appears from the facts that in all likelihood the infringement effectively ended in December 2000, it is necessary to ensure with absolute certainty that the infringement has ceased and, accordingly, necessary for the Commission to require the undertakings to which this Decision is addressed to bring the infringement to an end (if they have not already done so) and henceforth to refrain from entering into any agreement, concerted practice or decision of an association which might have the same or a similar object or effect.

(445) The prohibition applies not only to secret meetings and multilateral or bilateral contacts between competitors aimed at restricting competition between them or enabling them to concert their market behaviour, but also to the activities of the undertakings in so far as they involve, in particular, collecting and distributing individualised sales statistics.

7.2. Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003

(446) Under Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently,
they infringe Article 81(1) of the Treaty and/or Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 which was applicable at the time of the infringement, the fine for each undertaking participating in the infringement could not exceed 10% of its total turnover in the preceding business year. The same limitation results from Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

(447) However, pursuant to Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the power of the Commission to impose fines or penalties for such infringements is subject to a limitation period of five years. Pursuant to Article 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, for continuing infringements, the limitation period begins to run on the day on which the infringement ceases. Any action taken by the Commission for the purpose of the preliminary investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringement interrupts the limitation period.

(448) As related in recital (368), Chemoxal ended its participation in the infringement on 31 December 1997. The first action taken by the Commission to investigate the infringement was the carrying out of unannounced inspections on 25 and 26 March 2003. As this action took place more than five years after Chemoxal had ended its participation in the infringement, no fines can be imposed on Chemoxal or on its parent company, Air Liquide.

(449) Pursuant to both Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 23(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the Commission must, in fixing the amount of the fine, have regard to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement. In doing so, the Commission will set the fines at a level sufficient to ensure deterrence. Moreover, the Commission will, having regard to all relevant circumstances, assess the role played by each undertaking party in the infringement on an individual basis. In particular, the Commission will ensure that the fines imposed reflect any aggravating or mitigating circumstances pertaining to each undertaking.

(450) In the present Decision, the Commission applies the Leniency Notice. It also evaluates the position of each undertaking which filed an application for a reduction of a fine.

(451) In assessing the fine to be imposed on each individual undertaking, the Commission also takes account of, *inter alia*:

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82 Commission Notice on the immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 45 of 19.02.2002, p. 3-5.
– the role played by each undertaking, in particular the leading role played by some companies, as described in the factual part of the present Decision;
– the respective duration of their participation in each infringement;
– the importance of each of the undertakings in the HP and PBS industry and the impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition.

8. THE BASIC AMOUNT OF THE FINES

(452) The basic amount of each fine is determined according to the gravity and the duration of the infringement.

8.1. Gravity

(453) In assessing the gravity of the infringement, the Commission takes account of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant geographic market.

8.1.1. Nature of the infringement

(454) The infringement in this case consisted mainly of competitors exchanging commercially important and confidential market- and/or company relevant information, limiting and/or controlling production as well as potential and actual capacities, allocating market shares and customers, and fixing and monitoring (target) prices. These kinds of horizontal restrictions are, by their very nature, among the worst kinds of infringements of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. With full knowledge of the illegality of their actions, the participants colluded to set up a secret and institutionalised scheme designed to restrict competition in this industrial sector.

8.1.2. The actual impact of the infringement

(455) In this proceeding, it is not possible to measure the actual impact on the EEA market of the complex of arrangements of which the infringement consists and therefore the Commission does not rely specifically on a particular impact, in line with the guidelines currently applicable according to which the actual impact should be taken into account when it can be measured. The Court of First Instance has found that the Commission is not required precisely to demonstrate the actual impact of the cartel on the market and to quantify it, but may confine itself to estimates of the probability of such an effect. What can be said, in the present case, is that with regard to the EEA, the cartel arrangements were implemented by the European producers and that such implementation did have an impact on the market, even if its actual effect is ex hypothesi difficult to measure.83

8.1.3. The size of the relevant geographic market

(456) The infringement covered the whole of the EEA. It is important to note that fact for the purposes of assessing gravity.

8.1.4. Conclusion on the gravity of the infringement

(457) Taking into account the nature of the infringement committed, the fact that it must have had an impact and the fact that it covered the whole of the EEA, where the HP/PBS market had a total value of around EUR 470 million\textsuperscript{84} in 1999, the last full year of the infringement, the Commission considers that the undertakings to which this Decision is addressed have committed a very serious infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

8.1.5. Differential treatment

(458) Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings in order to take account of the effective economic capacity of the offenders, respectively, to cause significant damage to competition. This is appropriate where, as in this case, there are considerable disparities between the respective market shares of the undertakings participating in the infringement.

(459) In the circumstances of this case, which involves several undertakings, it is necessary, when setting the basic amount of the fines, to take account of the specific weight, and therefore the real impact on competition, of each undertaking’s offending conduct. For this purpose the undertakings concerned can be divided into different categories according to their relative importance in the market concerned.

(460) In order to determine the individual weight of participants in the infringement, the global market shares in 1999, the last full year of the infringement for both products, as indicated in section 2.3.1, will be used. By assessing the turnover in the respective products for each undertaking and setting them off against the total turnover for HP and PBS for the purposes of determining the individual weight, the Commission has taken account of the fact that certain undertakings were only active on the market for one of the two products concerned. In doing so the Commission has taken account of the real impact of the unlawful conduct of each undertaking on competition, particularly as there is a considerable disparity between the sizes of the undertakings that committed the unlawful behaviour. Because of the different varieties in which HP and PBS can be sold, sales based on the total value amount appear a more reliable indicator of operators’ capacities. These figures show that Solvay was the largest market operator in the EEA, with a share of the combined sales of around [20-30]%.

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\textsuperscript{84} This takes together both the HP and the PBS market.
category. FMC Foret, EKA, Atofina, Kemira and Ausimont with shares of [8-12]% respectively, are placed in a third category. Finally, Caffaro, with a market share in PBS of around [5-10]% in its last full year, 1998, and a share of sales with regard to the combined HP and PBS market of [1-5]% is placed in a fourth category.

(461) In the case of Caffaro, the Commission takes into account, in the light of the facts as established, and despite the several links existing between the two products, that it has not been established that Caffaro was aware or could necessarily have had knowledge of the overall scheme of the anti-competitive arrangements. Consequently, given the circumstances of the case, a reduction of 25% is applied to the starting amount of the fine calculated for Caffaro.

(462) On this basis, the appropriate starting amounts for those undertakings that will receive a fine are as follows:

First Category (Solvay) EUR 50 million
Second Category (Degussa) EUR 30 million
Third category
(FMC Corporation/FMC Foret, Akzo Nobel/Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding/EKA Chemicals, Total/Elf Aquitaine/Atofina, Kemira and Edison/Ausimont (now Solvay Solexis)) EUR 20 million
Fourth category (Snia/Caffaro) EUR 1.875 million

8.1.6. Sufficient deterrence

(463) Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines also makes it possible to set the fines at a level which ensures that they have sufficient deterrent effect, taking into account the size of each undertaking. In this respect, the Commission notes that in 2005, the most recent financial year preceding this Decision, the world-wide turnover of Total was EUR 143 billion, that of Elf Aquitaine EUR 120 billion, that of Akzo EUR 13,000 million, that of Degussa EUR 11,750 million, that of Solvay EUR 8,560 million and that of Edison EUR 6,650 million. Accordingly, the Commission considers it appropriate to multiply the fine for Total by a factor of 3, that is based on the size of the parent companies, Elf Aquitaine and Total, which each have a turnover well above EUR 100 billion. Akzo and Degussa, with a turnover each of around 10% of that of Total are still very large undertakings, with a turnover well exceeding EUR 10,000 million. It is therefore considered it appropriate to multiply the fine for these undertakings by a factor of 1.75. In view of the fact that Solvay had a turnover of EUR 8,560 million, the Commission considers it appropriate to multiply the fine for Solvay by a factor of 1.5. In view of the fact that Edison had a turnover of EUR 6,650 million, the Commission considers it appropriate to multiply the fine for this undertaking by a factor of 1.25. Given that Ausimont was transferred to a different undertaking, in
the circumstances of the case, the multiplier applies to the fine to be attributed to Edison only.

Total/Elf Aquitaine submitted that it is not appropriate and, according to Arkema, would be discriminatory, to take the world-wide turnover of Total and/or Elf Aquitaine for the purpose of increasing the fine for Atofina to be made provision in order to ensure sufficient deterrence, unless the direct involvement of the parent companies in the anti-competitive agreements is demonstrated. They argued that the Court of First Instance (rectius the Court of Justice) has reduced a fine where it was the result of a simple calculation based on global turnover, particularly where the goods concerned only represented a small proportion of global turnover. Atofina further supported this approach by reference to the Commission decisions *Pre-insulated Pipes* and *Carbonless Paper* which, they allege, demonstrate that where the responsibility for the infringement lies with the subsidiary alone and not with the group, no multiplier is justified.

The Commission disagrees. If the Commission were to decide, on the basis of this argument, that a lower fine should be imposed on Atofina than is justified by the size of the undertaking of which it is part, a very large undertaking involved in one or several cartels could escape from high fines by creating small subsidiaries with little turnover to engage them in illegal behaviour. Imposing a sufficiently high fine on very large undertakings for each infringement committed by any entity of such undertaking deters such behaviour. Regarding the claim concerning the principle of non-discrimination between multinational companies and others, it suffices to refer to the fact that the rules laid down in Article 81 of the Treaty apply equally to all companies, regardless of their size.

As a result, the starting amounts of the fines to be imposed on each undertaking become as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undertaking</th>
<th>Amount (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total/Elf Aquitaine/Atofina</td>
<td>60 million;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvay</td>
<td>75 million;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degussa</td>
<td>52.5 million;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akzo Nobel/Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding/EKA Chemicals</td>
<td>35 million;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edison</td>
<td>25 million;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of this amount Ausimont (now Solvay)

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85 See judgment of the European Court of Justice of 7 June 1983 in joined cases 100 to 103/80: *SA Musique Diffusion Francaise and others v Commission*, ECR 1983, page 1825, paragraph 121.
Solexis) is liable for EUR 20 million
- FMC Corporation/FMC Foret EUR 20 million;
- Kemira EUR 20 million;
- Snia/Caffaro EUR 1.875 million.

8.2. Duration of the infringement

(467) As related in section 6.6, Degussa, Solvay and Kemira participated in the infringement at least from 31 January 1994 to 31 December 2000, a period of six years and eleven months. All these undertakings committed an infringement of long duration. The starting amounts of the fines should consequently be increased by 10 % for each full year of infringement. They should be further increased by 5 % for any remaining period of 6 months or more but less than a year. This leads to a percentage increase of the starting amount for each undertaking of 65 %. EKA participated in the infringement at least from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 1999, a period of five years and eleven months, while Atofina and Ausimont participated in the infringement at least from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000, a period of five years and seven months. According to the criterion set out above, this leads to a percentage increase of the starting amount for each undertaking of 55%. FMC Foret participated in the infringement at least from 29 May 1997 until 13 December 1999, a period of two years and seven months. According to the criterion set out above, this leads to a percentage increase of the starting amount of 25 %. Caffaro participated in the infringement at least from 29 May 1997 until 31 December 1998, a period of one year and seven months. According to the criterion set out above, this leads to a percentage increase of the starting amount of 15 %.

8.3. Conclusion on the basic amounts

(468) The basic amounts of the fines for each undertaking are therefore as follows:

- Atofina (Arkema)/Elf Aquitaine EUR 93 million;
  Of this amount Total is liable for EUR 60 million
- Solvay EUR 123.75 million;
- Degussa EUR 86.625 million;
- Akzo Nobel / Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding / EKA Chemicals 88 EUR 42 million;

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88 As [deleted] enabled the Commission to trace back the cartel to 31 January 1994, in accordance with point 23 of the Leniency Notice, these elements will not be taken into account when setting the fine, resulting in an increase for duration of 20% instead of 55% for this undertaking.
Of this amount Ausimont (now Solvay Solexis) is liable for EUR 31 million;  

- FMC Corporation/FMC Foret
eUR 25 million;  
- Kemira
eUR 33 million;  
- Snia/Caffaro
eUR 2.156 million.

9. AGGRAVATING AND ATTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES

9.1. Aggravating circumstances

9.1.1. Recidivism

(469) At the time the infringement took place, Atofina, Degussa, Edison and Solvay had already been the addressees of previous Commission decisions concerning cartel activities\(^\text{89}\). The fact that the undertakings have repeated the same type of conduct either in the same industry or in different sectors from that in which they had previously incurred penalties, shows that the first penalties did not prompt these undertakings to change their conduct. This constitutes for the Commission an aggravating circumstance. This aggravating circumstance justifies an increase of 50 % in the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on the undertakings mentioned above\(^\text{90}\). A 50% rate is the normal rate employed by the Commission in cases involving recidivism.

(470) In its reply to the Statement of Objections, Solvay submitted that the fact that it may have been the addressee of previous decisions finding a similar infringement should not permit an increase of the fine, mainly because the deterrence would be already guaranteed by the increase of the fine on the basis of the size of the

\(^{89}\) Such decisions include:  
As regards Atochem/Arkema: Commission decision of 23 November 1984 quoted (Peroxygen products), Commission decision of 27 July 1994 quoted (PVC II).

\(^{90}\) The increase for recidivism applies only to Atofina and not to its parent companies, Elf Aquitaine and Total, as the latter were not in control of Atofina at the time of the previous infringement. The multiplying factor applied to Total, namely 3 is not included in the calculation. Instead a multiplying factor of 1.25, which would have been applied had Atofina been the sole addressee of the Decision (given its worldwide turnover of 5.7 billion EUR in 2005), will be used for the purposes of calculating recidivism. A separate fine will accordingly be addressed to Arkema alone for this amount.
undertaking. Furthermore Solvay argued that an increase on the ground of recidivism would amount to looking backwards and punishing an undertaking for a repetition of its past conduct, that effectively the decision would assume a criminal nature, which is prohibited by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. Finally the time that has elapsed between the previous Commission decisions in cartel cases, firstly the decision of 1984 for the same products, but also another three decisions fining Solvay for anti-competitive behaviour contrary to Article 85 (now 81) of the Treaty, is too long to constitute the basis of recidivism. Atofina, in turn, stated that the Commission should not be entitled to increase the starting amount of the fine on account of recidivism because, according to it, the kind of infringement as well as the features established by the “peroxigen” decision of 1984 are of a different nature; the other two prohibition decisions quoted by the Commission in the Statement of Objections were addressed to legal persons other than Atofina; finally, applying the notion of recidivism would be excessive considering that the previous decisions were adopted in 1984 and 1988 and concerned facts dating back to more than 20 years before the adoption of the present decision.

The Commission does not share Solvay’s and Atofina’s opinion. The fact that Solvay repeated the same type of conduct not only in the same sector in which it had previously incurred penalties, but also in different sectors, shows that the first penalties did not prompt Solvay to change its conduct. This constitutes for the Commission an aggravating circumstance. This aggravating circumstance justifies an increase of 50% in the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on Solvay. As regards the remarks by Atofina, the infringement established and punished by the Commission decision of 1984 was contrary to Article 85 (now 81) of the Treaty, that is to say, the same as is established by the present Decision. Therefore, no difference is shown between the two allegedly different kinds of infringement. The same can be said for the other decision. As to the addressees of previous decisions, the Commission considers that the legal entities which were addressees of such decisions were and still are part of the Total group, therefore belonging to the same undertaking to which the present decision is addressed. Finally, the two decisions quoted by the Commission as precedents were adopted in 1984 and 1994, respectively. Only one year after the latter decision Atofina again started negotiating anti-competitive arrangements. Thus, the time that elapsed between the previous prohibition decision and the start of new anti-competitive negotiations is not long at all. The arguments of the parties on those points are therefore rejected.

9.2. **Attenuating circumstances**

9.2.1. **Early termination of the infringement**

EKA, Solvay, Solexis and Arkema claim that the fact that the infringement was voluntarily terminated before the Commission initiated an investigation should be taken into account as an attenuating circumstance.

Cartel infringements are by their very nature hard-core anti-trust violations. Participants in these infringements normally realise very well that they are engaged in unlawful activities. In the Commission's view, in such cases of deliberate unlawful behaviour, the fact that a company terminates this behaviour before any
intervention of the Commission does not merit any particular reward. It means only that the period of infringement of the company concerned will be shorter than it would otherwise have been. In *Graphite Electrodes*, the Court of First Instance confirmed that the fact that an undertaking voluntarily puts an end to the infringement before the Commission has opened its investigation is sufficiently taken into account in the calculation of the duration of the infringement period and does not constitute an attenuating circumstance\(^\text{91}\).

### 9.2.2. Minor and/or passive role

(474) Kemira, Atofina, Solexis and Caffaro have invoked attenuating circumstances for their minor and/or passive role in the cartel. Chemoxal stated that it did not attend most of the meetings and this shows its minor role.

(475) In general, an exclusively passive or "follow-my-leader" role played by an undertaking in the infringement may, if established, constitute an attenuating circumstance. A passive role implies that the undertaking has adopted a 'low profile', that is to say, it did not actively participate in the creation of any anti-competitive agreements.\(^\text{92}\) The factors capable of revealing such a role within a cartel include the significantly more sporadic nature of the undertaking’s participation in the meetings by comparison with the ordinary members of the cartel,\(^\text{93}\) and also the existence of express declarations to that effect made by representatives of other undertakings which participated in the infringement.\(^\text{94}\) In any event, it is necessary to take account of all the relevant circumstances in each particular case.

(476) It is clear from the facts described in the factual part of the present Decision that Caffaro’s involvement in the cartel was not comparable with that of the other active members. It is equally apparent that Caffaro’s participation in the collusive contacts was significantly more sporadic by comparison with the other members of the cartel and limited to only two meetings relating to PBS. The number of Caffaro’s proven anticompetitive contacts is indeed very small and shows a limited involvement in the overall arrangements.

(477) Thus, in the case of Caffaro the Commission will, because of its passive and minor role, reduce the otherwise appropriate figure by 50%.

\(^\text{91}\) See the judgment of Court of First Instance of 29 April 2004 in joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-242/01, *Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and Others v Commission*, [2004] ECR, p II-1202, at paragraph 341.


The same cannot be said for the other competitors that claim to have been small players or to have behaved as followers. The attempts by Kemira, Atofina, Solexis and Chemoxal to portray themselves as minor players and/or mere followers of Degussa and Solvay in the cartel are not convincing. Rather, the evidence in the Commission’s file points to their having consistently been ordinary, regular and active participants in the arrangements described in the factual part of the present Decision.

Indeed, Kemira’s participation in the collusive contacts with the other producers cannot be considered significantly more sporadic than that of the other members of the cartel. The frequency of Kemira’s contacts with the other producers (the company itself admits that Kemira’s representatives were present at 31 out of 73 meetings referred to by the Commission in the Statement of Objections) throughout the entire infringement period is incompatible with any notion of a passive or minor role. See, for example, Kemira’s presence at fundamental meetings where the various topics of the cartel were discussed. Kemira was involved in all collusive price increases reported, including the stages of their preparation, implementation and follow-up. Moreover, the active contribution of the Kemira executives to the overall scheme and the strategy of the cartel, as implemented in the EEA, is fully demonstrated. With regard to Kemira’s argument that it was a minor player in Europe, compared with Solvay, Degussa and EKA, the Commission notes that Kemira was the third largest HP producer as well as the third largest PCS producer in the EEA.

Kemira’s claim for mitigating factors due to its alleged passive and/or minor role must therefore be rejected.

The same applies to Atofina’s argument that it was only a follower as Degussa and Solvay were the real leaders of the cartels. On the contrary, Atofina participated in almost all the multilateral contacts, it organised (and hosted) some of them and fully took part in all the discussions, also formulating several proposals for a market sharing agreement as well as for price fixing arrangements. Therefore Atofina’s argument must also be rejected.

Finally, Solexis and Chemoxal claim that they were among the smallest players compared with other producers in the industry. As to Solexis, its aim was to increase its weight on the market by building new capacity. This project was at odds with the market strategy of the larger producers like Degussa. Solexis further claims that it was only present at 13 out of 48 meetings in the period mid-1997 – December 1999 and only at those meetings where it was requested to agree upon proposals already elaborated elsewhere by the largest producers. Chemoxal states that it was absent from a great number of the meetings described in the present Decision.

The Commission defined for instance Ausimont “one of the smallest producers of HP in Europe” at paragraph 148 of the Statement of Objections.

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(483) The Commission observes, however, that Ausimont was represented at at least 29 bilateral or multilateral contacts during the operation of the cartel described in the factual part of the present Decision and, when absent, it was often informed of the outcomes of the main discussions which had taken place in its absence. The same is valid for Chemoxal which, despite the earlier termination of its infringement, was nevertheless present at at least nine of the meetings described in the factual part of the present Decision between 1995 and 1997.

9.2.3. Non-implementation

(484) Caffaro claims that the infringement, or elements thereof, was not effectively implemented, or not implemented at all. First of all, Caffaro claims that no agreement on PBS was reached in Seville and when an agreement was actually reached, in Evian, Caffaro’s own increase in PBS price was over two thirds smaller than that of its competitors. On the basis of this reasoning and of the sales figures annexed to the reply to the Statement of Objections, which show that prices went up only slightly, Caffaro concludes that it behaved in a disruptive manner and its transaction prices differed significantly from those of the other participants in the infringement, which is the criterion that, according to the Court of First Instance, justifies a reduction of the fine.

(485) The Commission’s conclusion on this point is set out in recital (340), where it is stated that the arrangements, in so far as they pertained to the EEA market, were implemented. They were implemented in particular in respect of the key elements of prices and the control of conversions, even if such implementation may have been less than fully successful in achieving an actual impact on the market.

(486) In the Commission’s view, the fact that an undertaking which participated in an infringement or elements thereof with its competitors did not always behave on the market in the manner agreed between them is not a matter which must be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance when determining the amount of the fine to be imposed. An undertaking which, despite colluding with its competitors, follows a more or less independent policy on the market may simply be trying to exploit the cartel for its own benefit.

(487) Such an undertaking would have to demonstrate that it systematically and explicitly refrained from applying the restrictive agreements. In this case such proof has not been adduced by Caffaro.

9.2.4. Crisis situation

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96 See judgement of the Court of First Instance in Cascades SA v Commission, cited above, paragraph 230; See also the judgement of the Court of First Instance in Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd and others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 297, and Judgement of the Court of First Instance in case T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission, [2004] ECR II-729 paragraphs 277-278.

97 See judgement of the Court of First Instance in Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission, cited above, paragraph 278.
Atofina, Solvay, Solexis and Caffaro argue that a reduction should be granted in view of the (alleged) fact that the HP and PBS industry was in a crisis situation and companies were in a poor financial condition. They state that during the period of the infringement the European producers often made losses on sales of HP and PBS.

The Commission observes that in a free market economy, entrepreneurial risk includes the risk of occasional losses or even bankruptcy. The fact that an undertaking may not happen to make profits on a certain commercial activity is no licence for it to enter into secret collusion with competitors to cheat customers and other competitors.

As a general rule, cartels risk coming into play not when undertakings make large profits but precisely when a sector encounters problems. Therefore, if the reasoning of Atofina, Solvay and Solexis were followed, fines on cartels would have to be reduced in virtually all cases. In Graphite Electrodes, the Court of First Instance confirmed that the Commission is not required to regard as an attenuating circumstance the poor financial state of the sector in question.

9.2.5. Absence of benefit

To the extent that Caffaro submits that its fine should be reduced because it did not gain any benefit from the arrangements, it suffices to note that for an undertaking to be classified as a perpetrator of an infringement it is not necessary for it to have derived any economic advantage from its participation in the cartel in question. The Court of First Instance has recently stated that “[i]f the fact that an agreement having an anti-competitive object is implemented, even if only in part, is sufficient to preclude the possibility that the agreement had no effect on the market”. Therefore, the gravity of Caffaro’s anti-competitive behaviour is in no way attenuated by the fact that the profits derived may have been negligible.

The Commission thus rejects Caffaro’s claim regarding absence of benefit as a mitigating factor.

9.2.6. Cooperation outside the 2002 Leniency Notice

Certain undertakings (Solexis, Kemira, Chemoxal and Caffaro) requested that in so far as their co-operation was not taken into account under the Leniency Notice, their co-operation be considered outside the Leniency Notice. According to the

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98 Judgment of Court of First Instance in joined cases T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-242/01, Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission, quoted in footnote 91, at paragraph 345.
100 Judgment of 25 October 2005 of Court of First Instance in case T-38/02, Danone v Commission. The official French text reads as follows : « La mise en œuvre, fût-elle partielle, d’un accord dont l’objet est anticoncurrentiel suffit à écarter la possibilité de conclure à une absence d’impact dudit accord sur le marché ». 

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Guidelines on the method of setting fines in antitrust cases, the Commission may reduce the basic amount of the fines on the basis of attenuating circumstances, such as effective cooperation of the undertakings outside the scope of the Leniency Notice.

(494) In this case the Commission has assessed, in line with the case-law, whether the co-operation of any of the undertakings concerned enabled the Commission to establish the infringement more easily. Indeed, an assessment of co-operation in a case where the Leniency Notice applies is in principle to be carried out under that Notice\(^\text{101}\). That assessment has in fact been carried out in application of the Leniency Notice (see sections 10.5 and 10.6).

(495) The Commission considers, taking into account the arguments of the parties, the very limited scope and value of their cooperation and the contestation of facts they have made beyond this limited cooperation, that no other circumstances are present that would lead to a reduction of fines outside the Leniency Notice, which, in secret cartel cases, could in any event only be of an exceptional nature (see the Commission’s decision in the Raw Tobacco Italy case\(^\text{102}\)).

9.3. **Conclusion on aggravating and attenuating circumstances**

(496) As a result of aggravating circumstances, the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on Arkema, Degussa, Edison and Solvay should be increased in each case by 50% to EUR 112.38 million, EUR 129.938 million, EUR 58.125 million and EUR 185.625 million, respectively, and, as a result of attenuating circumstances, the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on Caffaro should be reduced by 50% to EUR 1.078 million.

9.4. **Application of the 10% turnover limit**

(497) Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides that the fine imposed on each undertaking is not to exceed 10% of its turnover. As regards the 10% ceiling, if “several addressees constitute the “undertaking”, that is the economic entity responsible for the infringement penalised, […] at the date when the decision is adopted, […] the ceiling can be calculated on the basis of the overall turnover of that undertaking, that is to say, of all its constituent parts taken together. By contrast, if that economic unit has subsequently broken up, each addressee of the decision is entitled to have the ceiling in question applied individually to it”\(^\text{103}\).

(498) The world-wide annual turnover achieved by Solexis in 2005 was EUR 256,190,307. The fine imposed on Solexis must therefore not exceed EUR 25,619 million.

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\(^\text{101}\) See judgment of the Court of First Instance of 15 March 2006 in case T-15/02 **BASF AG v Commission**, (not yet reported), at paragraph 586. See also judgment of the Court of First Instance of 6 December 2005 in case T-48/02 **Brouwerij Haacht v Commission**, not yet reported (see OJ C 36 of 11.02.2006, p.60), at paragraph 104 and the case law cited therein.

\(^\text{102}\) Commission decision of 20 October 2005, available on the Commission’s website.

\(^\text{103}\) See judgment **Tokai Carbon and Co v Commission**, cited in footnote 43, paragraph 390.
10. APPLICATION OF THE 2002 LENIENCY NOTICE

Degussa, EKA, Arkema, Solvay, Solexis and Kemira submitted applications under the Leniency Notice. They co-operated with the Commission at different stages of the investigation with a view to receiving the favourable treatment provided for in the Leniency Notice.

As concerns EKA and Arkema, it is noted that the leniency applications submitted by entities from those respective groups are considered in the circumstances of this case also to cover the other addressees of the same undertaking, given that indeed they belong to the economic entity held liable for the infringement and that there are no grounds for refusing to extend the beneficial treatment to them.

10.1. Degussa

Degussa was the first European producer of HP and persalts to inform the Commission of the existence of a cartel in the HP market as well as in the HP-linked PBS market. By letter dated 13 December 2002, Degussa produced the evidence for both products and on 27 January 2003 the Commission granted Degussa conditional immunity from fines in accordance with point 15 of the Leniency Notice on the basis of the information provided on 13 December 2002.

Following the application under the Leniency Notice on 13 December 2002 the Commission was able to carry out inspections under Article 14(3) of Regulation Nr. 17 on 25 and 26 March 2003. Degussa has co-operated fully, on a continuous basis and expeditiously throughout the Commission’s administrative procedure and provided the Commission with all evidence available to it relating to the suspected infringement, giving details of meetings between competitors as concerns both products and enabling the Commission to prove the existence of a cartel for both products. Degussa ended its involvement in the suspected infringement no later than the time at which it submitted evidence under point 8(a) of the Leniency Notice and did not take steps to coerce other undertakings to participate in the infringement. Hence, Degussa qualifies for a full immunity from the fine that would otherwise have been imposed on it.

10.2. EKA

EKA was the second undertaking to approach the Commission under the Leniency Notice, on 29 March 2003, and the first undertaking to meet the requirements of point 21 thereof, as it provided the Commission with evidence which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession at the time of its submission.

EKA terminated its involvement in the infringement no later than the time at which it submitted the evidence and its involvement has remained terminated. The Commission therefore will apply a reduction of fines in the band of 30-50%.
In the assessment of the level of reduction within the band of 30-50%, the Commission takes into account the time at which the evidence of significant added value was submitted and the extent to which it represents such value. It may also take into account the extent and continuity of any cooperation after the submission. The timing of EKA’s leniency application on 29 March 2003 was early after the inspections. EKA voluntarily submitted evidence of the infringement in the week following the Commission’s inspections without itself undergoing such inspections.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission grants EKA a 40% reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed on it for the period from 14 October 1997 until 31 December 1999.

As noted, EKA’s evidence enabled the Commission to trace the existence of the cartel back to 31 January 1994. EKA’s evidence for the period of the infringement before 14 October 1997 related to facts previously unknown to the Commission which had a direct bearing on the duration of the suspected cartel. In accordance with point 23 of the Leniency Notice, the Commission will not take these elements into account for the purposes of setting the amount of the fine to be imposed on EKA.

10.3. Atofina (Arkema)

Atofina, (now Arkema), was the second undertaking to meet the requirements of point 21 of the Leniency Notice, as it provided the Commission with evidence which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession at the time of its submission and, to the Commission’s knowledge, Atofina terminated its involvement in the infringement no later than the time at which it submitted the evidence. It qualifies, therefore, under the second indent of point 23 (b) of the Leniency Notice, for a reduction of 20-30% of the fine. In the assessment of the level of reduction within the band of 20-30%, the Commission takes into account the time at which the evidence of significant added value was submitted and the extent to which it represents such value.

On 3 April 2003, shortly after its premises had been inspected under Article 14 of Regulation No 17, Atofina submitted its application under the Leniency Notice. Atofina supplemented its initial submission only on 26 May 2003.

In its reply to the Statement of Objections Arkema does not contest that it was the third undertaking to cooperate with the Commission (after Degussa and EKA) but claims that the evidence it submitted to the Commission was of a higher added
value than the one produced by EKA, in terms of both quantity and quality, justifying a reduction of fine by 50%.

(512) The Commission rejects Arkema’s claim. Pursuant to the Leniency Notice (points 21 and 22), in order to get a reduction in fines an undertaking must provide the Commission with evidence of the suspected infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession. It is clear from point 23 of the Leniency Notice that the time of the submission of any submission that meets the threshold of significant added value is determinate for the band of reduction. The evidence submitted is compared with the evidence already in Commission’s possession at the time such evidence is provided. Therefore, in order to establish whether this submission represents significant added value, only the elements already in the Commission’s file and the evidence provided by the applicant are taken into account. The Commission has already explained that it considers that the submission of EKA of 29 March 2003, together with the corporate statement of 31 March 2003, met the threshold of significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, as set out in point 21 of the Leniency Notice. This results in EKA being placed in the first band pursuant to point 23 of the Leniency Notice. This means that the value of Atofina’s submissions can only be relevant for establishing a possible level of reduction within the subsequent band.

(513) In the assessment of the level of reduction within the band of 20-30%, the Commission takes into account the time at which the evidence of significant added value was submitted and the extent to which it represents such value. It may also take into account the extent and continuity of any cooperation after the submission. As to the timing of Atofina’s submissions, the first submission by Atofina containing significant added value occurred on 3 April 2003, only one week after the inspections had taken place. However, additional explanations and new documents were not provided until 26 May 2003. The documents [Deleted] enabled the Commission to corroborate the information already provided by Degussa and are used exhaustively in the Decision.

(514) Based on the foregoing the Commission grants Arkema a 30% reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed on it.

10.4. Solvay

(515) Solvay was the third undertaking to meet the requirements of point 21 of the Leniency Notice. On 4 April 2003, also soon after its premises had been inspected under Article 14 of Regulation No 17, on 25 March 2003, Solvay submitted an application under the Leniency Notice [Deleted], which was completed during a meeting on 9 April 2003. [Deleted]. On 17 May 2004, Solvay provided the Commission with an additional statement. The meeting of 4 April 2003 took place upon Solvay's request for a meeting dated 3 April 2003. The submission on 4 April 2003 met the requirements of point 21 of the Leniency Notice, as Solvay provided the Commission with evidence representing significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession. To the Commission’s
knowledge, Solvay terminated its involvement in the infringement no later than the time at which it submitted the evidence.

(516) Solvay submits that it contacted the Commission by telephone on the morning of 3 April 2003 to inform it that Solvay wished to make an application under the Leniency Notice. Its external legal advisers confirmed this in writing the same day and requested a meeting the same day or 4 April 2003 at the latest. Solvay stated that it was only offered a meeting for 4 April 2003. At this meeting, Solvay provided the information constituting its leniency application. The application by Atofina, made on 3 April 2003 at 15:50hrs enclosed thirteen documents which, according to Solvay, were illegible and/or unintelligible without a transcript or other form of explanation, so that the Commission was unable to make use of any of these documents until a full explanation was provided, on 26 May 2003, that is to say, after Solvay’s leniency application was made.

(517) Solvay submits that, according to the wording of the Leniency Notice (points 21 and 22) and the case law of the Court of Justice (as well as decisions by the Commission such as in Austrian Banks104), a decisive factor in determining whether an application for leniency qualifies for a reduction under Section B of the Leniency Notice is the objective quality of the information submitted in terms of the extent to which it is useful to the Commission105, to be assessed as at the date it is submitted against the background of the information already in the Commission’s possession at that time.

(518) Solvay concludes that its application for leniency was properly made on the morning of 3 April 2003 and provided significant added value in relation to both HP and PBS (while Degussa would only have provided information on HP but few useful elements on PBS). Solvay also stated that EKA did not provide significant added value in relation to either HP or PBS. Furthermore, Solvay was ready to meet with the Commission on 3 April 2003, but was only offered an appointment for the following day and Atofina did not provide significant added value before 26 May 2003. Therefore the Commission was wrong in finding that Solvay ranks only fourth in the ‘leniency ranking’, since it actually was the first undertaking to provide significant added value in relation to the cartel concerning HP and PBS. It therefore qualifies, under Section B of the Leniency Notice, for the maximum reduction (50%) of any fine imposed in relation to the two products.

(519) The Commission refers to recital (512), concerning Atofina, which applies mutatis mutandis to the arguments submitted by Solvay.

104 The party quoted from the paragraph 550 of the Commission decision Austrian Banks – ‘Lombard Club’ of 11 June 2002, in OJ (2004) L 56/1, which reads as follows: “The added value is easy to determine: it is the sum of, first, any facts that were not ascertained from the inspections, or from the documents that were provided or ought to have been provided in accordance with the duty to supply information (new facts), and, second, any explanations that facilitated the Commission’s understanding of the case. Only new facts and explanations that assist better comprehension will make it easier for the Commission to establish the infringement”.

105 See judgment Tokai v Commission, paragraph 390.
The Commission has already explained that it considers that EKA’s submission of 29 March 2003, together with the corporate statement of 31 March 2003 represented significant added value with respect to the evidence in the Commission's possession, according to point 21 of the Leniency Notice. The submission of Atofina of 3 April 2003 also represented significant added value in accordance with point 21 of the Leniency Notice. The first submission by Solvay only occurred on 4 April 2003, when it submitted evidence constituting significant added value concerning an infringement in the HP and PBS industry. In particular, in relation to the claim that Solvay’s application preceded that of Atofina, it is noted that neither the telephone call of the morning of 3 April 2003 nor the fax sent at midday contained any information about the infringement.

The meeting of 4 April 2003 was scheduled in agreement with Solvay. In any case, on 3 April 2003 at 15.50hrs (that is before Solvay’s request of 17.24hrs) Atofina had already sent its leniency application by fax to the Commission.

Therefore the Commission rejects Solvay’s argument.

As already stated in recital (513), the time, scope and value of the submissions have to be taken into account when establishing the level of the reduction within the band assigned. The Commission considers that, as to the timing, the first submission by Solvay containing significant added value occurred on 4 April 2003. An additional statement was submitted on 17 May 2004. As regards the scope, the documents concern the Europe-wide cartel for both products. As regards the value, basically Solvay submitted evidence which enabled the Commission to corroborate certain of the information already provided by Degussa and Atofina and which is used widely in the present Decision.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission grants Solvay a 10% reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed on it.

10.5. Solexis

On 7 July 2003 Solexis submitted an application under the Leniency Notice including a statement by the company regarding both HP and PBS.

The Commission has examined Solexis’ submission, applying its practice of examining each submission of evidence in the chronological order in which submissions are made and evaluating for each submission whether it, together with the value accorded to any previous submissions by the same applicant, constitutes significant added value within the meaning of point 21 of the Leniency Notice. Based on these criteria the Commission has concluded that the evidence submitted by Solexis does not represent significant added value within the meaning of the Leniency Notice. This is because Solexis' submission of 7 July 2003 merely included for the time period 1997 until 1999 information [Deleted] already known to the Commission prior to Solexis’ leniency application.
10.6. Kemira

(527) On 18 September 2003 Kemira submitted an application under the Leniency Notice for HP regarding sales in Northern Europe including a corporate statement with 11 annexes.

(528) The Commission has examined Kemira’s submission, applying its practice of examining each submission of evidence in the chronological order in which submissions have been made and evaluating for each submission whether it, together with the value accorded to any previous submissions by the same applicant, constitutes significant added value within the meaning of point 21 of the Leniency Notice. Based on these criteria the Commission has concluded that the evidence submitted by Kemira did not represent significant added value within the meaning of the Leniency Notice. The information from Kemira only relates to a small part of the market whilst the investigation of the Commission covers the EEA-market. Furthermore the facts provided by Kemira were already known to the Commission prior to Kemira’s leniency application.

10.7. Conclusion on the application of the 2002 Leniency Notice

(529) In conclusion, Degussa, EKA, Arkema and Solvay should be granted the following reductions of the fines that would otherwise have been imposed on them:

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<tr>
<td>- Degussa</td>
<td>immunity</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Akzo Nobel / Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding / EKA Chemicals</td>
<td>40 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Total / Elf Aquitaine / Atofina (now Arkema)</td>
<td>30 %</td>
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<td>- Solvay</td>
<td>10 %</td>
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11. The Amounts of the Fines Imposed in this Proceeding

(530) The fines to be imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 should therefore be as follows:

(a) Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB and EKA Chemicals AB, jointly and severally: EUR 25.2 million;

(b) Degussa AG: EUR 0;

(c) Edison SpA: EUR 58.125 million, of which EUR 25.619 million jointly and severally with Solvay Solexis SpA;

(d) FMC Corporation and FMC Foret S.A., jointly and severally: EUR 25 million;

(e) Kemira OYJ: EUR 33 million;
(f) L’Air Liquide SA and Chemoxal SA: EUR 0;

(g) Snia SpA and Caffaro Srl, jointly and severally: EUR 1.078 million;

(h) Solvay SA/NV: EUR 167.062 million;

(i) Arkema SA: EUR 78.663 million, of which EUR 42 million jointly and severally with Total SA and EUR 65.1 million jointly and severally with Elf Aquitaine SA.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following undertakings have infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement by participating, for the periods indicated, in a single and continuous infringement regarding hydrogen peroxide and sodium perborate, covering the whole EEA territory, which consisted mainly of exchanges between competitors of information on prices and sales volumes, agreements on prices, agreements on reduction of production capacity in the EEA and monitoring of the anti-competitive arrangements:

(a) Akzo Nobel NV, from 25 February 1994 until 31 December 1999;
(b) Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB, from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 1999;
(c) EKA Chemicals AB, from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 1999;
(d) Degussa AG, from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 2000;
(e) Edison SpA, from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000;
(f) FMC Corporation, from 29 May 1997 until 13 December 1999;
(g) FMC Foret S.A., from 29 May 1997 until 13 December 1999;
(h) Kemira OYJ, from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 2000;
(i) L’Air Liquide SA, from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 1997;
(j) Chemoxal SA, from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 1997;
(k) Snia SpA, from 29 May 1997 until 31 December 1998;
(l) Caffaro Srl, from 29 May 1997 until 31 December 1998;
(m) Solvay SA/NV, from 31 January 1994 until 31 December 2000;
(n) Solvay Solexis SpA, from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000;
(o) Total SA, from 30 April 2000 until 31 December 2000;
(p) Elf Aquitaine SA, from 12 May 1995 until 31 December 2000;

Article 2

For the infringements referred to in Article 1, the following fines are imposed:
(a) Akzo Nobel NV, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Holding AB and EKA Chemicals AB, jointly and severally: EUR 25.2 million;

(b) Degussa AG: EUR 0;

(c) Edison SpA: EUR 58.125 million, of which EUR 25.619 million jointly and severally with Solvay Solexis SpA;

(d) FMC Corporation and FMC Foret S.A., jointly and severally: EUR 25 million;

(e) Kemira OYJ: EUR 33 million;

(f) L’Air Liquide SA and Chemoxal SA: EUR 0;

(g) Snia SpA and Caffaro Srl, jointly and severally: EUR 1.078 million;

(h) Solvay SA/NV: EUR 167.062 million;

(i) Arkema SA: EUR 78.663 million, of which EUR 42 million jointly and severally with Total SA and EUR 65.1 million jointly and severally with Elf Aquitaine SA.

The fines shall be paid in Euros, within three months of the date of the notification of this Decision, to the following account:

Account N°

375-1017300-43 of the European Commission with:

ING - Agence Bruxelles-Européenne, Rond-Point Schuman, 5 B-1040 Brussels

(Code SWIFT BBRUBEBB – Code IBAN BE66 3751 0173 0043)

After expiry of that period, interest shall automatically be payable at the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations on the first day of the month in which this Decision is adopted, plus 3.5 percentage points.

Article 3

The undertakings listed in Article 1 shall immediately bring to an end the infringements referred to in that Article, in so far as they have not already done so.

They shall refrain from repeating any act or conduct described in Article 1, and from any act or conduct having the same or similar object or effect.
Article 4

This Decision is addressed to:

AKZO NOBEL NV
Velperweg 76
NL - 6824 BM ARNHEM

AKZO NOBEL CHEMICALS HOLDING AB
P.O. BOX 11500
SE – 10061 STOCKHOLM

ARKEMA SA
4-8, cours Michelet
F – 92800 PUTEAUX

CAFFARO Srl
Via Borgonuovo, 14
I – 20121 MILANO

CHEMOXAL SA
75, Quai d’Orsay
F – 75007 PARIS

DEGUSSA AG
Bennigsenplatz, 1
D - 40474 DÜSSELDORF

EDISON Spa
Foro Buonaparte, 31
I – 20121 MILANO

EKA CHEMICALS AB
SE – 44580 BOHUS

ELF AQUITaine SA
2, place de la Coupole
La Défense 6
F – 92078 Paris La Défense Cedex

FMC Corporation
1735 Market Street
US – PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103

FMC Foret SA
Plaza Xavier Cugat, 2 - Edificio C, planta 3
Parque de Oficinas Sant Cugat Nord
E - 08174 SANT CUGAT DEL VALLÉS (BARCELONA)

KEMIRA OYJ
Porkkalankatu, 3 - P.O. Box 330
FIN - 00101 HELSINKI
This Decision shall be enforceable pursuant to Article 256 of the Treaty and Article 110 of the EEA Agreement.

Done at Brussels, 03.05.2006

For the Commission

Neelie Kroes
Member of the Commission