"A Dominant-Strategy Asset Market Mechanism," joint with Simon Loertscher, Games and Economic Behavior 120, 1-15 (2020).
"Merger Review with Intermediate Buyer Power," joint with Simon Loertscher, International Journal of Industrial Organization 67 (2019).
"Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power," joint with Simon Loertscher, Journal of Political Economy 127(9), 2967-3017 (2019). paper . online appendix . supplemental appendix: results for the asymmetric setup
"Mix-and-Match Divestitures and Merger Harm," joint with Simon Loertscher, Japanese Economic Review 70(3), 346-366 (2019).
"Two-Sided Allocation Problems, Decomposability, and the Impossibility of Efficient Trade," joint with David Delacrétaz, Simon Loertscher, and Tom Wilkening, Journal of Economic Theory 179, 416–454 (2019).
"A Tussle Over Royalties: Pandora v. ASCAP, Pandora v. BMI, and the DOJ's Consent Decree Review," joint with Keith Waehrer, in The Antitrust Revolution, Seventh Edition, edited by John E. Kwoka, Jr., and Lawrence J. White, Oxford University Press, Chapter 10 (2018).
"Auctions with Bid Credits and Resale," joint with Simon Loertscher, International Journal of Industrial Organization 55, 58–90 (2017).
."Club Good Intermediaries," joint with Simon Loertscher, International Journal of Industrial Organization 50, 430–459 (2017).
"Defending Against Potential Collusion by Your Suppliers---26th Colin Clark Memorial Lecture," Economic Analysis and Policy 53, 23–128 (2017).
"Buyer Resistance for Cartel versus
Merger," joint with Vikram Kumar, Robert C. Marshall, and Lily Samkharadze, International Journal of Industrial Organization 39, 71–80 (2015).
"A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers," joint with
Simon Loertscher and Tom Wilkening, Journal of Economic Literature 53(4), 857–897 (2015). Reprinted in Recent Developments in the Economics of Information, edited by Cristiano Antonelli, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 342, Chapter 29 (2018).
"Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders," joint with Claudio Mezzetti and Robert C. Marshall, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7(3), 205-240 (2015).
"Leniency, Profiling and Reverse Profiling: Strategic Challenges for Competition Authorities," joint with Claudio Mezzetti, in C Beaton-Wells and C Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion, Hart Publishing, 107-122 (2015).
"Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly," joint with Edward J. Green and Robert C. Marshall, in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol eds., Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 2, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 464–497 (2015).
"Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms," joint with Claudio Mezzetti, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2(2), 305-332 (2014); winner of Best Economics Article - 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards.
"What Next? Cartel Strategy After Getting Caught," joint with Robert C. Marshall and Claudio Mezzetti, forthcoming in Competition Law and Economics: Beyond Monopoly Regulation, East-West Center and Korea Development Institute Monograph Series, Edward Elgar.
"An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating
(Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses," joint with Simon Loertscher, Review of Industrial Organization 45(3), 245-273 (2014).
"Economics and the Efficient Allocation
of Spectrum Licenses," joint with Simon Loertscher, in Tansu
Alpcan, Holger Boche, Michael L. Honig, and H. Vincent Poor eds., Mechanisms
and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Access, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
"The Economics of Auctions and Bidder
Collusion," joint with Robert C. Marshall and Michael J. Meurer, in Kalyan Chatterjee and William F. Samuelson eds., Game Theory and
Business Applications, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2014).
"Section 1 Sherman Act: Compliance from an Economic Perspective," joint with Robert C. Marshall, in Nicolas Charbit and Elisa Ramundo eds., William E. Kovacic: An Antitrust Tribute Liber Amicorum - Volume II, Institute of Competition Law (2014). Reprinted in Concurrences 1 (2016).
The Economics of Collusion: Cartels
and Bidding Rings, joint with
Robert C. Marshall, published by MIT Press (2012).
MIT Press Website
John Asker, New York University, Concurrences 2, 2013
Don Klawiter, SheppardMullen, Competition Law International 9(1), April 2013
William E. Kovacic, George Washington University, The Antitrust Source, December 2012
John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University and University of Adelaide, Journal of Economic Literature 50, December 2012
Excerpt in European Financial Review, August/September 2012
"Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust
Law," joint with William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Halbert
L. White, Michigan Law Review 110(3), 393-436 (2011). Winner of the Tenth Annual Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award given for the best antitrust writing during the prior year.
"Bidder Collusion at First-Price
Auctions," joint with Giuseppe Lopomo and Peng Sun, Review of Economic
Design 15(3), 177-311 (2011).
"Coordinated Effects in the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines," joint with Wayne-Roy Gayle, Robert
C. Marshall, and Jean Francois Richard, Review of Industrial Organization
39(1), 39-56 (2011).
"Carbon Allowance Auction Design:
An Assessment of Options for the U.S.," joint with Giuseppe Lopomo,
David McAdams, and Brian Murray, Review of Environmental Economics and
Policy 5(1), 25-43 (2011).
"The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions,"
joint with Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo, American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics 3(2), 165-193 (2011).
"Break-Up Fees and Bargaining Power in Sequential Contracting," joint with Greg Shaffer, International Journal of
Industrial Organization 28, 451-463 (2010).
"Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf
Space," joint with Greg Shaffer, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 19(3), 575-603 (2010).
"Individual Accountability in Teams with Adverse
Selection," joint with Francesco Squintani, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 72, 260-273 (2009). Working paper version:
"Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated
Effects," joint with William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Steven
P. Schulenberg, Antitrust Law Journal 76(2), 397-430 (2009).
"Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms:
Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct," joint with
Randall D. Heeb, William E. Kovacic, and Robert C. Marshall, Chicago
Journal of International Law 10(1), 213-231 (2009). Online Appendix
"The Vulnerability of Auctions to
Bidder Collusion," joint with Robert C. Marshall, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 124(2), 883-910 (2009). Online appendix: appendix.pdf
"The 'Google Effect' in the FCC's
700 MHz Auction" (with Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo), Information
Economics and Policy 21, 101114 (2009).
"Cartel Price Announcements: The Vitamins Industry,"
joint with Robert C. Marshall and Matthew E. Raiff, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 26, 762802 (2008).
"Rent Shifting and the Order of Negotiations,"
joint with Greg Shaffer, International Journal of Industrial Organization
25, 1109-1125 (2007).
"Upfront Payments and Exclusion in
Downstream Markets," joint with Greg Shaffer, RAND Journal of Economics
38, 823-843 (2007).
"Bidder Collusion," joint with Robert C. Marshall,
Journal of Economic Theory 133, 374-402 (2007).
"Lessons for Competition Policy from
the Vitamins Cartel," joint with William Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall,
and Matthew E. Raiff, in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Volume
282, Contributions to Economic Analysis Series, edited by Vivek Ghosal
and Johan Stennek, Elsevier, Chapter 6, 149-176 (2007).
"Exploring Relations Between Decision Analysis and
Game Theory," joint with Jules van Binsbergen, Decision Analysis
4, 32-40 (2007).
"Coordinated Effects in Merger Review:
Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion," joint with William E. Kovacic,
Robert C. Marshall, and Steven P. Schulenberg, Annual Proceedings of
the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law &
Policy, edited by Barry E. Hawk (Juris Publishing, Inc.), Chapter 13,
"Economics at the Federal Communications Commission,"
Review of Industrial Organization 29, 349-368 (2006).
"Bidding Rings and the Design of
Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements," joint with
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, and Matthew E. Raiff, in Handbook
of Procurement, edited by N. Dimitri, G. Piga and G. Spagnolo, Cambridge
University Press, Chapter 15, 381-411 (2006). Chapter15 Link
"Inefficiency of Collusion at English
Auctions," joint with Giuseppe Lopomo and Robert C. Marshall, Contributions
in Theoretical Economics 5 (1), Article 4 (2005). Available
"Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical
Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment,"
joint with Greg Shaffer, American Economic Review 94, 796-801 (2004).
"Opportunism and Menus of Two-Part
Tariffs," joint with Greg Shaffer, International Journal of Industrial
Organization 22, 1399-1414 (2004).
"Adverse Specialization," joint
with Glenn M. MacDonald, Journal of Political Economy 109, 864-899
"Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to
a Public Project," joint with Steven A. Matthews, Review of Economic
Studies 67, 327-358 (2000).
"Predatory Accommodation: Below-Cost
Pricing Without Exclusion in Intermediate Goods Markets," joint with
Greg Shaffer, RAND Journal of Economics 30, 22-43 (1999).
"Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak
Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior 26, 2, 253-278 (1999).
"Payments for Order Flow on NASDAQ,"
joint with Eugene Kandel, Journal of Finance 54, 1, 35-66 (1999).
"Odd-Eighth Avoidance as a Defense
Against SOES Bandits," joint with Eugene Kandel, Journal of Financial
Economics 51, 85-102 (1999).
"The Effects of Transaction Costs
on Stock Prices and Trading Volume," joint with Michael J. Barclay
and Eugene Kandel, Journal of Financial Intermediation 7, 130-150
"Efficient Venture Capital Financing
Combining Debt and Equity," Review of Economic Design 3, 371-387
(1998); Winner of the Koc University Prize for the Best Paper of the Year
in Review of Economic Design.
"Nasdaq Market Structure and Spread
Patterns," joint with Eugene Kandel, Journal of Financial Economics
45, 35-60 (1997).
"Order Independence for Iterated
Weak Dominance," joint with Jeroen M. Swinkels, Games and Economic
Behavior 18, 219-245 (1997). "Corrigendum," GEB 31,