100 Fuqua Drive Office W315 Durham, NC 27708 p. 919.660.7927 firstname.lastname@example.org
|2008 - 2013||Columbia Business School, New York, NY|
|Ph.D. in Decision, Risk and Operations|
|2001 - 2007||Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ingenieria, Argentina|
|Bachelor and Master degrees in Industrial Engineering|
Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Non-Commitment
- In preparation
Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design
- Management Science (forthcoming)
- Approximation Result: Technical Report
- Conference Version: Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, Philadelphia, PA, 2013.
Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
- Management Science (Dec, 2014)
- Electronic Companion
- Data files
- Conference Version: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, San Jose, CA, 2011.
The Cost of Moral hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem
- Working Paper
- Conference Version: Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE'10), Stanford, CA, 2010.